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Abstract
The thesis is composed of three essays on mergers and acquisitions: deal
initiation and insider trading. Specically, it tries to gure out the reasons
and managers' motivation concerning M&A deal initiation as well as analyze
insiders' trades in target and acquiring rms both before and after the takeover
public announcement date.
Chapter 2 shows that target versus bidder initiated deals dier in two
main respects. First, target initiated deals have higher insider and CEO own-
ership that motivates the management to engage in the sale. Second, target
initiated rms are more levered and seem to have higher growth options. This
suggests that an important motivation behind the board's decision to initiate
a sale of their rm is to preserve growth options in a situation with potential
nancial distress. A complementary analysis shows larger dierences between
deal versus non-deal rms that remain publicly listed.
In Chapter 3, we nd that target insiders stop selling during 6 months
immediately before the public announcement but do not stop selling in the
early pre-announcement period. Moreover, we show that target insiders are
stronger net buyers before the public announcement in informal sales, cash and
nancial deals. Furthermore, target insiders in stock deals do not stop selling
even immediately before the public announcement, which supports the bidder
overvaluation hypothesis. In addition, we nd that target insiders change their
trading patterns after the deal public announcement. Insiders are stronger net
buyers in target initiated deals, formal auctions and cash deals.
Chapter 4 shows that, overall, acquirer insiders decrease their purchases
and sales to same extent during the 2 months immediately before the public
announcement. Concerning deal characteristics, we show that acquirer insiders
are stronger net buyers both before and after the announcement date in stock
deals relatively to cash deals and in informal sales relatively to formal auctions.
The two factors reinforcing each other. For informal sales, acquirer insiders
are stronger net buyers in stock deals before the public announcement but
change to cash deals after the public announcement.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Merger and acquisition is one of the most important corporate decisions. Re-
cently, the initiation of a takeover has been emphasized by the academic.
Furthermore, insiders in both target as well as acquiring rms might trade on
the private information that they possess. Therefore, the thesis is composed of
three essays on M&A deals and insiders' trades. Chapter 2 is to explore why
publicly listed rms actively seek to sell themselves and whether managers of
the selling rms are incentivized for the sale. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the
eects of deal characteristics on insider trading before and and after M&A
public announcement date in target and acquiring rms, respectively.
The M&A literature so far implicitly or explicitly assumes that reasons
for acquisitions are usually rooted outside of target rms. Indeed, the market
for corporate control as suggested by Jensen and Ruback (1983) is built on
a premise of management resistance to takeovers. Other reasons for mergers
and acquisitions that consider some kind of synergies, like economies of scale
or integration, complementarity of resources or diversication, also implicitly
assume initiative on the side of the acquirer (Andrade et al., 2001). In contrast
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to this assumption, a large fraction of takeovers are voluntarily imposed by
target rms themselves. Still, evidence concerning potential reasons for target
rms initiating their own sale or incentives of their managers is so far limited
in the literature.
In Chapter 2, we show that target versus bidder initiated M&A deals
dier in two main respects. First, target initiated deals have higher insider and
CEO ownership that motivates the management to engage in the sale. Second,
target initiated rms are more levered and seem to have higher growth options.
This suggests that an important motivation behind the board's decision to
initiate a sale of their rm is to preserve growth options in a situation with
potential nancial distress. A complementary analysis, comparing the group
of deal rms (together target and bidder initiated rms) to other non-deal
rms that remained publicly listed, shows that the dierences between deal
versus non-deal rms are much larger relatively to the dierences within the
deal rms based on deal initiation.
Insider trading on material information has always been a hotly debated
topic both in popular press as well as in the academic literature. Insider
trading regulation in the US is one of the most restrictive and eective around
the world.
The fact that public takeover announcements are associated with a
strong positive market reaction for target companies is a direct evidence of
the eectiveness of insider trading restrictions before public releases of ma-
terial information. In contrast, Bhattacharya et al. (2000) show no unusual
returns or return volatility around takeover announcements for target compa-
nies in Mexico arguing that unrestricted insider trading causes prices to fully
incorporate the material information before its public release. Acquiring rms
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are, however, associated with small positive or even insignicant announce-
ment stock abnormal returns.1 This might rather suggest the ineectiveness
of insider trading regulations or the market's perception of low synergies.
Chapter 3 documents that target insiders stop selling during 6 months
immediately before the public announcement but do not stop selling in the
early pre-announcement period. Moreover, we conjecture that insider trading
activity in target rms before and after the public announcement depends on
deal characteristics, such as the deal initiation, the selling mechanism, method
of payment and buyer type. We conrm our hypotheses using a dierence in
dierences approach, which controls for insider trading within the same target
rm outside of the treatment period and at the same time for change in insider
trading in matched rms. We show that insiders are stronger net buyers before
the public announcement in target rms that are sold through informal sales,
in target rms that are paid for in cash and in target rms that are acquired
by nancial buyers. Furthermore, target insiders in stock deals do not stop
selling even immediately before the public announcement, which supports the
bidder overvaluation hypothesis.
Chapter 3 also shows that target insiders change their trading patterns
after the deal public announcement. Their intention to stop buying is even
stronger across all deals and so dierences across deal characteristics stem
solely due to dierences in insider sales. Insiders are stronger net buyers in
target initiated deals, formal auctions and cash deals suggesting that target
insiders are willing to adjust their trading after the public announcement and
bet on certainty of deal completion rather than increased deal value.
1See Lorderer and Martin (1990), Moeller et al. (2004), Bradley and Sundaram (2006),
Moeller et al. (2007), and Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) for detailed results.
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Chapter 4 suggests that acquirer insiders may take advantage of the
information of a potential takeover and at the same time, take into account
their legal jeopardy. Using a dierence in dierences approach, we show that,
overall, insiders decrease their purchases and sales to same extent during the 2
months immediately before the public announcement and do not change their
trading patterns in the early pre-announcement and the post-announcement
periods. Moreover, insider trading patterns around the public announcement
should reveal insiders' perception of deal benets for the acquiring rm, and
could potentially depend on the deal initiation, selling mechanism and method
of payment. Informal sales are usually private value deals that are associated
with higher future synergies (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2013). In contrast, full-
scale auctions might be more risky and costly for acquirers as tougher bidding
competition might result in higher prices and lower probability of winning.
Cash deals are on average associated with higher announcement abnormal
returns, but at the same time, they might be costly for acquirers as they
commit to a xed price and do not have the advantage of target insiders sharing
the overpayment cost. Furthermore, acquirer insiders are often overcondent
about synergies of the deals.
In Chapter 4, we show that acquirer insiders are stronger net buyers
both before and after the announcement date in stock deals relatively to cash
deals and when acquirers engage in buying their targets through less formal
selling mechanisms rather than full-scale auctions. The two factors reinforcing
each other. For informal sales, insiders are stronger net buyers in stock deals
before the public announcement but change to cash deals after the public
announcement. It seems that insiders are more optimistic in private value
rms that exhibit higher future synergies relatively to market's perception
4
and at the same time are associated with lower overpayment cost.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the ndings in the thesis and discusses
future research.
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Chapter 2
M&A Deal Initiation and
Managerial Motivation
2.1 Introduction
The main aim of this chapter is to explore why publicly listed rms actively
seek to sell themselves and whether managers of the selling rms are incen-
tivized for the sale. The M&A literature so far implicitly or explicitly assumes
that reasons for acquisitions are usually rooted outside of target rms. Indeed,
the market for corporate control as suggested by Jensen and Ruback (1983) is
built on a premise of management resistance to takeovers. Other reasons for
mergers and acquisitions that consider some kind of synergies, like economies
of scale or integration, complementarity of resources or diversication, also
implicitly assume initiative on the side of the acquirer (Andrade et al., 2001).
In contrast to this assumption, a large fraction of takeovers are voluntarily
imposed by target rms themselves. For example, Boone and Mulherin (2007)
report that 15% of the large M&A transactions in their sample are initiated
6
by the target company. Heitzman (2011) reports a fraction of 35%, while the
fraction gets as high as 44% in our data set that covers also relatively small
rms. Still, evidence concerning potential reasons for target rms initiating
their own sale or incentives of their managers is so far limited in the literature.
Initiation of a takeover contest is an important corporate decision. If
the board of directors decides to initiate a sale, they should do so in line with
their duciary duties to maximize shareholder value. As organizing a company
sale is complicated and expensive, alternative internal solutions that would be
signicantly simpler and cheaper should be considered before the company is
oered for sale. Assuming that a sale is an optimal decision, the high cost
of organizing it implies that deal initiation is associated with specic rm
circumstances and substantial benets for rm's shareholders.
At the same time, even though takeover oers are usually value enhanc-
ing for target shareholders, they might not be in line with the target managers'
interests. As a result of a takeover, target rm CEOs may be giving up sub-
stantial expected utility from both future wages (in case they are not retained)
and the lost ability to extract private benets from the rm (Hartzell et al.,
2004).1 In line with the target CEOs' expected losses associated with a po-
tential takeover, previous literature shows that rms with higher managerial
ownership are less likely to be acquired (Mikkelson and Partch, 1989; Had-
lock et al., 1999). Also, Jenter and Lewellen (2015) show that rms with
CEOs in retirement age are more likely to be taken over suggesting that tar-
get CEOs seem to resist change in control transactions. Therefore, it might
be in target shareholders' interests that their CEOs are compensated for the
1Fich et al. (2011) estimate that the average lost remuneration to CEOs due to takeovers
is $35 million.
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losses suered in takeovers and then do not resist transactions that enhance
shareholder value. We conjecture that in deals where the board of directors
decides for a sale, CEOs are more motivated for the deal relatively to bidder
initiated deals. Insiders with the right incentives are more likely to agree with
their company sale and perhaps are also more likely to actively participate in
the selling process.
Previous literature, not distinguishing between target versus bidder ini-
tiated deals, shows that in the period after deal initiation target CEOs get
unscheduled option grants (Fich et al., 2011) and extra cash payments in the
form of merger bonuses or increased golden parachutes (Hartzell et al., 2004;
Heitzman, 2011; Fich et al., 2015). These papers argue that the extra CEO
remuneration and/or golden parachutes just before the public deal announce-
ment are associated with higher probability of deal completion and compensate
CEOs for their earnings and private benets lost as a result of the acquisition.
Even though these results are consistent with CEOs being motivated to ac-
tively participate in takeover negotiations, it is also possible that CEOs are
only being bribed not to resist the takeover. Corporate governance conse-
quences of the two alternatives are, however, critical. The former would sug-
gest a positive side to golden parachutes and executive remuneration around
change in control transactions versus the latter would suggest overpayment
and opportunism of entrenched managers. We explore the two alternatives
in the context of deal initiation with a conjecture that target initiated deals
would tend to induce active CEO participation in takeover negotiations. If
a rm is intending to sell, it might also want to have its managers prepared
and motivated for takeover negotiations, especially in case the managers are
expected to be pivotal in such negotiations. For targets that are approached
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by a prospective bidder such an option is not available.2
A strong counterargument against a conjecture that rms initiate their
own sale to maximize shareholder value is that, ultimately, the initiation de-
cision does not matter. It is not a rst-order question. In other words, a rm
ultimately gets an oer from an interested bidder without initiating its own
sale. Moreover, due to management and director duciary duties, the board
has to seriously consider every oer. Eventually, the rm is sold regardless
of initiation and so the initiation decision itself does not increase shareholder
value as it would increase eventually anyway. This `irrelevance' conteragument,
however, assumes that (i) interested bidders are able to identify potential tar-
gets that t their requirements and create merger synergies and (ii) no value
is lost while a target is waiting for a potential bidder to become interested in
buying it. Information asymmetry between bidders and potential target rms
might make the searching process less eective and longer. In case value cre-
ated in a takeover depends on exact timing of the deal and on rm attributes
prone to be concealed from public scrutiny, active deal initiation might play
a crucial role. Therefore, we conjecture that in a situation where insiders
have strictly better information about suitability of their rm for sale and
where the cost (potential loss) associated with waiting for a suitable bidder is
high, deal initiation should matter because it marginally increases shareholder
value. Private information about specic rm circumstances and appropriate
timing of the deal makes a signicant dierence in terms of shareholder value
2We are not able to determine causality of the relationship between CEO ownership,
choice of a selling mechanism and target initiation. It is also possible that a rm with
high CEO ownership (or golden parachutes) is more likely to prompt a sale once a suit-
able situation arises. Then the rm would tend to opt for informal sale associated with
higher premium as the CEO is motivated to represent shareholders' interests in takeover
negotiations.
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enhancement in favor of deal initiation.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. In order to test the irrelevance hy-
pothesis that deal initiation does not matter for a rm to be sold, we compare
all rms with a successful takeover oer to other comparable rms that remain
publicly listed and consider all potential reasons associated with the odds of a
takeover provided in the literature. The irrelevance hypothesis predicts that
the deal rms are dierent from other rms that remained publicly listed in
a similar way and do not dier from each other based on who initiates the
deal. A logistic regression estimating the factors associated with the odds of
a takeover versus staying publicly listed would reveal the common character-
istics of all deal rms together. As our main research question, however, we
model the initiation decision to reveal those factors that do dier between tar-
get versus bidder initiated deals. Our conjecture is that even though common
factors prevail, the diering factors are still important and depend on man-
agerial motivation for the deal, information advantage of targets' insiders and
right timing of the deal.
The existing literature suggests several potential candidates associated
with the likelihood of a successful takeover deal. We group them into four
categories. First, Jenter and Lewellen (2015) suggest that CEO age and cor-
porate governance characteristics aect the likelihood of takeovers. Related
are also ownership and takeover defence characteristics suggested by Ambrose
and Megginson (1992). We also consider managerial motivation in form of
higher golden parachutes and stock and option grants during negotiations
that increases the odds of takeover completion (Hartzell et al., 2004; Fich
et al., 2011). Second, recent literature highlights the importance of indus-
try competition and complementarity of resources (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010;
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Hoberg et al., 2014) that extends older evidence on importance of economic
disturbances within industries (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). The third group
focusses on target rm stock and operating performance and asset characteris-
tics (Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Edmans et al., 2012; Bena
and Li, 2014). Finally, the fourth group highlights nancial constraints and
debt overhang in deal rms as a special case (Erel et al., 2015; Khatami et al.,
2015; Almeida et al., 2011a), though it could be considered within the third
set of factors. We discuss debt overhang separately because it relates to our
information advantage hypotheses that conjectures dierences between target
versus bidder initiated rms.
We work with a sample of 1098 US publicly listed targets over the
period from 2005 to 2011 from which 487 are target initiated and 611 are
bidder initiated. The acquiring rms are both public and private. To form a
counterfactual, we match all deal rms with publicly listed rms that remain
publicly listed based on industry, year and size (total assets).3 Our results
show that, in general, target and bidder initiated deal rms are quite alike.
They dier in similar ways to other rms that remain publicly listed. They
have CEOs that are more likely to be in the retirement age, they have large
monitoring blockholders and are younger. They also have less independent
and larger boards. They operate in industries with higher takeover liquidity,
higher competition and are less likely to be similar to other rms in their
3We decide for matching rather than including all publicly listed rms due to our analysis
relying on hand-collected data concerning CEO and corporate governance characteristics
that are not available in usual electronic data sets for smaller rms. As the initiation
decision concerns smaller rms, we consider as essential to hand collect the key variables
and keep the smaller rms in the sample. Palepu (1986) argues that any analysis based
on matched samples should result in the right relative ranking of rms in terms of their
acquisition probabilities. As we are not per se interested in forecasting the odds of takeovers
out of sample, our conclusions based on relative ranks of the outcomes should not lead to
erroneous inferences even when based on matched counterfactuals.
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industry. They are also more likely to acquire other rms and divest assets
in the recent past. In terms of rm performance and asset structure, stock
performance decreases the odds of becoming a successful takeover target while
operating performance increases the odds. It seems that the takeover targets
are undervalued, but still have growth options and suer lower free cash ow.
In contrast to all these signicant dierences between deal rms as a
group relatively to other rms that remain publicly listed, our results show
that the only factors that signicantly dierentiate target from bidder initiated
deals are associated with leverage and managerial motivation for the deal.
Target initiated deals suer higher leverage and, at the same time, exhibit
higher growth options. This suggests that deal initiation is associated with
higher possible future nancial distress and due to preserved growth options
it is optimal for the rm to be sold as a going concern. This situation involves
private information on the side of the target rm management concerning the
growth options, which are not easily identied by outside bidders. Exact and
prompt timing is also very important as growth options might loose value over
time. These results are in line with our asymmetric advantage hypothesis and
suggest that the decision to initiate a sale improves shareholders' value and is
not a second-order issue. By initiating, the board prevents potential nancial
distress and associated destruction of growth options.
The second important dierence between target versus bidder initiated
deal rms stems from incentives for the deal. In line with our incentive hypoth-
esis we show that target rms that initiate their sale themselves exhibit higher
executive and insider ownership, which is complemented by golden parachutes
in case CEO ownership is low. In order to distinguish managerial motivation
for a deal in form of active participation in deal negotiations versus plain brib-
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ing for low deal resistance, we exploit procedural dierences between formal
full-scale auctions versus less formal sales. In particular, full-scale auctions rep-
resent a way to sell rms that is very formalized, pre-determined and xed and
does not allow much scope for inuencing sale outcomes (Hansen, 2001). In
contrast, private negotiations and controlled sales are less structured and more
ad hoc with takeover negotiations being at the core of the process and having
huge impact on deal outcomes. Skilful and motivated negotiators probably
have signicant eect on the deal success and takeover premium. Therefore,
we argue that rms opting for formal full-scale auctions would not prot much
from higher managerial incentives, while higher CEO ownership and golden
parachutes might be quite important in motivating active participation in deal
negotiations that would eventually lead to better deal outcomes in case rms
are sold in private negotiations or controlled sales. Alternatively, higher CEO
ownership in controlled auctions would suggest wasting high remuneration
in a situation when the outcome is already determined and cannot be much
changed. Our results show that the odds of target initiation are higher for
rms with higher CEO ownership or golden parachutes exactly only in infor-
mal sales. In formal full-scale auctions, CEO ownership or golden parachutes
do not dier between target versus bidder initiated deals. Our results seem to
suggest alignment between CEO incentives and active participation in negoti-
ations in target initiated deals.
Our analysis extends the recent empirical literature that shows that
deal initiation is an important aspect of the takeover process aecting the
deal premium, selling procedure and also deal success probability (Masulis and
Simsir, 2015; Xie, 2010; Aktas et al., 2010; DeBodt et al., 2014; Fidrmuc et al.,
2012b). Masulis and Simsir (2015) show that target deal initiation is associated
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with lower announcement abnormal returns and link this nding to information
asymmetries concerning the quality of target rms. Xie (2010) in turn argues
that deal initiation reveals both selling rm bargaining power but also bidder
valuations and thus buyer initiated deals result in higher premiums. Xie (2010)
also shows that target initiated deals are more often organized as auctions
whereas bidder initiated deals are most likely privately negotiated. Fidrmuc
et al. (2012b) conrm that target initiation together with high protability
is an important determinant of whether rms are sold in auctions or private
negotiations. DeBodt et al. (2014) conrm that a higher willingness to sell,
measured by target initiation, is associated with lower premium and at the
same time also increases deal success probability.
Masulis and Simsir (2015) are the closest to our analysis but with a
dierent focus. Their aim to nd an explanation for the dierences in pre-
mium between target versus bidder initiated deals. They argue that acquirers
pay lower premium for target initiated deals to be compensated for adverse
selection. Good quality target rms generally have strong incentives to avoid
selling themselves for discounted prices and so acquirers infer that target rms
initiating deals are more likely to be overvalued. As part of modeling the
takeover premium, Masulis and Simsir (2015) treat the initiation choice as the
rst stage of the model and hypothesize that target rms with nancial or
competitive weaknesses, with nancial constraints and rms in recession are
more likely to initiate their sale and then receive a smaller premium.
In contrast to Masulis and Simsir (2015), we are interested in the initi-
ation decision itself and in managerial incentives associated with the decision.
We also compare both the target and bidder initiated deal rms with other
comparable rms that remained publicly listed. Comparing the deal versus
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non-deal rms, we are able to highlight that target versus bidder initiated
deals are more alike than dierent. Nevertheless, deal rms that initiate their
sale are dierent from bidder initiated deal rms in important ways: they are
highly levered, maintain growth options and exhibit dierent CEO incentives
for a takeover deal. Our approach to initiation highlights the information
advantage on the side of target rm insiders who could enhance shareholder
value by optimally timing their rm sale. Given their high share ownership,
they are motivated to execute the sale.4
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 ex-
plains in more detail the factors associated with successful merger oers. Sec-
tion 2.3 introduces the data, explains the coding process and provides basic
statistics. Section 2.4 shows and discusses the regression results, Section 2.5
presents the robustness tests and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Merger anticipation factors
Jenter and Lewellen (2015) show that CEOs in retirement age are more will-
ing to accept takeover oers probably because their personal costs of losing
their jobs are diminished once they are in socially acceptable retirement age.
Moreover, the retirement age eect is signicantly weaker among better gov-
erned rms. This points towards agency conicts between shareholders and
target CEOs as the explanation for the retirement eect. In line with these
hypotheses, our merger anticipation regression includes a CEO retirement age
dummy and corporate governance variables, such as insider ownership, insti-
4Smaller bargaining power of rms that initiate their sale (stemming from eagerness to
preserve growth options from potential nancial distress) might eventually be associated
with smaller premium. Deals where timing is not a concern can enjoy the luxury of waiting
for a better oer. Premium analysis is, however, not the aim of this chapter.
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tutional ownership, golden parachutes, board size, board independence and
CEO/chairman duality.
Ambrose and Megginson (1992) conjecture that the likelihood of re-
ceiving a takeover bid is inversely related to the level of insider ownership.
Managers who own large equity stakes in their rms manage their rm more
in line with the outside shareholders' interests relatively to non-shareholder in-
siders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This should make the rm less vulnerable
to a takeover, since an acquirer would be less able to recoup his investment in
the acquisition by improving target rm performance. Also, insiders with high
insider ownership enjoy comfortable protection from outside bids. Therefore,
the probability of a takeover bid should decrease as bidders need to oer pre-
miums large enough to overcome insider resistance. However, in case a sale of
the rm is a good strategic alternative for the future of the rm, the board of
directors might be forced to initiate the sale (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2013).
In such a case high managerial ownership would help to mitigate managerial
resistance to the deal.
In line with the entrenchment hypothesis of Ambrose and Megginson
(1992), also lower board independence, higher anti-takeover defenses and larger
board size might entrench current management and so decrease the odds of
takeovers. Alternatively, low board independence and a large board size might
be associated with poor management and so increase the odds of takeovers as
bidder payos from takeovers increase with target rm ineciencies. Institu-
tional investors might also contribute to better governance as they seem to
provide eective corporate monitoring (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Chen et al.,
2007). At the same time, institutional investors increase the odds of takeover
bids through targeting rms with higher chances to become takeover targets
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but also through active promotion of takeovers in their portfolio rms (Gaspar
et al., 2005; Greenwood and Schor, 2009).
Takeover activity is to a large extent industry driven and, therefore,
other takeovers in the same industry are closely related to economic funda-
mentals in the industry and might increase the odds of future takeover ac-
tivity (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). Higher product uidity5 and product
competition create more unstable environment with industry peers competing
ercely in many respects (Hoberg et al., 2014). In highly competitive indus-
tries, takeovers could help to dierentiate acquirers' products relatively to their
competitors (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). Therefore, we conjecture that prod-
uct uidity and industry competition increase takeover anticipation for target
rms. In contrast, Cornett et al. (2011) (mainly referring to Gort (1969))
argue that industry concentration (low industry competition) might increase
the odds of takeovers in the industry because takeovers represent means of
survival in industries with large players or because the large players might
engage in takeovers to reduce further already high competition. In addition to
industry competition, similarity of products within a rm industry may also
aect the odds of takeovers. When a rm is similar to its local rivals and
so relative crowding of rivals around the rm is high, potential bidders have
many similar rms to choose from. Therefore, the industry product similarity
should decrease the odds of takeovers for target rms (Hoberg and Phillips,
2010).
Palepu (1986) and Ambrose and Megginson (1992) are important early
references in terms of target rm characteristics and rm asset structures af-
5Product uidity measures the changes in rm's rivals' products relative to the rm's
own products and so measures the rm's competitive product threats (Hoberg et al., 2014)
.
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fecting the odds of takeovers for target rms. They suggest management inef-
ciencies and market undervaluation as important factors aecting the odds of
takeovers. Acquirers can prot from taking over rms whose market values are
low relative to their peers, due to either mispricing or mismanagement, and
restore it back to its potential (Edmans et al., 2012). Jensen (1986) suggests
that rms with high free cash ow and no growth options have higher agency
problems and exhibit mismatch between their nancing resources and growth
options. This increases their odds of being taken over. The LBO literature
explores this hypothesis quite extensively (Lehn and Poulsen, 1989).
Synergies, asset complementarities and pursuit of technological innova-
tions are also important drivers of M&As recognized in the more recent lit-
erature (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010; Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson, 2008; Bena
and Li, 2014). Bena and Li (2014) show that small rms with high ratio of
innovations, measured both through patents and R&D expenditure, are more
likely to become takeover targets. In contrast, the inecient management hy-
pothesis suggests that rms with high growth options should have lower odds
of becoming a takeover target as high growth options suggest good rather
than poor managerial skills (Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992).
Another argument is that growth opportunities rely heavily on the human
capital of current managers and therefore rms with signicant future growth
opportunities are poor takeover candidates as outside bidders might not have
a comparative advantage in managing the growth options. In contrast, the
most optimal use of xed assets is open to interpretation. Thus, rms with a
high proportion of xed assets represent opportunities for outside bidders to
shift current asset utilization (Ambrose and Megginson, 1992).
Recent literature highlights nancial constraints as an important addi-
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tional reason for takeovers (Erel et al., 2015; Khatami et al., 2015). The main
argument is that takeovers could potentially mitigate nancial constraints for
rms that would otherwise have to forgo valuable investment opportunities.
Acquirers with internally generated cash ow or ability to raise capital exter-
nally can enable their targets to undertake an increased number of positive
net present value investments and create value.
Higher odds of future nancial distress may be considered as a special
case of nancial constraints with important extra features (Almeida et al.,
2011a). A target that is constrained but not distressed does not necessarily
face the choice between liquidation and company sale. A nancially con-
strained target has the option to withstand a liquidity shock by investing less
than what would be optimal in the absence of the shock and wait for the
access to external capital to improve. Targets with high reallocation costs
due to their specic assets might have even higher motivation to withstand a
liquidity shock rather than decide to sell. Also, the value of taking time and
waiting longer for a suitable bidder with a good match for a rm with specic
assets is high. In contrast, a rm with high leverage, which as a result of a
liquidity shock experiences increased probability of nancial distress but still
has growth options, faces dierent trade-os (Shrieves and Stevens, 1979). In
this case, waiting to withstand a liquidity shock might lead to a nancial dis-
tress with associated punitive costs. Once in nancial distress, the rm would
liquidate its distressed assets at the value that can be captured by industry
outsiders (sell for scrap). A timely sale of the assets as a going concern might
be optimal, given the alternative. A suitable buyer would be able to operate
the specic assets closer to their best/optimal value relatively to their scrap
value and so a timely sale should preserve the rm's growth options while
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potential liquidation would not.6 It might also be the case that a private eq-
uity investor would provide new fund infusion and extra monitoring and the
existing management would continue running the rm and realize the value of
growth options. Almeida et al. (2011b) argue that when future projects are
valuable and capital markets are imperfect, factors related to a rm's ability to
smooth the nancing of investment over time become valuable. For a rm with
high leverage and high growth options, prompt action minimizes the impact of
future nancial distress. Firms could initially reduce their leverage, but this
would come at a cost as they can then nance smaller amount of projects.
2.3 Data
Our sample includes US M&A deals that were announced between January
2005 and December 2011 and are covered by the Security Database Corpo-
ration (SDC) in Thomson ONE Banker. We apply the following 3 selection
criteria: (i) both the acquirers and targets are US companies; (ii) all targets
are publicly listed rms before the deal while acquirers could be publicly listed
or private rms; (iii) the acquirers own 100% of targets' shares after the deal.
We use COMPUSTAT and CRSP to collect accounting and stock price data.
Institutional ownership data come from FactSet, insider ownership and stock
and stock option grants data come from Thomson Insider Filings. Corporate
governance data and CEO characteristics come from a combination of Execu-
Comp and ISS Governance Services, formerly Risk-Metrics, (for large rms)
and Thomson Reuters Eikon and hand collection from SEC EDGAR company
lings. Industry composition data are collected from the Hoberg-Phillips Data
6This is despite the fact that some value might be lost because a bidder has to be found
relatively fast.
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Library.7
We also hand collect and code information concerning the selling process
from the `background of the deal' section of DEFM14A, PREM14A, SC14D9,
or S-4 lings, which we recover from the EGDAR ling collection provided by
the SEC. We hand collect information concerning initiation, initiation date,
selling mechanism, number of bidders contacted and the number of bidders
signing a condentiality agreement. Appendix 2.7.1 illustrates our coding sys-
tem on examples of a target (between Applebees International Inc, the target,
and IHOP Corp, the acquirer) and bidder initiated deal (between AirTran
Holdings Inc., the target, and Southwest Airlines Co., the acquirer).
The selling process is usually initiated either by the board of the selling
company deciding that they want to be sold or by a prospective bidder propos-
ing to take over the rm. We code the initiation decision based on target's
or bidders' actions as described in the SEC lings. Usually if a target rm
plans to sell, the board considers various `strategic alternatives' that include
a possible sale of the company and they hire a nancial advisor to evaluate
these strategic alternatives. We classify a deal as target initiated if the target
rm rmly decides for a sale or at least hires a nancial advisor to identify and
contact potential bidders. We classify a deal as bidder initiated, when a buyer
approaches the target rm with a takeover proposal, the board considers the
proposal and responds to the bidder. The target rm could then negotiate
with the rst bidder or contact other potential bidders to open wider competi-
tion. Whether the deal is initiated by the nal acquirer or by another bidder,
we dene the deal as bidder initiated. Over the period 2005-2011, out of 2003
7Appendix 2.7.2 provides detailed information on data sources for each particular vari-
able.
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deals identied in SDC we are able to nd SEC lings on EDGAR for 1260
deals. For 103 deals, we are not able to classify the initiator and we are not
able to get data from Compustat or CRSP for 59 targets. All together, the
hand collection results in a sample of 1098 deals, from which 487 are target
initiated and 611 are bidder initiated.
Table 2.1 shows selling process summary statistics for target versus
bidder initiated deals. Variable denitions are provided in Appendix 2.7.2. We
test for dierences in means using the t-test allowing for unequal variances and
for dierences in medians using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank sum test.
The rst variable shows that target initiated deals are signicantly smaller
(USD1.4 billion) relatively to bidder initiated deals (USD2.2 billion). In line
with the literature (Masulis and Simsir, 2015; Fidrmuc et al., 2012b) we nd
that target initiated deals earn smaller premium (27% versus 39%). Out of all
deals initiated by a potential bidder, 39% are eventually acquired by a dierent
bidder.
- insert Table 2.1 about here -
Firms could be sold in full scale auctions, controlled sales or private
negotiations (Boone and Mulherin, 2009). A full scale auction is a very struc-
tured process that follows multiple designed rounds and accommodates rela-
tively large number of bidders (Hansen, 2001). Controlled sales involve com-
petitive bidding but from a limited number of bidders. In controlled sales,
target rms discretely canvass interest from a chosen number of bidders who
then counter-bid each other (Boone and Mulherin, 2009). Private negotiations
involve only one bidder. Target initiated deals are more frequently sold in auc-
tions (50% versus 20%) and less often sold in private negotiations (14% versus
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42%). These statistics are consistent with Xie (2010).
Initiation date is the date when a target rm starts considering a po-
tential sale of its business (Boone and Mulherin, 2007). For target initiated
deals, it is usually the date when the board of directors decides that they want
to explore strategic alternatives. For bidder initiated deals, the initiation date
is established by a potential buyer directly expressing interest in buying the
target rm. Table 2.1 shows that target initiated deals take on average longer
from the initiation date to completion (595 versus 441 days) even though they
take fewer days between the public announcement to the completion. This is
the case regardless of the selling mechanism.8 It seems that companies need
more time to organize the sale when they are not prompted by a potential
(eager) buyer. Due to the fact that the private selling process is relatively
lengthy and also due to the dierence in length between target versus bidder
initiated deal rms it is important to measure all rm characteristics aecting
the initiation decision properly before the initiation date. Measuring the rm
characteristics relatively to the announcement date might result in signicant
biases.9
We also code the number of potential bidders that a target rm contacts
during the selling process and the number of bidders that a target rm signs a
condentiality agreement with. The average number of bidders contacted (30
versus 9) and signing a condentiality agreement (11 versus 4) is signicantly
higher for target initiated deals. This is the case again also when we control
for the selling process. 26% of target initiated and 23% of bidder initiated
deals are eventually bought by a private equity buyer while 35% and 29% of
8These statistics are not reported, but are available on request.
9Masulis and Simsir (2015) measure their rm characteristics relatively to the SDC an-
nouncement date and so might be subject to this bias.
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target and bidder initiated deals end up with a buyer that is not a publicly
listed company. The payment consideration is not dierent for the 2 groups of
deals. We see that majority of deals (68% and 71%) is paid for in cash while
only 12% and 10% by stock.
The main aim of the chapter is to analyze determinants of the initiation
decision. However, for comparison reasons, we are also interested in determi-
nants of successful takeovers in general - that is, of both target and bidder
initiated deals. We want to compare all the deal rms to other similar pub-
licly listed rms that at the moment are not involved in any takeover deal and
remain publicly listed. As Table 2.1 shows, target deal initiation is tilted to-
wards smaller rms. In order to avoid any unnecessary biases, it is important
that we keep as many small rms in the data set as possible. This, however,
means that we have to hand collect data for several of the determinants for
merger anticipation because CEO and corporate governance characteristics
are not available in electronic data sets for smaller rms.10 To avoid time
consuming hand-collecting of data, we decide to create our counterfactual by
matching each deal rm based on target industry, year and size (total assets)
just before the deal initiation. Palepu (1986) argues that any analysis based
on matched samples should result in the right relative ranking of rms in terms
of their acquisition probabilities. As we are not per se interested in forecasting
the odds of takeovers out of sample, our conclusions based on relative ranks
of the outcomes should not lead to erroneous inferences even when based on
matched counterfactuals as opposed to a random sample.
Size is a very important matching requirement because it strongly af-
10ISS Governance Services (formerly Risk-Metrics) covers only S&P 1500 rms, which
means that only around 15% of our target and matched rms would be covered. For smaller
rms, we hand collect data from Thomson Reuters Eikon and SEC EDGAR lings.
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fects the odds of becoming a takeover target. Small rms are more likely to
be taken over (Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Cornett et al.,
2011). Both the cost of absorbing a large rm into the acquirer's business
and that of a hostile takeover of a large rm are prohibitive. Moreover, size is
usually correlated with other determinants, like corporate governance, insider
ownership and innovation and so it is important to compare small target rms
to similarly small rms that remained publicly listed.
Our matching procedure is as follows. From the pool of all potential
matching rms with available accounting and stock price data, we pick the rm
that is in the same Fama-French 30 industry and comes the closest in terms
of total assets in the same scal year using a +/{25% range. In case we fail to
nd a matching rm, we repeat the process for the corresponding Fama-French
12 industry. If we still do not have a match, we apply the 4-digit SIC code
industry and then the 3-digit, 2-digit and nally 1-digit SIC code industry.
We also require that the same publicly listed rm is not matched repeatedly
to dierent target rms and that target rms that dropped out from our data
set due to unavailable SEC ling data are not included as matched rms.11
Firm characteristics are reported in Table 2.2. We show means sepa-
rately for matched versus deal rms (target and bidder initiated deal rms
together) in columns 2 and 3, respectively. Column 4 shows their dierence
in means and its signicance. Further, Columns 5 and 7 report the averages
for target and bidder initiated deal rms, respectively, while Columns 6 and 8
show the dierence in means relatively to their respective matched rms and
their signicance. Finally, Column 9 shows the dierence in means between
11All together, 889 target rms are matched based on FF30 industry, 162 based on FF12,
28 based on 4-digit SIC, 2 based on 3-digit SIC, 7 based on 2-digit SIC and nally 10 targets
based on 1-digit SIC.
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target versus bidder initiated deal rms. All variables are measured just before
the initiation date and are winsorized at 1% and 99%, except for all dummy
variables.
- insert Table 2.2 about here -
We see that due to our matching procedure deal versus non-deal rms
do not dier in total assets or total sales. The deal rms, however seem to be
less valuable { their market capitalization is signicantly smaller. They are
younger, but are followed by more analysts. The target and bidder initiated
deal rms are similar in size to their matched non-deal rms, but target initi-
ated deal rms are smaller relatively to bidder initiated deal rms. They are
also less valuable and followed by fewer analysts.
The rst set of characteristics that are conjectured to be associated with
deal prediction concern ownership structure, corporate governance and CEO
age. We see that deal rms have signicantly higher insider, non-executive and
institutional ownership and at the same time higher stock and stock option
grants to their CEOs before and after deal initiation. Deal rms have also
larger and less independent board of directors. Their CEOs are older and more
likely to be in the retirement age. Table 2.2 suggests that the insider ownership
dierences are mostly due to target rather than bidder initiated deal rms
having higher insider ownership. Institutional ownership is higher for both
types of deal rms relatively to their matched rms, but is still signicantly
higher for bidder initiated deal rms. Target initiated deal rms grant their
CEOs slightly more stocks and stock options from 2 years before the initiation
to the public announcement. Board independence is signicantly lower in
target initiated deal rms.
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Industry characteristics suggest large dierences between deal versus
non-deal rms, but virtually no dierences within the group of deal rms.
Deal rms operate in an environment with higher product uidity and lower
industry concentration. More deals over the year before initiation (M&A liq-
uidity) also increase the odds while industry similarity decreases the odds of
being a target. Moreover, deal rms more often participate in asset sales and
acquire other rms.
Asset characteristics conrm again a similar pattern: the only signi-
cant dierences between target versus bidder initiated deals stem from higher
R&D, and lower protability of target initiated deals. On the other hand, the
deal rms together are quite dierent from non-deal rms: they have poorer
stock performance and lower market to book ratio, have lower asset tangibil-
ity and higher R&D ratio and at the same time higher EBITDA growth and
smaller cash ow.
The last group of characteristics focusses on leverage and nancial con-
straints. We see signicant dierences between both deal versus non-deal but
also target versus bidder initiated deal rms. Target initiated deal rms are
more levered with smaller interest coverage ratio. They have also signicantly
higher SA index, which indicates higher nancial constraints. Moreover, they
are also more likely to fall to the nancial distress category with low Z-score.
They issue more equity. The following section tests for the dierences in a
multinomial setting.
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2.4 Results
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report our results for logistic regressions determining the
odds of being successfully taken over in general and of a target rm initiating
its own sale, respectively. In other words, Table 2.3 compares all our deal rms
to their matched rms that remain publicly listed while Table 2.4 compares
target versus bidder initiated deals. In both tables, we rst report results sepa-
rately by the four groups of takeover determinants discussed in Section 2.2 and
then pool all the explanatory variables together. We report Hubert/White ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include time and industry
dummies, but we do not report them in the tables to preserve space. Brows-
ing the 2 tables, it is apparent that several factors signicantly determine the
odds of becoming a takeover target in Table 2.3 while only a few variables are
signicant in Table 2.4 that predicts the odds of initiation. This shows that
all the deal rms are quite alike when comparing target versus bidder initiated
deals, but together they dier quite signicantly and in important ways from
other non-acquired rms. To some extent, the irrelevance hypothesis holds.
2.4.1 Determinants of being a target in general
Even though we are not directly interested in the determinants of merger
anticipation in general, a logistic regression determining the odds of becoming
an M&A target relatively to staying publicly listed is useful for our purposes
because it highlights that both target and bidder initiated deals are indeed very
dierent from other non-deal rms. Table 2.3 reports the results. Column 1
explores the eect of corporate governance and ownership characteristics on the
probability of a takeover. It shows that target rms have signicantly higher
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insider and institutional ownership. The change in institutional ownership over
the year just before deal initiation is not signicant indicating that institutional
owners do not increase their ownership to force through a change in control.
- insert Table 2.3 about here -
Board size and board independence are both signicant at the 1-percent
level. Both coecients indicate that poor governance is associated with higher
odds of takeovers. This is in line with the inecient management hypothesis
suggesting that poorer governance allows space for poorer management and
attracts potential bidders who could improve the rm's management and so
earn prot on the transaction (Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 1992).
Nevertheless, we explore the inter-relation between insider and institutional
ownership on the one hand and board independence on the other hand. We
nd that less independent boards have higher board and ocer ownership
for target initiated deal rms and higher institutional ownership for bidder
initiated deal rms. This indicates a substitution eect between ownership
concentration and board independence: the deal rms might exhibit poorer
governance in form of lower board independence, however, they have concen-
trated owners who should monitor their management and so substitute for
board independence. As a result, we would have support for the entrenchment
rather than inecient management hypothesis: rms with lower ownership
concentration and therefore poorer governance have lower odds of takeovers
while rms with higher ownership concentration and better governance have
increased chances of successfully completing an M&A deal. High ownership
concentration encourages takeover oers. It is also interesting to note that the
explanatory power of the model in Column 1 is unusually high.
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In Column 2, we include a dummy for one person covering both positions
of the CEO and the chairman of the board. It is not signicant. Further,
we also include a dummy for the CEO being in the retirement age. In line
with Jenter and Lewellen (2015), we see that CEOs in retirement age increase
signicantly the odds of takeovers. Insider ownership becomes insignicant,
but this is due to signicant drop in the number of observations rather than
inclusion of the 2 extra explanatory variables. The explanatory power of the
model remains high.
We explore the impact of industry characteristics in Column 3. In line
with our conjecture, high product market uidity and industry competition
increase the odds of takeovers. Higher rivals' change in their products, that is
higher industry uidity, and higher competition in the industry are associated
with higher odds of takeovers. In contrast, industry similarity decreases the
odds as more similar industry peers pose a crowding eect and mean that
similar peers might be taken over instead (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). The
M&A liquidity dummy, based on Schlingemann et al. (2002), measures the
frequency of deals in the industry over the past year and is not signicant
in Column 3 because it is highly correlated with similarity. M&A liquidity
becomes signicantly positive at the 1-percent level when included without
the other industry variables.
The last two variables in Column 3 measure alternative strategic op-
tions rms might explore before considering being sold. First, a rm might
consider partial asset sale(s) to focus its activities and improve its nancial
position (Bates, 2005). Indeed, the dummy for asset sales over the last 3 years
before the current deal is positive and signicant at the 1-percent level. The
deal rms actively sell signicantly more of their assets before they are taken
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over relatively to comparable rms that remain publicly listed. The acquirer
dummy is also positive and signicant at the 1-percent level. It shows that deal
rms are also more likely to get involved in takeovers of other rms relatively
to non-deal rms. Industry uidity and concentration are highly correlated
with rm age and so we do not include rm age as a control variable in this
column. It seems quite natural that younger rms operate in more uid and
more competitive industries.
Columns 4 to 7 explore the eect of stock and asset characteristics. In
Column 4, we include the abnormal return over the last year before deal initi-
ation and the market to book ratio. The past return is signicantly negative
suggesting that deal rms suer poor stock performance. In Column 5, we
replace the market to book ratio with its 3 components due to Rhodes-Kropf
et al. (2005): rm-specic error, sector error and long-run market to book. We
see that the market to book ratio in Column 4 is probably insignicant because
2 of its components have opposing eects that might cancel out and result in
an insignicant overall eect. The 3 components in Column 5 suggest that
deal rms are underpriced in the short-term relatively to their industry peers
(the rm-specic error is signicantly negative), but at the same time, they
exhibit higher growth options (the long-run market to book is signicantly
positive). Past performance becomes insignicant, probably because the rm-
specic error picks up the low performance eect. The R&D ratio in Column
6 is not signicant. Column 7 includes the 3 market to book components
together with protability, cash ow and stock-trading liquidity. The market
to book components remain signicant. The negative coecient for cash ow
contradicts the free cash ow hypothesis by Jensen (1986) that rms with very
high free cash ow are prone to agency problems and therefore should be more
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prone to takeovers. We see that deal rms suer low rather than high cash
ow.
Column 8 explores leverage and nancial constraints as determinants
of takeovers. The SA index is signicant and positive suggesting that deal
rms do suer higher nancial constraints conrming recent empirical evi-
dence (Khatami et al., 2015). Leverage is not signicant, it is rather nancial
constraints that matter. The 2 Altman's Z-score dummies measure nancial
distress. The dummy for low Z-score is set to 1 in case the Z-score is lower
than 1.81 and 0 otherwise and indicates a high immediate risk of nancial
distress. The dummy for high Z-score is set to 1 in case the Z-score is higher
than 2.99 and 0 otherwise and, so, indicates nancially solidly healthy rms.
The 2 Altman's Z-score dummies show that nancial distress is not associated
with target merger anticipation. The debt and equity issue dummies are both
positive and signicant at the 1-percent level: deal rms, relatively to non-
deal rms, engage more in raising new nancing. Interestingly, they are still
nancially constrained.
The last 2 columns in Table 2.3 show that most of the explanatory
variables remain signicant also when we include them all together. Overall,
the results show large dierences between deal rms versus rms that remain
publicly listed. Interestingly, the highest explanatory power comes from the
corporate governance measures.
2.4.2 Determinants of target initiation
Table 2.4 shows that, in contrast to a multitude of dierences between deal
versus non-deal rms, target versus bidder initiated rms are dierent only in
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2 important respects. First, even though these two sets of rms do not dier
in terms of board size, board independence or CEO/chairman duality, their
ownership structure is dierent. Columns 1 and 2 show that target initiated
deal rms have signicantly higher insider ownership, which is mostly due to
high ownership by executives and their CEOs. In contrast, bidder initiated
deal rms tend to have higher institutional ownership (signicant at the 10-
percent level). Higher insider ownership is a robust predictor of the odds of
target initiation, as the coecient remains signicant at the 1-percent level
also when including all other explanatory variables in the last 3 columns of
Table 2.4.12
- insert Table 2.4 about here -
The second set of signicant factors concerns leverage together with
growth options. Columns 4 and 5 show that target initiated deals have higher
growth options. In particular, Column 4 includes the 3 components of the
market to book decomposition due to Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). The rst
2 components representing the short-term rm undervaluation (rm-specic
error) and the long-term industry undervaluation (sector error) are not sta-
tistically signicant. However, the long-run value to book component that
measures the long-run growth prospects of the target rm is positive and sig-
nicant at the 10-percent level. Also, the R&D ratio in Column 5 is positive
and signicant at the 1-percent level. Column 6 further indicates that due to
high negative correlation of long-run value to book with earnings (high growth
rms have negative earnings), the long-run value to book coecient becomes
12Unreported specications show that a dummy for rm incorporation in states with
strong anti-takeover defense laws is not a signicant factor inuencing the odds of target
initiation.
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insignicant when we control for EBITDA. The R&D ratio remains signicant
even when controlling for earnings.13
At the same time, target initiated rms exhibit higher leverage. Columns
7 to 11 show that leverage is highly signicant regardless of other control vari-
ables. Interestingly, the SA index measuring nancial constraints (Hadlock
and Pierce, 2010) does not diminish signicance of leverage and by itself is
not signicant (Column 7). This suggests that it is high leverage per se rather
than nancial constraints per se that increases the odds of target deal initia-
tion: a rm must face increased prospects of nancial distress to be motivated
to organize its own sale. A nancing shock that increases nancial constraints
but leads only to postponement of investment rather than decrease in value of
growth options and potential nancial distress does not push rms into deal
initiation.
Column 8 controls for imminent nancial distress as it includes 2 dummy
variables for low and high Altman's Z-score (Altman, 1968). Both of the Z-
score dummies are insignicant, suggesting that the target initiated rms are
neither nancially distressed nor very healthy. This is quite important for our
hypothesis because it shows that even though high leverage is associated with
an increased possibility of nancial distress, the nancial distress is not yet
imminent and, so, the rm's growth options still keep their value. In other
words, selling for scrap is not yet an issue. Naturally, inclusion of the two Z-
score dummies decreases the signicance of the leverage coecient and shows
that leverage is closely linked with nancial distress.
Column 8 includes also dummies for debt and equity issues over the last
3 years before the deal initiation. The debt issue dummy is not signicant,
13This regression is not reported.
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but the positive and signicant coecient for equity issues shows that target
initiated rms do try to decrease their leverage before they organize the acqui-
sition. Related to equity issues, we also check for alternative strategies that
could help to avoid the rm sale, like asset sales or acquisitions of other rms.
Column 3 with all the industry activity variables shows that neither the asset
sale nor acquirer dummy variables are signicant. It is perhaps important to
note that both the target and bidder initiated deal rms are indeed actively
participating in asset sales and/or acquisitions over the last 3 years before the
initiation of the current deal (see Table 2.3). Still, Column 9 does not show
signicant dierences between target versus bidder initiated deal rms.
Altogether, the results are consistent with the conjecture that the board
of directors decides to oer its rm for sale in a situation with high leverage but
still valuable growth options. Financial distress is likely, but is not imminent
yet. It seems optimal to start actively looking for a suitable bidder who would
be able to preserve current growth options. Waiting for a bidder to overcome
his information disadvantage on his own is inferior as, with time and closer
to nancial distress, growth options would drastically loose in value. In this
situation, it is up to the board to exercise its put option (to sell) as potential
bidders might not want to exercise their call options (to buy). Bargaining
power of the board that initiates its sale is lower as it wants to sell, which
naturally might result in lower takeover premium. Still, given the situation,
the board seems to act optimally to maximize its shareholders' value.
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2.4.3 Motivating managers
Table 2.4 shows that higher insider and executive ownership are important
determinants of the odds of rms initiating their own sale. In this section, we
explore further whether higher CEO ownership just increases CEOs' willing-
ness to accept deal initiation or it is also associated with active participation of
CEOs in the negotiation process. Panel A in Table 2.5 explores rst the eect
of CEO golden parachutes that are in place before deal initiation. Column
1 conrms that CEO ownership is associated with higher odds of deal initia-
tion. We also see that golden parachutes do not change the odds. However,
Column 2 with an interaction term between the golden parachute dummy and
CEO ownership dummy shows that golden parachutes do not matter for deal
initiation in rms with higher CEO ownership, but signicantly increase the
odds of deal initiation in rms without CEO ownership. The golden parachute
dummy is signicantly positive, but the interaction term is signicantly neg-
ative. The overall eect of golden parachutes in rms with CEO ownership
(golden parachutes plus the interaction term) is insignicant. These results
suggest that golden parachutes and CEO ownership are substitutes. CEOs get
golden parachutes when they do not own shares to motivate them positively
for deal initiation.
- insert Table 2.5 about here -
Columns 3 and 4 partition the sample conditional on the selling mech-
anism. Comparing Column 3 for formal auctions versus Column 4 for private
negotiations and controlled sales, we see large dierences. CEO ownership and
golden parachutes do not matter for deal initiation in formal auctions, while
they are signicant in informal sales. These results are in line with managerial
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motivation for active participation. Once incentives are in place, selling rms
opt for deal initiation and sell their rms through less formal selling mecha-
nisms with important impact of takeover negotiations on the overall outcome.
We see evidence for managerial motivation for active participation rather than
for bribery to accept takeovers.
Panel B in Table 2.5 explores a quasi-experiment considering board
independence. A board with majority of independent directors is widely con-
sidered as a good corporate governance practice and so we use it to evaluate
the eect of CEO ownership and golden parachutes on deal initiation. We
conjecture that if CEO ownership and golden parachutes serve to motivate
active CEO participation in their rm sale, it should be more so in rms with
independent boards. Our results in Panel B indeed conrm this conjecture.
Even though board independence does not aect the odds of target initiation
in Column 1, Column 2 shows that board independence signicantly increases
the eect of CEO ownership on target initiation. The interaction term for
board independence and the CEO ownership dummy is signicantly positive.
The interaction term for board independence and golden parachutes is also
positive, but not signicant. Columns 3 and 4 again partition the sample
into formal auctions and informal sales and show that the positive eect of
independent boards is present only in informal sales (private negotiations and
controlled sales) when active negotiation of the CEO is more vital. These re-
sults conrm our results from Panel A supporting motivation for CEOs' active
participation in sale negotiations.
The second quasi-experiment takes advantage of CEO retirement age.
Jenter and Lewellen (2015) show that rms with CEOs in retirement age are
more likely to be taken over. They also show that this eect is present only
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in rms with weak corporate governance arguing that retirement age should
not matter in well govern rms. CEOs should not resist takeovers unless they
are in retirement age. Following this argument, we use `no eect of retirement
age' as an indicator of good corporate governance. Table 2.4 in section 2.4.2
shows that the retirement age dummy is not signicant for deal initiation. In
Panel C of Table 2.5, we include retirement age also in interaction terms with
the CEO ownership and golden parachutes dummies. In Column 1, retirement
age is signicantly positive, but the interaction term with CEO ownership is
negative. Even though the interaction term is not signicant, the overall eect
of retirement age on target initiation in rms with CEO ownership (retirement
age + retirement age x CEO ownership) is not signicant. Thus, retirement
increases the odds of target initiation only in rms without CEO ownership.
CEO ownership mitigates the eect of retirement age on target initiation and,
therefore, again shows a positive corporate governance role.
Column 2 in Panel C shows a positive coecient for the interaction term
between retirement age and golden parachutes. Golden parachutes are signi-
cantly increasing the odds of target initiation if the CEO is in retirement age.
The joint eect is signicant at the 5-percent level. Golden parachutes rein-
force the eect of retirement age rather than mitigate it, which is an indication
of weak corporate governance and misuse of golden parachutes in case when it
is not necessary. Columns 3 and 4, where we partition the sample into formal
auctions and informal sales, reconcile the issue. Golden parachutes mitigate a
positive eect of retirement age in formal auctions when active participation
in negotiations is not important. The interaction term for retirement age with
golden parachutes is negative and signicant and the overall eect of retire-
ment age in rms with golden parachutes is insignicant. This is a positive
38
result for golden parachutes as they serve as a positive corporate governance
tool. When golden parachutes are granted retirement age does not matter for
deal initiation. In column 4 with private negotiations and controlled sales, the
interaction term is positive and signicant. Golden parachutes increase the
odds of target initiation in rms with CEOs in retirement age. However, it is
in a situation when active participation of CEOs might be valuable. Perhaps
CEOs in retirement age would not care much about outcomes of takeover ne-
gotiations and so are given extra incentives in form of golden parachutes to
negotiate harder.
As a last step, Table 2.6 explores grants of stocks and stock options to
CEOs over the period from 2 years before the initiation up to deal completion.
In this context, we conjecture that in case a board of directors perceives a
future takeover deal more likely, it would grant its CEO extra stocks and/or
options to align the CEO's with the shareholders' interests. Moreover, we
expect that the board might grant its CEO more options and stocks not only
after deal negotiations have commenced, but even before the deal initiation,
especially for target initiated deals. If the board expects a deal likely, it might
make sense to incentivize its CEO before he/she starts negotiating.
- insert Table 2.6 about here -
Table 2.6 explores this idea. Column 1 shows that all equity grants
together (stock and stock options from 2 year before the initiation up to deal
completion) are signicantly higher in target initiated deals. In Column 2,
we partition all equity grants into (i) equity grants 2 years before the deal
initiation, (ii) equity grants from initiation up to the deal announcement,
and (iii) equity grants after the public announcement up to deal completion.
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Coecients for all three equity grant variables are positive, but only the second
one for stock and stock option grants after deal initiation but before public
announcement is signicant. Target initiated rms do not grant their CEOs
more stocks and stock options before the deal initiation in target initiated
deal rms, but they do grant them more equity based compensation after
the deal initiation. Equity grants in target initiated deal rms are higher
both for formal auctions (Column 3) and informal sales (Column 4) and the
dierence between formal versus informal sales is not statistically signicant.
However, Columns 5 and 6 show that target initiated deal rms grant their
CEOs signicantly more equity compensation after initiation only in informal
sales. This is in line with increased motivation for CEOs when their active
participation in negotiations would be more valuable.
2.5 Robustness checks
As a robustness check and an alternative to the 2 sets of logistic regressions,
we estimate a multinomial logit regression that compares the target and bid-
der initiated deal rms to their matched rms in one model. Table 2.7 reports
results for a representative specication from Tables 2.4 and 2.3.14 The de-
pendent variable is a categorical variable equal to 0 for all matched rms, 1
for target initiated deal rms and 2 for bidder initiated deal rms. We choose
the the matched rms to be the reference category and so we report 2 sets of
results: for the target and bidder initiated deal rms. The coecients should
be interpreted relatively to the reference category of matched rms. For com-
14We are not able to include specications from section 2.4.3 as deal characteristics
concerning the selling process are not available for non-deal rms. Also, we have golden
parachute data only for the deal rms.
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pleteness, the last column in Table 2.7 shows the coecient dierences between
target versus bidder initiated deal rms and their signicance.
- insert Table 2.7 about here -
Table 2.7 conrms all our conclusions. The last column shows that
target versus bidder initiated deal rms dier signicantly in insider and insti-
tutional ownership and leverage and growth options. We use R&D expenses
to measure growth options and the coecient dierence between target ver-
sus bidder initiated deals is positive and signicant at the 5-percent level. If
we replace the R&D ratio with the set of market to book components, the
eect of the long-run market to book is not signicantly dierent for target
versus bidder initiated rms. This is because the long-run market to book
is correlated with leverage. In an unreported specication corresponding to
Column 4 in Table 2.4, the coecient for long-run market to book is positive
and signicant at the 10-percent level.
Many of the coecients for target and bidder initiated deals versus the
matched rms are signicant and they both have the same sign. This shows
that the variables aect the odds of target and bidder initiated deal rms in
the same way with no signicant dierences between the 2 types of deal rms.
This conrms the results in Table 2.3.
2.6 Conclusions
The main aim of the chapter is to explore empirically the reasons for why a
board of directors might decide to sell its rm and how the board incentivizes
its managers for the sale. On a sample of 1098 US publicly listed target rms,
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we show that even though target versus bidder initiated deal rms are quite
alike and together much more dierent from non-deal rms, they still dier in
two important ways. First, target initiated rms have higher alignment be-
tween board members (CEO) and shareholders in the form of higher ownership
stakes relatively to bidder initiated rms. In case CEO ownership is low, it
is substituted by golden parachutes. Further analysis shows that CEO owner-
ship and golden parachutes increase the odds of target initiation only in infor-
mal sales and not in formal auctions. Thus, managerial incentives are higher
in informal sales where their active participation in takeover negotiations is
more valuable and might improve deal outcomes, while they do not matter in
controlled sales with less scope for negotiations to inuence outcomes. Two
quasi-experiments involving board independence and CEO retirement age fur-
ther conrm our conjecture that CEOs in target versus bidder initiated deals
are more motivated for active participation in takeover negotiations.
The second important dierence is that target initiated deal rms are
more levered but still seem to keep growth options. It suggests that the rm
intends to avoid possible future nancial distress that would largely destroy
rm value associated with valuable growth options.
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2.7 Appendices
2.7.1 Initiation coding example
This appendix illustrates our coding. We use 2 examples that correspond to a
target initiated deal (between Applebees International Inc and IHOP Corp.)
and a bidder initiated deal (between AirTran Holdings Inc and Southwest
Airlines Co).
Applebees International: a target initiated deal
The following paragraph extracted from the SEC ling of Applebees Inter-
national Inc describes the initial decision and helps us to code the deal ini-
tiator and the initiation date when the private selling process started: "Our
Board held its annual strategic retreat on August 23-25, 2006. . . .The strategic
alternatives discussion focused on two potential alternatives: (1) a leveraged
recapitalization involving an expanded share repurchase program that would in-
volve increasing the total debt to EBITDA leverage ratio to approximately three
times and (2) a condential market test for a possible sale of the company."
The text shows that Applebees took initiative and started considering a
potential sale as a way forward for the company, so we code the deal as target
initiated. Applebees also retained nancial advisors to solicit potential merger
candidates. We code August 23, 2006 as the initiation date when the whole
selling process started.
The following section of the ling indicates that the number of bidders
contacted is 35 and the number of bidders with condentiality agreements
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is 26. "During the next several weeks and in accordance with the Commit-
tee's instructions, Citi and Banc of America Securities contacted 35 potential
purchasers of Applebee's. . . .Twenty-six potential purchasers executed a con-
dentiality agreement and received an oering memorandum with non-public
information during the week of March 18, 2007."
Applebee's was sold in an auction, as documented in the following text:
"On April 14, 2007, Citi and Banc of America Securities informed the Com-
mittee that we received four preliminary indications of interest in purchasing
our company. . . . Five other potential bidders asked for additional time to
submit an indication of interest . . .As is typical, these indications of interest
were non-binding and contained numerous conditions, including due diligence
conditions. . . .After reviewing the initial indications of interest with Citi's as-
sistance, the Committee decided to allow these four bidders, including IHOP,
to continue to the next phase of the sale process which involved more detailed
due diligence, including access to a data room and participation in multi-day
management presentations. . . .This conclusion was driven in large part by the
fact that at that point in time the contemplated deadline for nal submission of
bids was shortly before the date of Applebee's annual meeting . . .During April
and May, all four remaining potential bidders continued their due diligence
activities. In addition, all four received a draft merger agreement and were
asked to submit nal, denitive oers, including a proposed contract, by June
11. "
AirTran Holdings: a bidder initiated deal
In this case, we code the initiation based on the following section from the SEC
ling of AirTran Holdings Inc: "On April 21, 2010, Gary Kelly, Southwest's
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Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Ocer, telephoned
Robert L. Fornaro, AirTran's Chairman, President and Chief Executive O-
cer, and asked Mr. Fornaro if he would meet with him in person to discuss a
potential business matter, without indicating the specic nature of the matter.
On May 6, 2010, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Fornaro met in a suburb of Dallas,
Texas, and Mr. Kelly asked Mr. Fornaro if AirTran would be open to dis-
cussions regarding an acquisition by Southwest. Mr. Fornaro replied that he
believed that management of AirTran had a duty to consider any adequately
priced and nanced acquisition oer and should such an oer be forthcoming
from Southwest, management of AirTran would so consider it." Since it is
Sothwest's Chairman to solicit potential merger candidate for the company,
we dene this deal as a bidder initiated deal. The initiation date is May 6,
2010.
AirTran was sold in a private negotiation, which can be implied from
the following lengthy process: "Following Southwest's and its advisors' evalu-
ation of AirTran, Southwest determined to propose to AirTran that Southwest
commence a preliminary due diligence investigation of AirTran. . . .AirTran
directed its counsel to establish an electronic data room for various docu-
ments to be made available to Southwest in connection with this due diligence.
. . .During the next three weeks, Southwest conducted its preliminary due dili-
gence investigation of AirTran, including accessing the electronic data room
that AirTran established. . . .On July 31, 2010, AirTran's senior management
held a conference call with Morgan Stanley and Smith Gambrell to review and
discuss the proposal received from Southwest and related matters. . . .On Au-
gust 13, 2010, Vinson & Elkins distributed an initial draft of a merger agree-
ment to AirTran and its representatives. . . .On August 27, 2010, Vinson
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& Elkins distributed a revised draft of the merger agreement to AirTran and
its representatives, which draft reected Southwest's responses to the AirTran
comments received on August 21, 2010. . . .On September 4, 2010, Vinson &
Elkins distributed a revised draft of the merger agreement in response to the
discussions between the parties subsequent to the August 27, 2010 distribution.
. . .Also on September 23, 2010, Vinson & Elkins sent a revised draft of the
merger agreement to AirTran and its representatives reecting all discussions
between the parties on open items up to that date. . . .The merger agreement
was executed on behalf of Southwest and AirTran shortly after conclusion of the
respective September 26, 2010 meetings of the AirTran and Southwest boards of
directors. The merger was publicly announced in the early morning of Septem-
ber 27, 2010." In a private negotiation, the number of bidders contacted and
with condentiality agreements are both 1.
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2.7.2 Variable denitions
Variable Denition Source
Acquirer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the rm ac-
quires another rm within 3 years before the ini-
tiation date.
SDC, OC
Altman's Z-score 1.2*(working capital/total assets) + 1.4*(retained
earnings/total assets) + 3.3*(EBIT/total assets)
+ 0.6*(market value of equity/book value of debt)
+ 0.999*(total sales/total assets). Based on Alt-
man (1968).
COMPUSTAT,
OC
Analyst following Number of analysts following the rm in Decem-
ber of the calendar year before the initiation date.
In the analysis, we use (1 + analystfollowing).
IBES
Asset sale Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the rm sells
a part of its assets within 3 years before the initi-
ation date.
SDC, OC
Asset tangibility Net plant and property divided by total assets one
scal year before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT
Auction Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the company
is sold in a highly organized auction with pre-set
rules and 0 otherwise. Based on Hansen (2001).
HC
Bidders contacted Total number of bidders that the target rm con-
tacts during the selling process.
HC
Bidder initiated deal Deal for which, at the beginning of the selling pro-
cess, a potential buyer approaches the target rm
and proposes an M&A transaction.
HC
Bidders with cond.
agreement
Total number of bidders that the target rm signs
condentiality agreement with during the selling
process.
HC
Board independence Total number of independent board members over
the total number of board members. In some re-
gressions used as a dummy that is set to one in
case at least 50% of board members are indepen-
dent directors and zero otherwise.
ExecuComp,
TRE, HC
Board size Total number of board members. ExecuComp,
TRE, HC
Cash Cash and marketable securities over total assets
in the accounting year just before the initiation
date.
COMPUSTAT
Cash ow Cash ow over total assets. Based on Erel et al
(2015).
COMPUSTAT
Cash oer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the acquirer
oers cash as the payment consideration and 0
otherwise.
SDC
CEO age The age of CEO at the private year. ExecuComp,
TRE, HC
CEO/chair duality Dummy variable equals to 1 in case CEO of a rm
is also chairman of the rm.
ExecuComp,
TRE, HC
continued on next page
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Variable Denition Source
CEO ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by
the CEO just before the initiation date. In some
regression used as a dummy variable that is set to
one in case CEO ownership is positive and zero
otherwise.
TIF, OC
CEO retirement Dummy variable equal to 1 in case CEO's age is
larger than 64 and 0 otherwise. Based on Jenter
and Lewellen (2015).
ExecuComp,
TRE, HC
Controlled sale Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the target com-
pany decides to discreetly canvass a limited num-
ber of bidders that target management believes to
have a serious interest in acquiring the company
and 0 otherwise. Based on Boone and Mulherin
(2007).
HC
Debt issue Dummy variable equal to 1 in case a rm issues
debt within 3 years before the private date and 0
otherwise.
SDC
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and
amortization over total assets in the accounting
year just before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT
EBITDA growth 3 year average change in EBITDA over total assets
before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT,
OC
Equity grants The total number of shares granted in options and
stock to the CEO as a fraction of ordinary shares
outstanding over the period from 2 years before
the initiation date to the completion date.
TIF; OC
Equity grants before
initiation
The total number of shares granted in options and
stock to the CEO as a fraction of ordinary shares
outstanding over the period from 2 years before
the initiation date to the initiation date.
TIF; OC
Equity grants after
initiation
The total number of shares granted in options and
stock to the CEO as a fraction of ordinary shares
outstanding over the period from the initiation
date to the SDC announcement date. Based on
Heitzman (2011).
TIF; OC
Equity grants after
public
The total number of shares granted in options and
stock to the CEO as a fraction of ordinary shares
outstanding over the period from the SDC an-
nouncement date to the resolution date. Based
on Heitzman (2011).
TIF; OC
Equity issue Dummy variable equal to 1 in case a rm issues
equity within 3 years before the private date and
0 otherwise.
SDC
Executive ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by
rms' executives just before the initiation date.
TIF, OC
Firm age The number of years from rst appearance in
CRSP. Based on Edmans et al. (2012).
CRSP, OC
continued on next page
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Variable Denition Source
Firm-specic error The rst component of the decomposition by
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) based on Model 1 with
FF12 industries; it estimates the deviation of the
rm specic pricing from short-run industry pric-
ing.
OC
Golden parachute Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the CEO is
paid with severance pay and cash bonuses due to
the termination of his/her employment after the
takeover, 0 otherwise.
HC
High Altman's Z-
score
Dummy variable equal to 1 in case Altman's Z-
score is larger than 2.99 and 0 otherwise. Indicator
of high nancial health of the rm.
COMPUSTAT,
OC
Industry concentra-
tion
Herndahl-Hirschman index based on TNIC-3
(10-K based Network) industry. Based on Hoberg
and Phillips (2014).
Hoberg-
Phillips Data
Library
Industry similarity Cumulative rm-by-rm pairwise similarity score
for all peers for the rm's TNIC-3 industry using
the 10-K rm product words. In analysis, we use
the score scaled by 1000. Based on Hoberg and
Phillips (2014).
Hoberg-
Phillips Data
Library
Initiation date The date on which the target rm starts to con-
sider a potential sale of the rm. Based on Boone
and Mulherin (2007).
HC
Insider ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by
the board members and other ocers just before
the Initiation date.
TIF, OC
Inst. ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by
institutional blockholders just before the initiation
date.
Factset
Inst. ownership
change
The change in institutional ownership over the
year before the initiation date.
Factset
Interest coverage EBIT over interest payment due in the accounting
year just before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT
Interest coverage
growth
3 year average change in interest coverage ratio
before the initiation date
COMPUSTAT,
OC
Leverage Long term debt over total assets in the accounting
year just before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT
Leverage growth 3 year average change in long term debt over total
assets before the initiation date
COMPUSTAT,
OC
Long-run value to
book
The third component of the decomposition by
Rhodes-Kropf et al (2005) based on Model 1 with
FF12 industries; it measures the deviation of the
long-run pricing of the industry from the book
value of the rm and so measures the long-run
growth prospects of the rm.
OC
continued on next page
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Variable Denition Source
Low Altman's Z-score Dummy variable equal to 1 in case Altman's Z-
score is smaller than 1.81 and 0 otherwise. Indi-
cator of nancial distress
COMPUSTAT,
OC
Low interest coverage Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the interest
coverage ratio (EBIT over yearly debt interest
payment in the accounting year just before the
initiation date) is smaller than 2 and 0 otherwise.
COMPUSTAT
M&A liquidity The total number of targets in the same rst three-
digit SIC code as the sample rm over the year
just before the initiation date expressed as a frac-
tion of the total number of rms in the same rst
three-digit SIC code in COMPUSTAT. Based on
Schlingemann et al. (2002).
COMPUSTAT,
SDC, OC
Market to book ratio Market capitalization over the book value of eq-
uity in the accounting year just before the initia-
tion date.
COMPUSTAT
Market capitalization Market capitalization (stock price times shares
outstanding) on the initiation date, in the anal-
ysis used as a natural log.
CRSP
Mixed payment Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the acquirer of-
fers both cash and merged rm's stock as payment
consideration and 0 otherwise.
SDC
Net income Net income to total assets in the accounting year
just before the initiation date.
COMPUSTAT
Net income growth 3 year average change in net income over total
assets before the initiation date
COMPUSTAT,
OC
Non-ex. ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned
by independent directors just before the initiation
date. In some regressions used as a dummy vari-
able that is set to one in case non-executive own-
ership is positive and zero otherwise.
TIF, OC
Past abnormal return Raw stock return over 1 year before the initiation
date adjusted by the equally weighted market re-
turn over the same period.
CRSP, OC
Past return Raw stock return over 1 year before the initiation
date.
CRSP
Premium The nal oer price relative to the stock price 4
weeks before the SDC announcement date in per-
centage points.
SDC
Private equity ac-
quirer
Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the target rm
is acquired by a rm that is majority owned by a
private equity investor and 0 otherwise. Based on
Fidrmuc et al. (2012).
SDC
Private negotiation Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the company is
sold in a privately negotiated sale and 0 otherwise.
Based on Boone and Mulherin (2009).
HC
continued on next page
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Variable Denition Source
Private selling pro-
cess length
Length in days from the initiation date to the SDC
announcement date.
HC
Prod. market uidity A measure of a rm's competitive product threats,
it shows changes in rivals' products relative to the
rm. Based on Hoberg et al. (2014).
Hoberg-
Phillips Data
Library
Public acquirer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the company
is acquired by a public rm and 0 otherwise.
SDC
Pubic selling process
length
Length in days from the SDC announcement date
to the resolution date.
HC
R&D ratio Research and development expenses divided by to-
tal assets.
COMPUSTAT
SA index -0.737*(size) + 0.043*(size2) - 0.04*(age), where
size is the natural log of ination adjusted (to USD
2004) book value of total assets; age is the number
of years the rm has been on COMPUSTAT with
a non-missing stock price. We winsorize size from
the top at ln4500 and age at 37. Based on Hadlock
and Pierce (2010).
COMPUSTAT,
OC
Sector error The second component of the decomposition by
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) based on Model 1
with FF12 industries; it estimates the deviation
between the short-run versus long-run pricing of
the rm's industry.
OC
Selling process length The length in days from the initiation date to the
resolution date.
HC
Stock oer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the acquirer
oers merged rm's shares as the payment con-
sideration and 0 otherwise.
SDC
Target initiated deal The board of the target rm decides to sell
the company and consequently contacts potential
buyers.
HC
Third party initiated Bidder initiated deal that ends up with a buyer
that is not the primary initiator of the deal.
HC
Total assets Book value of total assets in USD millions; in the
analysis used as a natural log.
COMPUSTAT
Total sales Total amount collected for providing goods and
services in USD millions.
COMPUSTAT
Trade liquidity Total number of shares traded in the year just
before the initiation date over the total number of
shares outstanding on the initiation date
COMPUSTAT
Transaction value Total value paid by the acquirer less fees and ex-
penses in USD millions.
SDC
51
Table 2.1: Selling process summary statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the hand collected target (487) and bidder (611) initiated deals.
All variables are dened in Appendix 2.7.2. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles
except all dummy variables. We test for dierence in means using the t-test and in medians using the
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank sum test. The signicance of dierences in means and medians between
target versus bidder initiated deals is denoted in the mean and median columns for bidder initiated deals.
a, b and c indicate signicance at the one-, ve- and ten-percent levels.
Target initiated deals Bidder initiated deals
Mean Median St. dev Mean Median St.dev
Transaction value(million USD) 1,409 286 3,973 2,165a 509a 4,992
Premium 26.6% 27.0% 58.2% 39.0%a 34.0%a 45.2%
Third party initiated 0 0 0 0.39 0 0.49
Auction 0.50 1 0.50 0.20a 0a 0.40
Controlled sale 0.36 0 0.48 0.38 0 0.49
Private negotiation 0.14 0 0.34 0.42a 0a 0.49
Private selling process length 478 342 409 314a 220a 333
Public selling process length 117 103 67 127b 104 83
Selling process length 595 464 407 441a 350a 342
Bidders contacted 30 14 43 9a 2a 18
Bidders with cond. agreement 11 4 17 4a 1a 8
Private equity acquirer 0.26 0 0.44 0.23 0 0.42
Public acquirer 0.65 1 0.48 0.71b 1b 0.46
Cash oer 0.68 1 0.47 0.71 1 0.45
Stock oer 0.12 0 0.32 0.10 0 0.30
Mixed payment 0.21 0 0.40 0.19 0 0.39
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Table 2.5: Analysis of managerial incentives for target initiation.
This table reports estimation results for logistic models predicting target initiation. The dependent
variable is a categorical variable that equals 1 for all target initiated deals and 0 for bidder initiated
deals. The data covers only the deal rms (487 target initiated deals, 611 bidder initiated deals). We
report Hubert/White robust standard errors in brackets. All variables are dened in Appendix 2.7.2 and
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, except for all dummy variables. Both year and industry
dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. a, b and c indicate signicance at the one-,
ve- and ten-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All obs. All obs. Auction Inf.sale
Panel A: Golden parachutes
Constant -1.226b -1.365b -1.789b -1.617b
(0.544) (0.544) (0.870) (0.696)
CEO ownership 0.287b 0.609a -0.236 0.842a
(0.142) (0.215) (0.427) (0.282)
Golden parachute 0.086 0.387c 0.189 0.545b
(0.140) (0.205) (0.426) (0.264)
GP x CEO ownership -0.555b -0.493 -0.666c
(0.277) (0.556) (0.362)
Non-executive own. 0.972 0.898 2.590 0.555
(0.916) (0.923) (2.128) (1.100)
Institutional own. -0.797a -0.788a -1.516a -0.738c
(0.284) (0.283) (0.573) (0.385)
Inst. own. change 0.593 0.690 1.826 0.414
(0.941) (0.938) (1.805) (1.168)
Firm age 0.004 0.004 0.014 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.008)
Total assets -0.098c -0.104c 0.229c -0.120
(0.057) (0.057) (0.124) (0.073)
# observations 1,004 1,004 331 673
2 83.59a 84.50a 39.28a 77.73a
Pseudo R2 6.61% 6.91% 11.60% 10.10%
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All obs. All obs. Auction Inf.sale
Panel B: Independent boards
Constant -1.285b -1.208b -1.664c -1.665b
(0.561) (0.572) (0.961) (0.722)
Board independence 0.019 -0.594 1.369 -0.771
(0.192) (0.382) (0.857) (0.537)
Board ind.x CEO own. 0.649c -0.795 0.930b
(0.351) (0.805) (0.455)
Board ind.x GP 0.265 -0.709 0.485
(0.347) (0.702) (0.463)
CEO ownership 0.712a 0.607b -0.041 0.742b
(0.235) (0.253) (0.502) (0.341)
Golden parachute 0.466b 0.463b 0.249 0.61b
(0.222) (0.235) (0.468) (0.309)
GP x CEO ownership -0.684b -0.792b -0.648 -0.872b
(0.299) (0.311) (0.621) (0.419)
Non-executive own. 0.689 0.716 1.563 0.868
(0.945) (0.946) (2.488) (1.082)
Institutional own. -0.633c -0.604c -0.944 -0.708
(0.326) (0.325) (0.626) (0.445)
Inst. own. change 0.496 0.554 0.688 0.023
(1.030) (1.025) (2.018) (1.294)
Firm age 0.008 0.008 0.021 0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.009)
Total assets -0.131b -0.131b 0.103 -0.124
(0.062) (0.062) (0.131) (0.078)
# observations 877 877 283 594
2 75.48a 77.85a 34.05a 71.44a
Pseudo R2 6.95% 7.31% 11.80% 10.80%
continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
All obs. All obs. Auction Inf.sale
Panel C: CEO retirement
Constant -1.217b -1.363b -1.627c -1.429b
(0.586) (0.588) (0.942) (0.718)
CEO retirement 0.564c 0.226 14.571a -0.164
(0.341) (0.405) (0.538) (0.427)
CEO ret x CEO own. -0.439 -0.464
(0.470) (0.469)
CEO ret x GP 0.654 -14.710a 1.472b
(0.469) (0.834) (0.587)
CEO ownership 0.375b 0.667a -0.422 0.889a
(0.157) (0.236) (0.490) (0.300)
Golden parachute 0.342 0.224 0.398
(0.225) (0.466) (0.293)
GP x CEO ownership -0.502c -0.262 -0.549
(0.294) (0.610) (0.386)
Non-executive own. 1.085 1.041 2.424 0.648
(0.993) (0.997) (2.154) (1.140)
Institutional own. -0.776a -0.812a -1.450b -0.979b
(0.297) (0.301) (0.613) (0.413)
Inst. own. change 0.504 0.565 0.179 0.500
(1.061) (1.052) (2.245) (1.295)
Firm age 0.008 0.008 0.018 0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.008)
Total assets -0.115c -0.118b 0.182 -0.104
(0.059) (0.060) (0.134) (0.076)
# observations 915 915 297 618
2 83.13a 85.14a 1095a 80.99a
Pseudo R2 7.31% 7.78% 13.40% 12.00%
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Table 2.6: Analysis of the impact of managerial stock and option grants on
target initiation.
This table reports estimation results for logistic models predicting target initiation. The dependent
variable is a categorical variable that equals 1 for all target initiated deals and 0 for bidder initiated
deals. The data covers only the deal rms (487 target initiated deals, 611 bidder initiated deals). We
report Hubert/White robust standard errors in brackets. All variables are dened in Appendix 2.7.2 and
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, except for all dummy variables. Both year and industry
dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. a, b and c indicate signicance at the one-,
ve- and ten-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All obs. All obs. Auction Inf.sale Auction Inf.sale
Constant -1.381a -1.614a -2.277b -1.896a -2.1b -1.964a
(0.489) (0.550) (0.917) (0.731) (0.909) (0.704)
Equity grants 9.106a 12.543b 7.423c
(3.103) (5.692) (4.307)
EG bef.initiation 3.847 7.276 4.728
(5.065) (9.768) (6.599)
EG after initiation 34.186a 18.225 44.453a
(11.904) (16.872) (16.707)
EG after pub.ann. 0.184 24.760 -18.585
(24.820) (43.421) (39.743)
CEO ownership 0.572a 0.525b -0.337 0.817a -0.320 0.748a
(0.216) (0.217) (0.432) (0.284) (0.429) (0.289)
Golden parachute 0.408b 0.361c 0.209 0.566b 0.171 0.542b
(0.207) (0.207) (0.425) (0.267) (0.426) (0.266)
GP x CEO ownership -0.563b -0.531c -0.469 -0.693c -0.450 -0.696c
(0.278) (0.279) (0.557) (0.365) (0.554) (0.366)
Non-executive own. 0.742 0.649 2.592 0.503 2.572 0.247
(0.897) (0.902) (2.214) (1.084) (2.165) (1.077)
Institutional own. -0.777a -0.806a -1.354b -0.721c -1.442b -0.784b
(0.285) (0.287) (0.595) (0.387) (0.587) (0.394)
Inst. own. change 0.675 0.777 1.794 0.406 1.859 0.519
(0.932) (0.948) (1.850) (1.160) (1.875) (1.184)
Firm age 0.005 0.006 0.018 0.008 0.017 0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008)
Total assets -0.081 -0.082 0.255b -0.101 0.243c -0.081
(0.058) (0.058) (0.127) (0.074) (0.128) (0.076)
# observations 1,004 1,004 331 673 331 673
2 88.09a 86.27a 46.04a 77.10a 43.29a 77.53a
Pseudo R2 7.33% 7.76% 12.80% 10.40% 12.10% 11.30%
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Table 2.7: Analysis of factors inuencing the likelihood of a successful takeover:
multinomial logistic regressions.
This table reports estimation results for multinomial logistic models. The dependent variable is a categor-
ical variable that equals 0 for all matched rms, 1 for target initiated deal rms and 2 for bidder initiated
deal rms. The data covers 487 target initiated deals, 611 bidder initiated deals and 1098 matching rms.
We report Hubert/White robust standard errors in brackets. All variables are dened in Appendix 2.7.2
and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, except for all dummy variables. Both year and indus-
try dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. a, b and c indicate signicance at the
one-, ve- and ten-percent levels.
Target initiated Bidder initiated Coecient
coe s.e. coe s.e. dierence
Panel A
Constant -0.974 1.336 1.611 1.086 -2.585b
Insider ownership -0.055 0.767 -1.755b 0.859 1.700b
Inst. ownership 1.599a 0.469 2.286a 0.442 -0.687c
Inst. ownership change 0.927 1.574 0.772 1.534 0.155
Board size 0.409a 0.042 0.394a 0.042 0.014
Board independence -3.701a 0.352 -3.691a 0.312 -0.010
CEO / chair duality -0.346c 0.201 -0.055 0.178 -0.292c
CEO retirement 1.021a 0.274 0.703a 0.263 0.318
Prod. market uidity 0.023 0.035 0.016 0.031 0.007
Industry concentration -0.835c 0.482 -1.073b 0.460 0.238
Industry similarity -0.164 0.102 -0.131 0.091 -0.033
M&A liquidity 0.099 0.120 0.087 0.107 0.013
Acquirer 1.593a 0.538 1.491a 0.526 0.102
Asset sale 1.001a 0.248 0.921a 0.225 0.079
Past abnormal return -0.181 0.188 0.010 0.174 -0.191
R&D ratio -2.030c 1.101 -4.253a 1.042 2.224b
Leverage 0.533 0.625 -0.788 0.643 1.321b
SA index -0.287 0.513 0.289 0.451 -0.576
Low Altman's Z-score -0.532 0.337 -0.336 0.311 -0.196
High Altman's Z-score -0.559c 0.293 -0.379 0.267 -0.180
Debt issue 0.359 0.262 0.448c 0.237 -0.089
Equity issue 1.096a 0.215 0.879a 0.198 0.217
Firm age -0.060a 0.016 -0.050a 0.014 -0.010
Total assets -0.498a 0.146 -0.316b 0.124 -0.182
# observations 1269
2 972.71a
Pseudo R2 28.20%
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Chapter 3
Target Insiders' Trades around
the Takeover Announcement
Date
3.1 Introduction
Insider trading on material information has always been a hotly debated topic
both in popular press as well as in the academic literature. Insider trading
regulation in the US is one of the most restrictive and eective around the
world.1 The fact that public takeover announcements are associated with a
strong positive market reaction for target companies is a direct evidence of
the eectiveness of insider trading restrictions before public releases of ma-
1Insider trading is regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Insider trading
on material, non-public information is not allowed by Section 10b and SEC rule 10b-5
and Section 16a requires corporate insiders to report their trades to the SEC. Further,
Section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 limits round-trip trades within six-
month. According to this rule, any prots earned by insiders on a round trip within any
six-month period are required to be paid back to the rm. Corporate insiders are dened
as ocers, directors and blockholders owning at least 10% of a rm's stock.
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terial information. In contrast, Bhattacharya et al. (2000) show no unusual
returns or return volatility around takeover announcements for target compa-
nies in Mexico arguing that unrestricted insider trading causes prices to fully
incorporate the material information before its public release.
Despite high legal jeopardy concerning insider trading before public
announcements of takeover deals, target insiders are still able to prot on
their material information. They decrease their purchases (Harlow and Howe,
1993; Agrawal and Jae, 1995; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012), but because they
also decrease their sales they are able to prot on the information without
violating insider trading regulation. Agrawal and Nasser (2012) show that
insiders stop selling to such an extent that, despite the restrictions on their
purchases, they increase their net purchases over one year before the takeover
announcement. We contribute to this literature by showing that insiders are
willing to stop selling and thus to postpone satisfying their diversication
and/or liquidity needs only closer to the public announcement even though
they are often aware of takeover negotiations more than one year in advance.
It seems that insiders are condent about their own estimation of the takeover
premium only closer to the deal announcement. More importantly, we show
that insiders use their material information in a selective way. They trade
depending on the diering information that they possess about the future deal
during the negotiation process, which suggests that they consider some types
of deals as more protable than others. Insiders of target rms keep trading
strategically also after the public announcement.
Insiders learn about their rm being `in play' no later than around the
initiation date, be it target or bidder initiated deal. Target insiders might then
adjust their trading in the company stock depending on their own expectation
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concerning the takeover premium, which is the dierence between the expected
nal oer price and the stock price at the moment. The expected nal oer
price is however uncertain and subjective and most likely is aected by takeover
deal characteristics. Therefore, we conjecture that insider trading decisions
depend on the deal initiation, selling mechanism, method of payment and
bidder type.
An intuitive conjecture is that insiders have a very good feeling for the
future oer price and so their trading is closely linked to the actual realized
premium. This then implies that insider trading diers across deal characteris-
tics in line with the realized takeover premium as documented in the literature:
the realized takeover premium is higher in bidder versus target initiated deals
(Xie, 2010; Masulis and Simsir, 2015), informal sales versus formal full-scale
auctions (Fidrmuc et al., 2012b), deals paid for in cash versus stock (Huang
and Walking, 1987; Eckbo and Langohr, 1989; Hayn, 1989) and strategic ver-
sus nancial deals (Bargeron et al., 2008; Ocer et al., 2010; Dittmar et al.,
2012). Still, when trading insiders might consider also the probability of deal
success and their ownership interests after deal completion.
As an additional contribution, we extend our analysis beyond the public
announcement and conjecture that insider trading decisions after the public
announcement also dier depending on deal characteristics. The main driving
factor for insider trading after the deal public announcement is the dierence
between the stock price and the initial oer price, often referred to as merger
arbitrage spread (Jetley and Ji, 2010). Insiders take into account their as-
sessment of deal failure risk and possible oer improvement. Moreover, they
might also be aected by their ownership interests after deal completion.
We analyze open market stock transactions by insiders in 1098 publicly
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listed US target rms over the period from 2005 to 2011. Similarly to Agrawal
and Nasser (2012), we use the dierence in dierences approach relatively to
a control period and matched rms but do not only examine insider trading
before but also after the takeover public announcement. Our analysis of the
pre-announcement period results in four main ndings. First, the most inter-
esting result is that insiders in stock deals do not stop selling regardless of
how distant is the public announcement. Target insiders in stock deals do not
stop selling even immediately before the announcement. On the one hand,
this evidence strongly supports the bidder overvaluation hypothesis. Travlos
(1987), Schlingemann (2004) and many others argue that acquirers in stock
deals suer negative announcement abnormal returns because of their stock
overvaluation. Discounting the overvaluation and taking into account higher
deal value volatility, the expected takeover premium is low and insiders pre-
fer to sell. On the other hand, this result rejects the information asymmetry
theory predictions when information asymmetry concerns target rms. Un-
dervalued targets should prefer stock payment as it allows them to share in the
realization of synergies once the rms merge and thus mitigate cost associated
with information asymmetry (Hansen, 1987).
Second, in line with higher realized premium insiders are stronger net
buyers in rms sold through informal sales versus formal auctions and in rms
paid for by cash versus stock. Third, insiders in nancial deals increase their
net purchases despite lower realized takeover premium. It seems that they
are interested in keeping their ownership stake and in participating in value
improvement after deal completion. However, further analysis shows that the
higher net purchases for nancial deals are mostly due to very high net pur-
chases in nancial deals sold in informal sales that do exhibit high realized
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takeover premium. Fourth, despite dierences in realized premium we do not
nd dierence in net insider purchases for bidder versus target initiated deals.
We believe this due to higher probability of deal success for target initiated
deals that stems from higher determination to sell (Xie, 2010).
Our results show that insiders in all deals reduce their purchases to a
larger extent in the post-announcement period relatively to the pre-announcement
period. We believe this is a manifestation of the restrictive short-swing rule
closely linked to the fact that target insiders are forced to sell their shares
to the buyer at the completion and that takeovers take on average less than
six months from the public announcement to completion.2 Target insiders also
decrease their sales during the post-announcement period suggesting that they
expect to prot on positive arbitrage spread and/or improved oers.
Interestingly, insiders change their behavior from the pre-announcement
period to the post-announcement period with respect to deal characteristics.
First, they are stronger net buyers in rms that initiate a deal and are sold
in formal auctions. Second, insiders in both nancial and strategic deals do
not change their net purchases relatively to the control period. Finally, we
show that deal initiation, selling mechanism and payment consideration have
an reinforcing eect on each other. Target insiders are stronger net buyers in
formal auctions that are target initiated and in formal auctions that are paid
in cash. In contrast, they are net sellers in rms sold in informal sales that
are bidder initiated and in informal sales paid in stock.
Overall, our ndings on insiders' trades after the public announcement
suggest that insiders increase their net purchases in rms with higher prob-
2Moeller et al. (2004) and Betton et al. (2008) report an average length of 82 and 105
days, respectively. Our average is 122 days.
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ability of deal completion rather than increased deal value as these rms are
associated with smaller arbitrage spread, smaller realized oer improvement
and shorter public selling process. These results contribute to the literature
on merger arbitrage.3 Insiders reveal their opinion concerning stock price de-
velopments in the period between the announcement and completion.
This chapter is closely related to Agrawal and Nasser (2012) who ex-
amine insider trading in M&A target rms before the public announcement.
They use the dierence in dierences approach relatively to matched rms and
a control period and show that before the public announcement target insiders
decrease their purchases but decrease their sales even more, resulting in pos-
itive net purchases. Relatively to Agrawal and Nasser (2012), our denition
of the pre-announcement and control periods is more precise. We carefully
code initiation date of each deal and so we capture exact timing of insiders'
acquisition of information concerning a possible takeover deal. Due to the
fact that the private selling process is relatively lengthly and varies widely for
dierent deals, it is important to measure insider trading from the initiation
date. Moreover, exact information concerning the timing of the selling pro-
cess allows us to explore whether insiders trade on their material information
since early in the selling process or only later as their information concerning
negotiation outcomes become more reliable.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 builds
the hypotheses concerning both the pre- and post-announcement periods. Sec-
tion 3.3 introduces the data, explains the coding and the matching process and
provides basic statistics. Section 3.4 shows and discusses the regression results
3See Larcker and Lys (1987), Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), Baker and Savasoglu (2002)
and Jindra and Walking (2004).
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and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Hypotheses
3.2.1 Insider trading in the pre-announcement period
The initiation date, when a target rm contacts interested bidders or is ap-
proached by a bidder, starts o the selling process (Boone and Mulherin, 2011)
and, inevitably, target insiders become aware of the possible future takeover.
Target insiders then estimate the expected takeover premium, the dierence
between their expected nal oer price and the stock price at the moment,
and decide to trade or not to trade on the basis of this estimated expected
takeover premium. The expected nal oer price plays a key role in the es-
timation because of its uncertainty and subjectivity. It is aected by the
number of possible future states of nature, oer prices at each state of nature,
probabilities of each state and, as a result, the variation between the possible
states. These components vary widely and usually would dier also depending
on takeover deal characteristics. Therefore, our main conjecture is that insider
trading decisions also depend on deal characteristics, which insiders are aware
of early in the bidding process. In particular, we consider the deal initiation,
selling mechanism, method of payment and bidder type.
Agrawal and Nasser (2012) show that target insiders increase their net
purchases just before the takeover announcement due to larger reduction of
sales relatively to purchases over one year before the public announcement.
During the private selling process before the public announcement, target in-
siders can prot from increasing their purchases due to the expectation of rel-
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atively high realized takeover premium.4 However, insider trading on material
information is illegal. Moreover, the short-swing rule, which limits round-trip
trades within six months, should further decrease insider purchases, especially
in cash deals where insiders have to sell their shares at completion. Strict
insider trading regulation implies that target insiders are highly motivated to
reduce rather than increase their purchases. In contrast, insiders can strate-
gically choose to postpone their sales until the public announcement or even
until the completion date without violating any insider trading regulation and
still prot on their private information. One should, however, note that in-
siders who receive a large part of their remuneration package in form of their
rm's stocks and options have often high diversication and liquidity needs
that predict a consistent stream of insider sales (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001;
Fidrmuc et al., 2006).
Even though the realized takeover premium is, on average, large and
overwhelmingly positive relative to the stock price 8 weeks before the an-
nouncement, the insiders' expected takeover premium might be considerably
smaller at the beginning of the takeover process. It might be lower due to
higher uncertainty that increases with time and relatively high stock prices at
the moment. For some takeover targets, stock prices might be falling before
they recover again during the run-up period. As a consequence of relatively
low expected takeover premium and high diversication and liquidity needs,
target insiders might not change their sales patterns early in the selling process
but they might stop selling only once the stock price is low and it is not worth
selling any more (even given their liquidity and diversication motives).
4See Betton et al. (2008) for evidence of high signicant realized takeover premium for
a large recent sample of US takeovers.
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In contrast to Agrawal and Nasser (2012), we take into account the
information on diering lengths of the selling process by establishing the initi-
ation date for each deal. Our rst hypothesis then dierentiates insider trading
decisions early versus later in the private selling process:
Hypothesis 1: (a) As a result of insider trading regulation target in-
siders decrease their purchases immediately after the deal initiation. Due
to more imminent legal jeopardy, target insiders stop buying even more as
the public announcement of the deal becomes more imminent.
(b) Target insiders do not stop selling in the early stages of the private
selling process but stop selling close to the announcement when they can
better estimate the expected takeover premium and the stock price is rela-
tively low.
(c) As a result, insiders are more signicant net buyers of their stock only
closer to the public announcement of the takeover deal.
The realized takeover premium is on average positive and highly sig-
nicant (Betton et al., 2008). It is the main factor that could aect insiders'
expected takeover premium early in the takeover process and, in fact, exten-
sive literature shows that the realized takeover premium does dier depending
on deal characteristics.5 However, insiders might not always trade in line with
the realized premium and, thus, we build alternative hypotheses taking into
account other important considerations that could aect insiders' decisions.
In the following text, we rst highlight the particular side of the deal char-
acteristic that is associated with higher realized premium and then provide
arguments for an alternative relationship. As each deal characteristic is asso-
5See further text for exact references concerning each deal characteristic.
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ciated with two alternative hypotheses, we do not state them explicitly. Our
underlying hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Insider net purchases from deal initiation up to the deal
announcement dier depending on the deal initiation, selling mechanism,
payment consideration and buyer type.
Initiation. The selling process is usually initiated either by a prospec-
tive bidder proposing to take over the rm or by the board of the selling
company deciding that they want to consider all alternative strategic options
for the future of the company and eventually they oer the rm for sale. Bidder
initiated deals are usually associated with higher realized takeover premium.
The literature argues that it is due to higher bidder valuations of targets and
higher target rm bargaining power in bidder initiated deals (Xie, 2010; Ma-
sulis and Simsir, 2015). In contrast, target initiation results in lower realized
takeover premium due to target rms' higher willingness to sell (Aktas et al.,
2010; DeBodt et al., 2014). Target insiders in bidder initiated deals might
thus expect higher takeover premium and, therefore, be motivated to increase
their net purchases. At the same time, however, higher willingness to sell in
target initiated deals also increases deal success probability and thus could
be associated with higher probability of gaining a positive premium (DeBodt
et al., 2014). This argument then suggests that it is the target rather than
bidder initiated rms whose insiders who might be motivated to increase their
net purchases.
Selling mechanism. Target rms could be sold in full-scale auc-
tions, controlled sales or private negotiations (Boone and Mulherin, 2009).
We classify selling mechanisms along the dimension of formality and full pre-
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determination of the process into formal full-scale auctions and informal sales,
which include controlled sales and private negotiations.6 A formal full-scale
auction is associated with a very structured process that follows multiple de-
signed rounds and accommodates relatively large number of bidders (Hansen,
2001). Controlled sales and private negotiations follow a less formally struc-
tured process and involve a smaller number of bidders. In controlled sales,
target rms discretely canvass interest from a chosen and a limited number
of bidders who then counter-bid each other, while private negotiations involve
only one bidder (Boone and Mulherin, 2009). On average, informal sales ex-
hibit higher realized takeover premium relatively to formal full-scale auctions
even though they involve a smaller number of bidders (Fidrmuc et al., 2012b;
Fidrmuc and Moeller, 2015). Furthermore, informal sales take fewer days from
the initiation date to the public announcement, which could further increase
the expected premium. Therefore, target insiders in deals organized as infor-
mal sales might expect higher takeover premium and be motivated to increase
their net purchases. Alternatively, however, the formal selling process of full-
scale auctions is xed and pre-determined and once a selling rm starts the
process, it is very likely to end up with a winning bidder committed to the
deal. Informal sales, in contrast, are more ad hoc and therefore more uncertain
in terms of outcomes. Moreover, target rms sold in formal full-scale auctions
are smaller (Fidrmuc et al., 2012b) and smaller deals are usually less complex,
easier to negotiate and, therefore, more likely to end up in a public deal an-
nouncement. Due to the higher associated certainty of deal announcements,
it might be the insiders of rms sold in full-scale auctions who are motivated
6Note that our classication diers from the classication in Boone and Mulherin (2007)
who contrast private negotiations against `auctions,' which include controlled sales and full-
scale auctions.
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to increase their net purchases.
Payment consideration. Deals paid for in cash are associated with
higher realized takeover premium (Huang and Walking, 1987; Eckbo and Lan-
gohr, 1989; Hayn, 1989). Also, nal oer price in cash deals is more certain
and xed, while in stock deals the expected nal oer price changes with the
acquirer stock price. Acquirers in stock deals usually suer negative announce-
ment abnormal returns because of possible stock overvaluation before the deal
announcement, further reducing the expected takeover premium to target in-
siders (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). Therefore, we
conjecture that insiders in cash deals are more motivated to increase net pur-
chases relatively to stock deals. Alternatively, Hansen (1987) provides a strong
theoretical argument for why insiders in rms paid for by stock might not want
to sell their shares. If target insiders believe that their rm is undervalued,
they prefer stock payment that allows them to share in the long-term value
improvement of the merged rm and long-term synergies created in the deal
(Hansen, 1987; Bradley et al., 1988). As a result, insiders in deals paid for in
stock might be motivated to increase their net purchases.
Buyer type. Target rms usually have a clear preference for the type
of buyer they aim for already early after deal initiation (Fidrmuc et al., 2012b).
Targets acquired by strategic buyers versus nancial bidders usually exhibit
higher realized takeover premium (Bargeron et al., 2008; Ocer et al., 2010;
Dittmar et al., 2012) and so also their insiders might expect higher takeover
premium. Therefore, target insiders in strategic deals might be motivated to
increase their net purchases. Alternatively, buyers in nancial deals aim at
undervalued rms that have high potential of generating high cash ows and
high revenue growth after going private (Dittmar et al., 2012; Gorbenko and
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Malenko, 2014; Baker et al., 2015). Moreover, private equity rms often keep
the target management on board after the buyout (Fidrmuc et al., 2012a).
Insiders are usually motivated to increase their ownership in the deal to prot
on the value improvement once the rm is private. At the same time, private
equity rms support higher insider ownership to align insiders' interests with
their own (Wruck, 2008). Therefore, target insiders in nancial rather than
strategic deals might be motivated to increase their net purchases.
3.2.2 Insider trading in the post-announcement period
Information concerning a takeover deal together with deal characteristics is
released at the public announcement of the deal. After the public announce-
ment, target insiders could be relatively more free to trade as most of the
material information about the takeover is released in the public announce-
ment. However, insider trades in target rms are still restricted by the short-
swing rule because target insiders are forced to sell their shares to the bidder
at the completion date. As deals take on average less than six months from
the public announcement to completion (Moeller et al., 2004; Betton et al.,
2008), insider purchases within a six-month period before completion would
violate the short-swing rule. An exception should apply for insider purchases
in stock deals, where insiders swap their stock with acquirer's stock at the
completion date and, so, do not actually sell their shares to the acquirer. In
contrast to purchases, target insider sales are not restricted by regulation in
the post-announcement period.
The main driving factor for (speculative) trading after takeover deal
announcements in general is a positive arbitrage spread, that is the dierence
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between the initial oer price announced and the stock price immediately after
the deal announcement (Jetley and Ji, 2010). The main reason for why the
stock price after a takeover does not climb as high as the oer price is the
market's assessment of uncertainty associated with a successful deal comple-
tion.7 Higher spread is associated with higher odds of announced deals not
going through. Target insiders might be better at assessing the risks of deal
failures and so could prot from reducing their sales (increasing their net pur-
chases) during the post-announcement period. Furthermore, insiders might
have more intuition concerning possible improved oers and they might also
have reasons to retain ownership after the deal is completed. In case the in-
siders' estimation of risks of deal failure is high or in case they expect the nal
oer price not to increase or they do not have any reason to retain ownership
in the rm, target insiders might choose to sell immediately after the public
announcement and satisfy their liquidity and diversication needs. Therefore,
our basis hypothesis concerning the post-announcement period is as follows:
Hypothesis 3: (a) As a result of insider trading regulation, target in-
siders decrease their purchases also after the public announcement.
(b) As a result of positive merger arbitrage spread and insiders' assessment
of completion risks, nal oer value and their ownership considerations,
target insiders decrease their sales after the public announcement.
(c) Altogether, insider net purchases increase after the public announce-
ment.
Further, we conjecture that also insider trading decisions in the post-
7One should also take into account the time value of money (estimated time to comple-
tion) and the odds of deal value changes.
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announcement period dier depending on deal characteristics. As we argue
above, insider trading decisions take advantage of a positive arbitrage spread
and depend on insiders' assessment of risks of deal failure, their expected deal
value changes and ownership interests after the deal completion. All of these
factors might depend on deal characteristics, in particular the deal initiation,
selling mechanism, payment consideration and buyer type. As in section 3.2.1,
for each deal characteristic, we argue for two alternative hypotheses. Our
underlying hypothesis is the following:
Hypothesis 4: Insider net purchases after the deal public announce-
ment dier depending on the deal initiation, selling mechanism, payment
consideration and buyer type.
Initiation. Firms that initiate their deal express high willingness to
sell and thus are associated with smaller risk of deal failure (DeBodt et al.,
2014). In contrast, targets of bidder initiated deals are less desperate/eager
to sell and so they are quite determined to sell only in case of an attractive
oer and they do not mind to continue their pre-deal operations if the deal is
not successful. This means that insiders might assess target initiated deals as
more certain and be more willing to increase net purchases given the arbitrage
spread is positive. Alternatively, bidder initiation usually represents higher
buyers' willingness to acquire and, at the same time, might be associated with
increased bids and/or more competition (e.g., white knights) after the public
announcement. If target insiders believe their rm is of a high quality, they
would expect larger improvement in the nal bid price relatively to initial
oer at the announcement. Therefore, target insiders in bidder initiated deals
might be motivated to increase their net purchases.
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Selling mechanism. The deterministic process of selling rms in full-
scale auctions is probably associated with well-dened and relatively certain
outcomes that are rarely changed during the public selling process after the
deal announcement. Deals negotiated through informal sales might involve
higher risks of failure. If insiders perceive the dierent risks of failure, target
insiders in formal full-scale auctions might be more motivated to increase their
net purchases. Alternatively, rms sold through informal sales might face
higher probability of competition after the public announcement as they limit
the number of bidders during the private selling process. More competition
after the public announcement might be associated with a higher nal deal
value and bid increase and thus could motivate target insiders to increase
their net purchases.
Payment consideration. Cash deals oer a xed price and are also
less volatile in the odds of completion. Deal value of stock deals, in contrast,
varies with acquirer's stock price. Acquirer stock might be overvalued and
target insiders might not be willing to participate in overpayment cost (Eckbo
et al., 1990). Therefore, in case the arbitrage spread is positive, we conjec-
ture that target insiders in cash deals are more motivated to increase their net
purchases after the public announcement relatively to stock deals. Alterna-
tively, target insiders in stock deals, who are paid fully or partially by stock
of the acquirer and so are not forced to sell their shares on completion, face
fewer restrictions to buy additional shares because restrictions on round-trip
trades are not binding. Moreover, Hansen (1987) argues that with information
asymmetry high value target rms might prefer stock consideration because
with stock payment they share in the value improvement after the takeover.
Consequently, target insiders in stock deals might be motivated to increase
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their net purchases.
Buyer type. Target rms are usually associated with improved per-
formance after selling to a private equity rm and at the same time their top
management is usually retained. Therefore, target insiders are more likely to
accept nancial buyers' oer and are more certain about the odds of deal com-
pletion. Deals sold to strategic buyers usually involve higher growth options
and intangible assets (Fidrmuc et al., 2012b; Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014)
and might involve more severe anti-competition issues, all leading to more
complicated negotiations and less certain outcomes. Therefore, target insiders
of rms eventually bough by nancial buyers might want to increase their net
purchases more after the public announcement. Alternatively, strategic deals
due to their targets' higher asset specicity and lower inclination to use full-
scale auctions (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2014) might attract improved oer
bids after the public announcement. Then, target insiders in strategic deals
might be motivated to increase their net purchases more.
3.3 Data
Our main aim is to analyze insider trading in target rms before and after
M&A public announcement date depending on deal characteristics, including
deal initiation, selling mechanism, method of payment and bidder type. The
selling process is usually initiated either by a prospective bidder proposing to
take over the rm or by the board of the selling company deciding that they
want to oer the rm for sale. A selling mechanism could involve a formal
full-scale auction or, alternatively, an informal sale, including a controlled sale
or a private negotiation. Controlled sales and private negotiations follow less
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formal procedures and involve less bidding competition (Boone and Mulherin,
2007, 2009). Deals can be paid for by cash or stock. We classify partial stock
and pure stock payments together in one category. The nal bidder could be
a nancial (a private equity rm of a consortium of private equity rms) or a
strategic buyer. We require that data on these characteristics are available for
all deals in our data set.
3.3.1 Deals
The sample includes US M&A deals that were announced between January
2005 and December 2011 and are covered by the Security Database Corpo-
ration (SDC) in Thomson ONE Banker. We apply the following 4 selection
criteria: (i) both the acquirers and targets are US companies; (ii) all targets
are publicly listed rms before the deal while acquirers could be publicly listed
or private rms; (iii) the acquirers own 100% of targets' shares after the deal;
(iv) targets have data in COMPUSTAT and CRSP concerning accounting and
stock price data. We hand collect and code information concerning the selling
process from the `background of the deal' section of DEFM14A, PREM14A,
SC14D9, or S-4 lings, which we recover from the EGDAR ling collection
provided by the SEC. We hand collect information concerning the initiation
type, initiation date and selling mechanism. Out of 2003 deals identied in
SDC we are able to nd SEC lings on EDGAR for 1260 deals. For further
103 deals, we are not able to classify the initiator. Finally, we are not able
to get data from Compustat or CRSP for 59 targets. All together, the data
collection results in a sample of 1098 deal targets.
Table 3.1 repots selling process summary statistics. Column 2 shows
84
means for all deals. Further, we show means separately for bidder versus target
initiated deals in columns 3 and 4, respectively, and report the signicance of
the dierence in means in column 4. Columns 5 and 6 display means for
deals sold through informal sales versus formal full-scale auctions with the
signicance of the dierences shown in column 6. Means for cash versus stock
deals are reported in columns 7 and 8, while for strategic versus nancial deals
in columns 9 and 10. Variable denitions are provided in Appendix 3.6.1. We
test for dierences in means using the t-test allowing for unequal variances.
- insert Table 3.1 about here -
Column 2 shows that the nal realized premium, relatively to the price
8 weeks before the public announcement, is positive (34%) for the full sample.
The premium drops slightly to 32%, when we consider the initial oer instead
of the nal oer. We also report initial premium relatively to the stock price
at the initiation date and nd that it is considerably larger relatively to the
initial premium relatively to the stock price 8 weeks before the announcement
date. Oer improvement (1%) shows that, on average, bidders slightly increase
their nal oer relatively to the initial oer at the announcement. Table 3.1
further shows abnormal stock returns over dierent windows from the initiation
date up to the public announcement. We see negative stock returns from the
initiation date up to 1 month before the announcement, but the nal month
run-up results in an overall positive return from initiation until 1 day before
the announcement. The announcement eect measured as a 3 days abnormal
return around the announcement date is large and positive (26%). The merger
arbitrage spread is also positive (12%) and indicates large average risks of deal
failure. The mean private, public and whole selling process lengths are 387,
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122 and 509 calendar days, respectively. 24% of rms are acquired by nancial
buyers and 70% of deals are paid for in cash. 33% of deals are sold in full-scale
auctions, 37% in controlled sales and 30% in private negotiations. Finally,
column 2 documents that 44% of deals are initiated by target rms.
We classify a deal as bidder initiated, when a buyer approaches the
target rm with a takeover proposal, the board considers the proposal and
responds to the bidder. We classify a deal as target initiated if the target
rm rmly decides for a sale or at least hires a nancial advisor to identify
and contact potential bidders. Columns 3 and 4 show that bidder initiated
deals are signicantly larger (USD2.2 billion) relatively to target initiated deals
(USD1.4 billion). In line with the literature, we see that bidder initiated deals
earn signicantly higher premium: 39% versus 27%, respectively (Xie, 2010;
Fidrmuc et al., 2012b; Masulis and Simsir, 2015). The initial premium, both
relatively to the stock price 8 weeks before the announcement and on the
initiation date, is also signicantly higher in bidder versus target initiated
deals (37% versus 26% and 47% versus 34%, respectively). We also see that
bidder initiated deals are associated with a larger oer improvement relatively
to target initiated deals (1.6% versus 0.5%) and exhibit signicantly larger
abnormal returns during the private selling process and a larger announcement
eect (28% versus 24%). The merger arbitrage spread is also larger for bidder
initiated deals (12.8% versus 10.9%).
Moreover, columns 3 and 4 show that bidder initiated deals take on
average fewer calendar days from the initiation date to completion (441 versus
595 days) even though they take longer from the public announcement to
completion (127 versus 117 days). They have a signicantly lower number
of bidders contacted (9 versus 30) and signing a condentiality agreement (4
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versus 11) and are more frequently sold in private negotiations (42% versus
14%) but less frequently using formal auctions (20% versus 50%).
Columns 5 and 6 show that deals sold through informal sales are signif-
icantly larger (USD2.2 billion) relatively to formal auctions (USD1.0 billion).
They earn higher premium (37% versus 28%), higher initial premium (35% ver-
sus 27% and 46% versus 33% relatively to the stock price 8 weeks before the
announcement date and to the stock price on the initiation date, respectively),
consistent with Fidrmuc et al. (2012b) and Fidrmuc and Moeller (2015). Tar-
get abnormal returns during the private selling process are signicantly larger
in deals sold using informal sales. In fact, they are all negative for formal
auctions. Deals sold in less formal sales exhibit higher announcement stock
abnormal returns (28% versus 22%) and merger arbitrage spread, indicating
higher deal completion risks. They take on average shorter from the initiation
date to the public announcement (346 versus 468 days) and to the completion
(477 versus 573 days) but longer from the public announcement to completion
(131 versus 105 days). The average number of bidders contacted (5 versus 46)
and signing a condentiality agreement (2 versus 18) is signicantly lower for
informal sales. Deals sold using informal sales end up less often in the hands of
nancial rms (18% versus 38%) and are less frequently target initiated (33%
versus 67%).
Deals could be paid in stock (including partial stock payment) or pure
cash. The rst variable in columns 7 and 8 shows that cash deals are signi-
cantly smaller (USD1.3 billion) relatively to stock deals (USD3.0 billion). In
line with the literature, we nd that the realized premium is larger in cash
takeovers (36% versus 29%) (Hazelkorn et al., 2004; Ling and Petrova, 2008).
The two other premium measures show similar dierences. Target stock per-
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formance during the private selling process is not dierent for the 2 groups of
deals but the announcement eect is higher for cash deals (28% versus 22%).
The merger arbitrage spread is narrower in cash deals (11% versus 14%) and
implies smaller risk of deal failure.
In terms of deal characteristics, cash deals stay fewer days in the public
selling process relatively to stock deals (108 versus 157 days) but their private
or whole selling processes is not dierent. The number of bidders contacted
and signing a condentiality agreement are signicantly larger for cash deals
(22 versus 11 and 9 versus 4, respectively). We see that 1% of stock deals are
sold to nancial buyers, which seems quite unusual. In a detailed investigation,
we nd that a small number of deals involves nancial rms paying for with
stock of the private buying vehicle company. Cash deals are more often sold
in full-scale auctions (40% versus 18%), but less often in controlled sales (36%
versus 41%) or private negotiations (25% versus 41%).
Columns 9 and 10 show that statistical versus nancial buyers acquire
targets of similar size, but the bidding premium is signicantly larger for strate-
gic deals (35% versus 29%). These statistics are consistent with the literature
(Bargeron et al., 2008; Ocer et al., 2010; Dittmar et al., 2012). The im-
provement from initial to nal oer and stock performance during the private
selling process are not dierent between the 2 groups. Strategic deals exhibit
larger announcement abnormal returns relatively to nancial deals (27% ver-
sus 24%). They have also larger merger arbitrage spread (13% versus 9%),
indicating more risks of deal failure. Concerning deal characteristics, we see
that strategic deals take on average fewer days from the initiation to the public
announcement (368 versus 443 days) and to completion (492 versus 560 days).
The number of bidders contacted and signing a condentiality agreement are
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signicantly smaller for strategic deals (15 versus 29 and 6 versus 12, respec-
tively). We nd that almost all nancial deals are paid for in cash, while
only 61% of strategic deals. Strategic deals are less frequently sold in auctions
(27% versus 52%) and more often in controlled sales (40% versus 29%) and in
private negotiations (33% versus 19%).
3.3.2 Summary statistics for insider trading
The insider trading data is from Thomson Financial Insider Filings Data, Ta-
ble 1, which contains corporate insider non-derivative transactions required to
be reported via Form 4 by Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
We have information on the transaction date, transaction price, number of
shares traded, person ID, rm ID, company name, resulting shares held and
transaction code (purchase or sale). We exclude inaccurate or unreasonable
lings 8 and transactions labeled as amendments of previous insider trans-
actions 9 (Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). If a transaction price is missing, we
replace it with the CRSP closing price on the transaction date. We merge
multiple purchases (sales) by the same insider on the same transaction date
in the same company. We are interested in analyzing insider purchases and
sales separately and, therefore, we keep both purchases and sales transacted on
the same day separately. We also compute insider net purchases as purchases
minus sales by the same insider on the same transaction date in the same rm
(Agrawal and Nasser, 2012).
For the purposes of our analysis, it is very important to compare insider
purchases and sales in the pre- and post-announcement period to a non-event
8They are indicated by the Cleanse Indicator as "A" or "S".
9They are indicated by the Amendment Indicator as "A".
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period within the same rm. Concerning insider trading during the private sell-
ing process before the public announcement, we dene the pre-announcement
and the control periods and take the initiation date as the cut-o point. The
pre-announcement period is precisely dened from the deal initiation date to
the public announcement date instead of a uniform one-year period before
the announcement across all rms as in Agrawal and Nasser (2012). Because
insider trading depends on the length of the private selling process and also
varies within a year, we dene the control period as a one-year period before
deal initiation in case the private selling process takes one year or longer. In
case the private selling process is shorter than one year, the control period is
matched in length and the time of year, e.g. it is from one year before the
initiation date to one year before the announcement date. In terms of insider
trading after the public announcement, the post-announcement period is the
time from the public announcement date up to the resolution of the deal. The
corresponding control period is a one-year period before the initiation date in
case the post-announcement period takes one year or longer and is a period
of the same length as the post-announcement period ending at the initiation
date in case the public selling process length is shorter than one year.
Then we compare the change in insider trading in target rms relatively
to change in insider trading in matched rms that do not experience any
takeover and remain publicly listed. This is in order to adjust the overall
change/dierence in target insider trading for the `normal' outcome, that is
the change/dierence in insider trading in rms that do not experience any
information shock but are similar to the treatment (target) rms and operate
over the same period of time. The change/dierence in insider trading from
the control period to the event period for the matched rms then measures
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the `normal' eect. We use it to adjust the overall target rms' eect to get
a clean treatment eect that is free of any time trends. This is the essence of
the dierence in dierences approach.
We match based on the industry and total assets just before the ini-
tiation date (Shrieves and Stevens, 1979; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). Our
matching procedure is as follows. From the pool of all potential matching
rms with available accounting, stock price and insider trading data, we pick
the rm that is in the same Fama-French 30 industry and comes the closest
in terms of total assets in the same scal year using a +/{25% range. In case
we fail to nd a matching rm, we repeat the process for the corresponding
Fama-French 12 industry. If we still do not have a match, we apply the 4-digit
SIC code industry and then the 3-digit, 2-digit and nally 1-digit SIC code
industry. We also require that the same publicly listed rm is not matched
repeatedly to dierent target rms. The targets that are dropped out from
our data set due to unavailable SEC ling data are not included as matched
rms.10
We focus on trading by top executives and independent directors. Top
executives are the most familiar with the day to day operations of their rms
and therefore should have the most accurate information concerning its value
and prospects (Seyhun, 1986; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Independent directors
should also be informed about the prospects of their rms and they should be
quite pivotal in takeover decisions. Combining the 2 types of insiders creates
a well informed and relatively well populated group for our tests. We use
two proxies to measure insider trading: $ shares traded (dollar value of shares
10All together, 880 target rms are matched based on FF30 industry, 185 based on FF12,
20 based on 4-digit SIC, 2 based on 3-digit SIC, 5 based on 2-digit SIC and nally 6 targets
based on 1-digit SIC.
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traded in USD millions) and % equity traded (number of shares traded as a
fraction of shares outstanding in base points). For all the 4 studied periods,
we aggregate all shares bought (sold) by the top executives and independent
directors over the whole period and then divide them by the length of the
period in months. We do this re-scaling on a monthly basis because the length
of the pre- and post-announcement periods and their corresponding control
periods varies from deal to deal.
Table 3.2 reports insider purchases and sales for the pre-announcement
period. Columns 1 and 2 show means for the pre-announcement versus the
control period. Means for matched rms for the corresponding two periods are
reported in Columns 3 and 4. The last four columns report dierences in means
and their signicance, including the dierence in dierences in the last column.
We show results for all deals and then by the four deal characteristics: bidder
versus target initiated deals, deals sold through informal sale versus formal
auction, cash versus stock deals and strategic versus nancial deals. The two
insider trading measures are reported on monthly basis and are winsorized at
1% and 99%.
- insert Table 3.2 about here -
For all deals, we see that target insiders signicantly decrease their
purchases (Panel A) and sales (Panel B) during the pre-announcement period
relatively to the control period and matched rms. Insider purchases and sales
in matched rms do not change in the pre-announcement versus the control
period. The dierence in dierences is however only signicant for insider
purchases. Reduction of insider purchases in target rms before their public
announcement is consistent with insider trading regulation. However, target
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insiders can still prot on the private information through reducing their sales.
Concerning deal characteristics, we see in Panel A that target insiders in
all partitions, except nancial deals, signicantly lower their purchases during
pre-announcement period relatively to the control period. Also, target insiders
in all partitions signicantly reduce their purchases before the announcement
relatively to the matched rms. The last column shows that the dierence in
dierences is signicant for all partitions except for target initiated and nan-
cial deals. The results for sales in Panel B are less signicant. Insiders stop
selling in the pre-announcement period signicantly more in bidder initiated
deals, deals sold through informal sales, cash and nancial deals. Compar-
ing to matched rms, insider sales drop in all 8 partitions. The dierence in
dierences is signicant only for nancial deals.
Table 3.3 reports target insider purchases and sales during the post-
announcement period. Similarly to Table 3.2, we show insider trading averages
for target and matched rms, but now on top of the post-announcement and
control periods, for comparison, we report also the pre-announcement period
trading. With respect to dierences in means, we report the dierences for
target rms over the post-announcement period relatively to both the control
and pre-announcement period and also to the matched rms. The dierence
in post-announcement period relatively to the control and pre-announcement
periods is repeated also for the matched rms. The last column shows the
dierence in dierences between target versus matched rms. We again report
insider trading for all deals and for the 8 partitions by deal characteristics.
Both measures of insider trading are on monthly basis and are winsorized at
1% and 99%.
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- insert Table 3.3 about here -
Panel A with purchases shows that target insiders in all deals together
decrease their purchases during the post-announcement period relatively to
the control and pre-announcement period and to matched rms, though they
are signicant only for the percentage of equity measure. Insider purchases
in matched rms are signicantly reduced during the post-announcement pe-
riod relatively to the pre-announcement period. The dierence in dierences
indicates a drop in insider buying but is signicant again only for the percent-
age of equity measure. For the deal characteristics, target insider purchases
decrease signicantly during the post-announcement period relatively to the
control period except in nancial deals, but they decrease signicantly to the
matched rms for all 8 partitions. The dierence to pre-announcement period
is negative but insignicant except for formal auctions. The dierence in dif-
ferences is signicant for bidder initiated, informal selling mechanisms, cash
and strategic deals.
Panel B reveals that insider sales in all target rms during the post-
announcement period are not dierent relatively to the control and the pre-
announcement periods but are signicantly smaller relatively to matched rms
over the same period. In terms of the partitions, insiders do not tend to stop
selling in the post-announcement period relatively to neither control nor pre-
announcement periods except in target initiated deals. The dierence rela-
tively to matched rms is negative and signicant for target initiated, formal
auctions and cash deals. In contrast to the target rms, insiders in the matched
rms do stop selling relatively to both the control and pre-announcement
periods in bidder initiated, informal sales and stock deals, which then re-
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sults in positive and signicant dierence in dierences. This result indicates
that insiders in these types of deals are more eager to sell during the post-
announcement period and do not want to take advantage of the positive merger
arbitrage spread.
3.4 Results
Tables 3.4 to 3.7 report our results for insider trading patterns in target rms
before and after the public announcement of the takeover depending on the
deal initiation, selling mechanism, method of payment and buyer type. For
each table, insider purchases, sales and net purchases by top executives and
independent directors are measured as a fraction of common equity in base
points and all are re-adjusted on a monthly basis. We believe that scaling the
number of shares traded by all shares outstanding provides the best insider
trading measure as it incorporates both the trading volume as well as rm size.
All regressions include the following control variables: natural log of market
capitalization, book to market ratio, volatility of daily stock returns, change
in volatility of daily stock returns, market-adjusted average daily abnormal
returns lagged 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters relatively to the studied period, insider
ownership, R&D over total sales, liquidity, time and industry dummies.11 In-
sider purchase and sale regressions are estimated using a left-censored Tobit
model while net purchase regressions are estimated using OLS. We report Hu-
bert/White robust standard errors in brackets.
11Coecients for control variables are not reported in the tables to preserve space, but
are available on request. The estimated values are consistent with the literature (Seyhun,
1986; Aboody and Lev, 2000; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012).
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3.4.1 Results for pre-announcement insider trading
Table 3.4 shows the results for insider trading before the takeover announce-
ment. To test Hypothesis 1, we partition the pre-announcement period
into the 6-month period immediately before the public announcement and the
early pre-announcement period and report the results for these two subpe-
riods in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Panel C reports results for the
whole pre-announcement period, starting at the initiation date. We include
two additional control variables that are not considered in the literature so
far: the abnormal stock return during the pre-announcement period and the
period length. Insider purchases are reported in columns 1 to 5, insider sales
in columns 6 to 10 and insider net purchases in columns 11 to 15.
Column 1 in Panel A replicates the results for insider purchases as in
Agrawal and Nasser (2012) but only for the last 6 months just before the pub-
lic announcement. The interaction term `target x pre-announcement' shows
the clean dierence in dierences eect.12 It is negative and signicant at the
1-percent level showing that insider purchases drop during the last 6 months
before the public announcement. In line with Hypothesis 1a, the reduction
in purchases is likely due to strict legal restrictions in the post-SOX environ-
ment. At the same time, the interaction term in Column 6 for insider sales
shows that target insiders decrease signicantly also their sales, which supports
Hypothesis 1b. It seems that insiders are during the last 6 months before
the public announcement quite condent in estimating the expected takeover
premium with satisfying precision and stop selling. Overall, target insiders
12The interaction term shows the dierence in dierences eect as `target' stands for a
dummy variable for targets versus matched rms and 'pre-announcement' is the dummy
variable for pre-announcement versus control period.
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do not change their net purchases: the interaction term in column 11 is not
signicantly dierent from zero, which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1c.
Insiders reduce their purchases and sales to the same extent and, so, overall do
not prot on private information they possess before the public announcement
of the deal. This is mostly due to large drop in purchases.
Columns 2 to 5 explore the eect of the deal characteristics on insider
purchases immediately before the public announcement. In order to show
diering eects of insider trading depending on individual deal characteristics
in the dierence in dierences approach, we have to include a set of additional
interaction terms. Ultimately, we are interested in the triple interaction term
`deal characteristic x target x pre-announcement' and its sum with the plain
interaction term `target x pre-announcement' that is reported at the bottom
of the panel under the heading `total eect by deal characteristic.'
Column 2 explores the eect of bidder initiation. The plain interaction
term is signicantly negative, while the triple interaction term is not signif-
icant suggesting that insiders decrease their purchases signicantly in target
initiated deal rms and this decrease is not signicantly dierent relatively
to bidder initiated deal rms. The total eect, which in this case reects
the overall insider purchase change in bidder initiated deals, is signicantly
negative: insiders decrease their purchases signicantly also in bidder initi-
ated deal rms. Columns 4 and 5 show similar results for cash and nancial
deals, respectively. The only deal characteristic that exhibits signicantly dif-
ferent change for insider purchases is the selling process in Column 3. The
plain interaction term is negative, signicant and very large in absolute terms:
insiders in formal auctions stop buying by quite a large margin. The triple
interaction term is signicantly positive and the total eect is signicantly neg-
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ative suggesting that insiders in rms sold in informal sales still decrease their
purchases, but the drop is signicantly smaller relatively to formal auctions.
Columns 7 to 10 show changes in insider sales by the four deal charac-
teristics. The plain interaction terms show that insiders stop selling in target
initiated deals, formal auctions and strategic deals, but do not stop selling
in stock deals. The payment method and buyer type do exhibit signicant
dierences in insider selling: both the triple interaction terms are signicantly
negative in Columns 9 and 10. The overall eect is negative and signicant
for all four deal characteristics: insiders in bidder initiated, informal sales,
cash and nancial deals drop their sales signicantly immediately before the
deal announcement. Only target insiders in stock deals do not stop selling. It
seems their expectations concerning the future deal are not positive enough to
outweight their diversication and liquidity needs.
- insert Table 3.4 about here -
The eect for net purchases is reported in Columns 12 to 15. Parti-
tioning by deal characteristics gains some interesting results. First of all, we
see that in support of Hypothesis 2 the deal characteristics, except deal
initiation, do matter for insider net purchases. The triple interaction term
is signicantly positive for the selling mechanism, payment consideration as
well as buyer type. Insider trading patterns are signicantly dierent by these
deal characteristics suggesting that the deal characteristics aect insiders' es-
timation of expected premium and other deal benets. The second interesting
result is that insider trading patterns are in line with the realized takeover
premium for informal sales (versus formal auctions) and cash (versus stock)
deals, but not for nancial (versus strategic) deals. Insiders' net purchases
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are larger in rms acquired by nancial rather than strategic buyers, despite
the lower realized premium. It must be that insiders aim to increase their
ownership and participate in value improvement after their rms are taken
private (Fidrmuc et al., 2012a). Net insider purchases are not dierent only
for target versus bidder initiated deal rms even though the realized premium
is larger for bidder initiated deal rms. It seems that the higher determina-
tion to sell for target initiated deals associated with higher probability of deal
success (Xie, 2010) evens out the higher premium for bidder initiated deals.
Thirdly, the plain interaction term for the payment method (Column
14) is signicantly negative: insiders in stock deals increase their net sales
rather than purchases. Even though they stop buying, they do not stop sell-
ing at all and so the overall eect is increased net sales. Insiders are not
interested in proting from takeover premium in stock deals, perhaps because
their estimation of the prots is very low. This result is in contrast to predic-
tions of theories that assume asymmetric information on the side of the target
rm and predict that undervalued target rms prefer stock payment as they
like to prot on value improvements after the takeover that are hard to prove
during takeover negotiations due to information asymmetry. The result rather
suggests that target insiders are worried about overvaluation of their bidders.
Finally, net purchases are signicantly positive only in nancial deals. This
eect is mostly due to a very large decrease in sales in Column 10. Despite low
realized takeover premium, insiders seem to be eager to keep a high ownership
stake.
Panel B reports results for insider trading during the early pre-announcement
period, that is from the initiation date up to 6 months before the public an-
nouncement. For insider purchases, we see in Column 1 that overall target
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insiders reduce their purchases signicantly even early in the selling process
but, in line with Hypothesis 1a, the reduction is smaller relatively to pur-
chases closer to the public announcement. Deal characteristics still matter.
In Columns 2 to 5, even though the triple interaction term is signicant only
for informal sales, insiders signicantly reduce their purchases only in bidder
initiated deals, formal auctions, stock deals and strategic deals while in target
initiated, informal sales, cash and nancial deals, the negative coecient is in-
signicant indicating that they do not stop buying. Insiders seem to be more
inclined to follow rules in some types of deals while be more lenient with rules
in other types. We do not nd any unifying reason for this result. Nothing
is signicant for insider sales in Columns 6 to 10. In line with Hypothesis
1b, insiders do not stop selling when it is still far to deal announcement. At
this point in time, insiders still seem to be uncertain about their expected
premium and their diversication and liquidity needs prevail. Finally, for net
purchases in Columns 11 to 15 only the coecient for strategic deals is sig-
nicant. The coecient is negative, suggesting that insiders in strategic deals
increase their net sales signicantly during the early pre-announcement pe-
riod. Panel C shows insider trading over the whole private selling process.
The results are similar relatively to Panel A, but due to the weaker eect in
the early pre-announcement period (Panel B), the overall eect over the whole
private selling process is a bit weaker.
Table 3.5 further explores possible reinforcing eects across dierent
deal characteristics. In particular, we separately tabulate insider trading ef-
fects depending on the method of payment and bidder type in rms sold in
less formal sales in Columns 1 to 6 versus in rms sold in formal auctions in
Columns 7 to 12. The choice for a particular selling mechanism is determined
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by target rms shortly after the initiation date. Usually, formal auctions are
more often associated with nancial and cash deals, while informal sales with
strategic buyers and stock deals (Fidrmuc et al., 2012b).13 Panels A to C again
report results for the period immediately before the public announcement,
early pre-announcement and whole pre-announcement period, respectively.
- insert Table 3.5 about here -
Panel A reports results immediately before the public announcement.
We see that formal auctions are more restrictive in terms of insiders stopping
their purchases independent of the method of payment or the type of buyer.
For informal sales, insiders stop buying markedly less, especially in cash and
nancial deals. The total coecient for insider purchases is insignicant for
informal sales eventually sold to nancial buyers: insiders do not stop buying
within 6 months before the public announcement. Furthermore, the drop in
sales is markedly larger for informal sales. Together, the two eects result
in signicant increase in net purchases for both cash and nancial deals sold
through informal sales. The overall eect in formal auctions is negative and
insignicant. If anything, insiders tend to decrease rather than increase net
purchases in formal auctions. It is the informal sales that are associated with
higher net purchases by their insiders, but only in cash and nancial deals.
The eect is not present for stock and strategic deals. The eect of informal
sales for nancial buyers indicates that realized takeover premium might still
motivate even nancial deals as nancial buyers tend to pay relatively high
premium in case they participate in informal sales (Fidrmuc et al., 2012a).
13Other combinations of deal characteristics would also be possible, but they do not lead
to any interesting results.
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Panel B shows that the signicant and large eects are not present
at all in the early period after deal initiation. Uncertainty concerning deal
outcomes aects not only insider sales that have more scope for opportunism
and proteering, but it aects also insider purchases. It seems that insiders
are not restricted by the regulation and do not stop buying even in formal
auctions when it is quite sure that a deal in inevitable. As expected, results
in Panel C for the whole private selling process show similar but a bit weaker
results relatively to Panel A.
To summarize our results for insider trading in target rms before the
public announcement, we would like to highlight four points. First, in line
with Hypothesis 1a insiders tend to reduce their purchases more as the pub-
lic announcement of the deal becomes more imminent. The imminent takeover
announcement and subsequent deal completion represent increased legal jeop-
ardy and motivate insiders to stop buying even though a positive expected
premium might tempt them to prot on their private information and in-
crease their purchases. Still, for some types of deals (especially for informal
sales to nancial buyers or paid in cash), insiders decrease their purchases
signicantly less despite the high legal jeopardy even close to the public an-
nouncement. Second, as regulation is less restrictive concerning insider sales,
insiders take advantage of the option to stop selling to prot on their ma-
terial information. But again, this eect is present only closer to the deal
announcement when insiders' information concerning the future deal becomes
more precise and reliable. Third, insider net purchases measure the combined
eect of insiders stopping buying as well stopping selling their shares shortly
before the public announcement. For all rms together, the combined eect
is insignicantly dierent from zero. Strict regulation forces insiders to stop
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buying, but they adjust their sales accordingly and oset the negative eect
of purchases. In line with the results for sales, net purchases are signicantly
negative for stock deals and signicantly positive for nancial deals.
Finally, even during 6 months immediately before the public announce-
ment, two types of deal rms step out. Insiders in stock deals do not stop
selling. This contradicts predictions of the asymmetric information on the
side of the target rm theory, which suggests that undervalued targets prefer
stock payment that allows them to participate in value improvements follow-
ing the deal and reveal their rms' true high value. The fact that insiders do
not stop selling in stock deals rather supports the overvaluation of bidders hy-
pothesis. With a stock payment, the range of possible values for the takeover
premium depends on bidder stock valuations and is therefore quite wide. Due
to high risks involved, the estimated takeover premium is low. Insiders are
then not willing to stop selling. On the other side of the spectrum, insiders in
rms eventually sold to nancial buyers do stop selling the most. They seem
to intend to keep their ownership stake and participate in rm operations after
the deal completion. However, we also show that most of the large negative
eect on insider sales comes from nancial deals that are sold in informal sales
that include private negotiations and controlled sales. These types of sales ex-
hibit high realized takeover premium, which represents an alternative reason
for the large drop in insider sales.
3.4.2 Results for post-announcement insider trading
Table 3.6 shows patterns of insider trading in takeover targets after the public
announcement up to deal completion. The results are reported in a similar
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fashion to Table 3.4, but we replace the pre-announcement dummy with a
post-announcement dummy to reect the change of the studied period. Again
we are interested in the plain interaction term `target x post-announcement,'
the triple interaction term `deal characteristic x target x post-announcement'
and the total eect for a given deal characteristic `target x post-announcement
+ deal characteristic x target x post-announcement.' As before, we include all
usual control variables, but do not report their estimated coecients because
they are in line with the previous ndings in the literature. We include the
length of the public selling process as an additional control variable. We nd
that insiders increase their purchases and sales (decrease them less) when
the post-announcement period is longer, indicating smaller legal jeopardy and
higher uncertainty for the decision to sell. Again, results for insider purchases
are reported in Columns 1 to 5, insider sales in Columns 6 to 10 and insider
net purchases in Columns 11 to 15.14
In Column 1 with purchases for all rms together, the dierence in
dierences interaction term is negative and signicant at the 1-percent level.
It is also larger in absolute value relatively to Table 3.4, suggesting that in line
with Hypothesis 3a insiders do stop buying and they do stop buying more in
the post-announcement relatively to the pre-announcement period. It seems
that the legal jeopardy is higher. Insiders also decrease signicantly their
sales. The coecient for the plain interaction term in Column 6 for all rms is
signicantly negative supporting Hypothesis 3b. Positive arbitrage spread
together with insiders' estimation of improved bids and ownership interests
seem to motivate insiders to prot on the situation and so they decrease their
14We do not divide the post-announcement period into dierent sub-periods as the public
selling process on average takes only 122 calendar days (see Table 2.1). The division would
not result in dierent conclusions.
104
sales. Combining purchases and sales into net purchases in Column 11, we
get a negative but insignicant dierence in dierences coecient. Insiders
decrease their sales less relatively to purchases so that the overall eect is
negative. However, it remains insignicant. The decrease in sales seems to be
enough to compensate for the large decrease in purchases. Hypothesis 3c is
not supported in the full sample.
- insert Table 3.6 about here -
Exploring the eect of deal characteristics on insider purchases in the
post-announcement period in Columns 2 to 5, we see that insiders stop buying
in all types of rms. In contrast to the pre-announcement period, insiders
stop buying even more in informal sales. Legal jeopardy seems to be more
binding. It is interesting to note that insiders stop buying somewhat less in
stock deals where the round-trip rule should not be binding, but the dierence
with respect to cash deals is not signicant. Insiders do not take advantage of
the possibility perhaps because they do not wish to own more shares in stock
deals.
Turning to insider sales in Columns 6 to 10, in line with Hypothesis 4
we see striking dierences depending on the deal characteristics. The buyer
type is the only deal characteristic without a signicant dierence in insider
sale patterns. Both strategic and nancial deals exhibit decreased insider
sales. We see that insiders in target initiated and formal auction deals stop
selling quite intensively. The plain interaction terms in Columns 7 and 8 are
signicantly negative and large and the triple interaction term is also very large
and signicant at the 1-percent level suggesting a sizeable dierence to bidder
initiated and informal sales, respectively. Thus, insiders in target initiated
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and formal auction deals seem to see benets in not selling immediately after
the public announcement. They are willing to postpone their liquidity and/or
diversication needs and sell only at completion. In contrast, insiders in bidder
initiated and informal sale deals do not see a virtue in waiting and decide to
sell more during the post-announcement period. Insiders in stock deals do not
consider it worth postponing their sales either. The plain interaction term
in Column 9 is positive and insignicant. If anything, insiders in stock deals
sell more in the post-announcement period suggesting that they seem not to
believe in deal value improvement or consider the risk of deal failure too large.
This is not the case for insiders in cash deals.
Big dierences across deal characteristics prevail also for net purchases,
further supporting Hypothesis 4. Again, only the buyer type does not ex-
hibit a diering eect: the triple interaction term in Column 15 is insignicant.
In fact, the triple interaction terms for the remaining 3 deal characteristics are
larger relatively to the pre-announcement period and several of the dierences
and overall eects have dierent signs. Insiders seem to behave slightly dier-
ently after relatively to before the deal announcement, probably because their
information set and legal jeopardy change as well. In the post-announcement
period, insiders trade on their opinion concerning the risks of deal failure, the
odds of oer improvements or willingness to keep their ownership stakes. In
the pre-announcement period, insiders trade on their estimation of stock price
developments as well as deal success and oer size. The realized gains are
smaller after the public announcement because the arbitrage spread is usually
much smaller than the realized announcement premium, but the risks involved
seem to be much smaller.
Table 3.6 shows that insiders signicantly increase net purchases only
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in rms sold in formal auctions. The plain interaction term in Column 13,
which shows the net purchase eect in rms sold in formal auctions, is large,
positive and signicant at the 1-percent level. The corresponding eect in the
pre-announcement period is negative, large, but not signicant. Insiders seem
to change their behavior. They do not stop selling in the pre-announcement
period, but do so in the post-announcement period. The triple interaction
term in Column 13 is signicantly negative: insiders in informal sales increase
their net purchases signicantly less. In fact, the total eect in informal sales is
negative. Insiders increase their net sales rather than net purchases. Insiders in
informal sales sell closer after the public announcement and do not wait until
completion. Also, insiders in bidder initiated and stock deal rms decrease
their net purchases (Columns 12 and 14). They do not wait with their sales
until completion of the deal. The triple interaction term osets this eect
resulting in insignicant net purchases in target initiated and cash deal rms.
For these types of rms, insiders do stop selling signicantly, but only to the
extent to oset the large drop in purchases.
We further explore possible reinforcing eects across deal characteris-
tics. The largest dierence in net purchases in Table 3.6 is for formal versus
informal sales. Usually, formal auctions are associated with target deal ini-
tiation, cash payment and nancial buyer (Xie, 2010; Fidrmuc et al., 2012b)
and, so, we might nd a reinforcing eect when these characteristics overlap.
Table 3.7 shows that this is indeed the case for deal initiation and payment
consideration.15 Insider net purchases are large and signicantly negative for
15Dierences for the type of buyer are not signicant and so are not tabulated. They are
available upon request. We have also large overlaps concerning interaction between the type
of buyer and method of payment as nancial deals almost always paid for in cash and so
stock payments are also almost always by strategic buyers. This means that the negative
net purchases coecient for stock deals is all due to strategic buyers. Net purchases for
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informal sales in bidder initiated deal rms but not in target initiated deal
rms. At the same time, insiders increase their net purchases in formal auc-
tions that are target initiated but not in bidder initiated. Similar eect holds
for the interaction between the selling mechanism and payment consideration:
insiders increase net purchases in cash deals sold in formal auctions and de-
crease net purchases in informal sales paid in stock. The other combinations
exhibit insignicant net purchases. Overall, the large triple interaction term
for the selling mechanism in Table 3.6 is mostly due to selling mechanism hav-
ing signicantly diering eect in target initiated and cash deals. For bidder
initiated and stock deals, the triple interaction term is not signicant.
- insert Table 3.7 about here -
Insiders increase net purchases in rms that have smaller average real-
ized oer improvement, smaller arbitrage spread and shorter post-announcement
period. It seems they are willing to adjust their trading and bet on certainty
of deal completion rather than increased deal value.
3.5 Conclusions
The main aim of the chapter is to analyze insider trading in target rms before
and after the takeover pubic announcement depending on deal characteristics
including the deal initiation, selling mechanism, method of payment and buyer
type. On a sample of 1098 publicly listed US target rms, we examine insider
trading patterns using the dierence in dierences approach that controls for
insider trading in the same rm during a control period and at the same time
strategic buyers paid in cash has to be positive to result in small negative overall eect for
all strategic deals together. The estimated results are available upon request.
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for change in insider trading in matched rms. We conrm that target insiders
decrease their purchases before the public announcement (Harlow and Howe,
1993; Agrawal et al., 1992; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). In line with higher
legal jeopardy, the decrease in insider purchases is larger as the deal public
announcement becomes more imminent. At the same time, we nd a large drop
in insider sales only closer to the deal announcement when insiders' information
concerning the future deal becomes more precise and reliable. Insiders do not
stop selling in the early pre-announcement period soon after deal initiation.
We believe their uncertainty concerning the expected premium at the moment
is high and causes the insiders' trade o to tilt in favor of their diversication
and liquidity needs.
Exploring the eect of deal characteristics, we nd that insiders are
stronger net buyers before the public announcement in rms sold through
informal sales and in rms paid for by cash. We interpret these ndings as
a result of high realized takeover premium. Despite dierences in realized
premium, net insider purchases are not dierent between target versus bidder
initiated deals. It seems that higher odds of success in target initiated deals
oset the lower premium.
Two types of deals step out during 6 months immediately before the
public announcement: stock and nancial deals. Insiders in stock deals do not
stop selling, which supports the hypothesis of bidder overvaluation. Insiders
are strong net buyers in nancial deals, which contradicts the higher realized
premium in strategic deals but supports insiders' aim to increase their owner-
ship. However, this eect mostly comes from nancial deals that are sold in
informal sales that do have high realized takeover premium.
Insider trading patterns change after the public announcement. Target
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insiders lower their purchases in line with the short-swing restriction as deals
take on average less than six months from the announcement to completion
and target insiders are forced to sell their shares at the completion date. At
the same time, we see drop in insider sales and no change in net purchases.
Concerning deal characteristics, we nd that insiders are stronger net buyers
in target initiated deals, in formal auctions and in cash deals. These character-
istics reinforce each other. These results suggest that insiders bet on certainty
of deal completion rather than increase in deal value.
In summary, we show that insiders use their private information strate-
gically as they trade dierently across deals with dierent deal characteristics
and before versus after the public announcement.
Future versions of the chapter could improve the analysis in several
aspects. First, to control for diering patterns of insider trading during a
calendar year, one could rematch the 2 control periods exactly in the same
months with the pre- and post-announcement period. Second, it might be
valuable to gure out when do insiders in stock deals sell after the public
announcement. Do they sell immediately at the public announcement date or
later after the announcement? Finally, one could check trades by other groups
of insiders, e.g., CEO or CFO or all insiders but excluding blockholders.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Variable denitions
Variable Denition Source
 The volatility of daily stock returns over the
period from 250 to 126 trading days before
the beginning of the pre-announcement, post-
announcement and control period, respectively.
Based on Agrawal and Nasser (2012).
CRSP, OC
 The change in volatility of daily stock returns
over the period from 125 to 1 trading day ver-
sus the period from 250 to 126 trading days be-
fore the beginning of the pre-announcement, post-
announcement and control period, respectively.
Based on Agrawal and Nasser (2012).
CRSP, OC
% equity The total fraction of shares outstanding in base
points bought or sold by corporate insiders during
the pre-announcement, the post-announcement
or the control period and is scaled as monthly
basis depending on the months of the pre-
announcement, the post-announcement and the
control period, respectively.
TIF, OC
$ shares Total value of shares (transaction price or stock
price that trading day if transaction price is
unavailable times total number of shares) in
USD millions bought or sold by corporate in-
siders during the pre-announcement, the post-
announcement or the control period and is scaled
as monthly basis depending on the months of the
pre-announcement, the post-announcement and
the control period, respectively.
TIF, OC
Auction Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the company
is sold in a highly organized auction with pre-set
rules and 0 otherwise. Based on Hansen (2001).
HC
Bidders contacted Total number of bidders that the target rm con-
tracts during the selling process.
HC
Bidder initiated deal Deal for which, at the beginning of the private
selling process, a potential buyer approaches the
target rm and proposes an M&A transaction.
The deal includes both nal acquirer initiated and
third party initiated M&As.
HC
Bidders with cond.
agreement
Total number of bidders that the target signs con-
dentiality agreement with during the private sell-
ing process.
HC
Book to market Book value of equity over market capitalization
1 scal year before the beginning of the pre-
announcement, post-announcement and control
period, respectively.
COMPUSTAT
continued on next page
111
continued from previous page
Variable Denition Source
CAR 1;+1 The cumulative target abnormal stock returns of
a target rm over the period from 1 day before to
1 days after the public announcement date.
CRSP, OC
CARinit:;6mbef:ann: The cumulative target abnormal stock returns of
a target rm over period from the initiation date
to 6 months before the public announcement.
CRSP, OC
CARinit:;4mbef:ann: The cumulative target abnormal stock returns of
a target rm over period from the initiation date
to 4 months before the public announcement.
CRSP, OC
CARinit:;2mbef:ann: The cumulative target abnormal stock returns of
a target rm over period from the initiation date
to 2 months before the public announcement.
CRSP, OC
CARinit:;1mbef:ann: The cumulative target abnormal stock returns of
a target rm over period from the initiation date
to 1 month before the public announcement.
CRSP, OC
CARinit:;1dbef:ann: The cumulative target abnormal stock returns of
a target rm over period from the initiation date
to 1 day before the public announcement.
CRSP, OC
Control period Concerning the pre-announcement period, it is the
one-year period before the initiation in case the
private selling process takes one year or longer.
It is from one year before the initiation to one
year before the announcement in case the length
is less than one year. Concerning the post-
announcement period, it is the one-year period be-
fore the initiation in case the post-announcement
period takes one year or longer. It is the period
ending at initiation but in the same length with
the public selling process in case the length is less
than one year.
OC
Cash oer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the acquirer
oers pure cash as the payment consideration and
0 otherwise.
SDC
Controlled sale Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the target com-
pany decides to discreetly canvass a limited num-
ber of bidders that target management believes to
have a serious interest in acquiring the company
and 0 otherwise. Based on Boone and Mulherin
(2009).
HC
Early pre-
announcement period
The period from the initiation date to six
months before the announcement in case the pre-
announcement period takes six months or longer.
It is from the initiation date to the public an-
nouncement in case the length is shorter than 6
months.
OC
continued on next page
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Variable Denition Source
Financial acquirer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the target rm
is acquired by a rm that is majority owned by a
private equity investor and 0 otherwise. Based on
Fidrmuc et al. (2012).
SDC
Immediately before
announcement
The 6-month period before public announcements
in case the private selling process stays six months
or longer and the initiation date to the public an-
nouncement in case the length is shorter than 6
months.
OC
Informal sale Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the deal is sold
in controlled sale or private negotiation and 0 oth-
erwise. Based on Boone and Mulherin (2009).
HC
Initial premium to 8w
b.ann
The initial oer price at the announcement date
relative to the stock price 8 weeks before the SDC
announcement date in percentage points.
SDC
Initial premium to
initiation
The initial oer price at the announcement date
relative to the stock price at the initiation date in
percentage points.
SDC
Initiation date The date on which the target starts to consider
a potential sale of the rm. Based on Boone and
Mulherin (2007).
HC
Insider ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by
the board members and top ocers (CB, CEO,
CO, GC, P; AC, AF, CC, CFO, CI, CT, D, DO,
EC, FC, GP, H, M, MC, MD, O, OB, OD, OP,
OS, OT, OX, S, SC, TR, VC) just before the deal
initiation, the public announcement and 1 year be-
fore the initiation date for the pre-announcement,
the post-announcement and the control period, re-
spectively.
TIF, OC
Liquidity Daily average fraction of shares outstanding that
is traded over the one calender year before
the beginning of the pre-announcement, post-
announcement and control period.
COMPUSTAT
Market capitalization Stock price times shares outstanding 1 scal year
before the beginning of the pre-announcement,
post-announcement and control period; in the
analysis used as a natural log.
CRSP
Merger arbitrage
spread
The dierence between the initial oer price an-
nounced and the stock price immediately after the
deal announcement in percentage points. Based
on Jetley and Ji ( 2010).
COMPUSTAT,
CRSP, OC
Net purchase Purchase minus sale by the same insider in the
same transaction date in the same company.
Based on Agrawal and Nasser (2012).
TIF, OC
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113
continued from previous page
Variable Denition Source
Oer improvement The nal oer price at the completion date relative
to the initial oer price at the initiation date in
percentage points.
SDC
Pre-announcement Dummy variable equal to 1 in case insider trading
is from the initiation date to the public announce-
ment and 0 otherwise.
TIF, OC
Premium The nal oer price relative to the stock price 8
weeks before the SDC announcement date in per-
centage points.
SDC
PRETt Market adjusted average daily abnormal returns
t quarter before the pre-announcement, the post-
announcement or the control period and t equals
1, 2, 3 and 4. Based on Agrawal and Nasser
(2012).
CRSP, OC
Post-announcement Dummy variable equal to 1 in case insider trad-
ing is from the SDC announcement date to the
resolution and 0 otherwise.
TIF, OC
Private negotiation Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the target rm
negotiates with only one bidder during the selling
process. Based on Boone and Mulherin (2009).
HC
Pri. pro. length Natural log of the private selling process length. HC
Private selling pro-
cess length
Length in days from the initiation date to the SDC
announcement date.
HC
Pub. pro. length Natural log of the public selling process length. HC
Public selling process
length
Length in days from the SDC announcement date
to the resolution date.
HC
R&D Research and development expenses divided by to-
tal sales.
COMPUSTAT
Selling process length The length in days from the initiation date to the
resolution date.
HC
Stock oer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the deals in
paid for by stock or partially by stock and 0 oth-
erwise.
SDC
Strategic acquirer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the target rm
is acquired by a rm that usually have related
type of businesses, e.g., suppliers, customers or
competitors. Based on Fidrmuc et al. (2012) and
Gorbenko and Manlenko (2014).
SDC
Target Dummy variable equal to 1 for the target rm and
0 otherwise.
OC
Target initiated deal The board of the target rm decides to sell
the company and consequently contacts potential
buyers.
HC
Third party initiated Bidder initiated deal that ends up with a buyer
that is not the primary initiator of the deal.
HC
continued on next page
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Variable Denition Source
Top executives and
independent directors
Corporate insider group that includes the board
members and top ocers (CB, CEO, CO, GC, P;
AC, AF, CC, CFO, CI, CT, D, DO, EC, FC, GP,
H, M, MC, MD, O, OB, OD, OP, OS, OT, OX, S,
SC, TR, VC, AV).
TIF, OC
Total assets Book value of total assets in USD millions; in the
analysis used as a natural log.
COMPUSTAT
Total sales Total amount collected for providing goods and
services in USD millions.
COMPUSTAT
Transaction value Total value paid by the acquirer less fees and ex-
penses in USD millions.
SDC
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Chapter 4
Acquirer Insiders' Trades
around the Takeover
Announcement Date
4.1 Introduction
Insider trading on material information has been widely discussed in the US,
Europe and other countries. Insider trading regulation in the US that dates
back to 1934 is one of the most restrictive and eective around the world.1
Takeover targets are usually associated with a strong positive market reaction
around the public announcement date, which provides a direct evidence of the
eectiveness of insider trading restrictions before public releases of material
1Insider trading is regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Insider trading
on material, non-public information is not allowed by Section 10b and SEC rule 10b-5
and Section 16a requires corporate insiders to report their trades to the SEC. Further,
Section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 limits round-trip trades within six-
month. According to this rule, any prots earned by insiders on a round trip within any
six-month period are required to be paid back to the rm. Corporate insiders are dened
as ocers, directors and blockholders owning at least 10% of a rm's stock.
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information. Acquiring rms are, however, associated with small positive or
even insignicant announcement stock abnormal returns.2 This might rather
suggest the ineectiveness of insider trading regulations or the market's per-
ception of low synergies.
Seyhun (1990) shows that insiders in acquiring rms increase their pur-
chases and decrease their sales over one year before the public announcement,
which indicates that insider trading restriction might not be eective. Boehmer
and Netter (1997) however nd that insider net purchases are not changed dur-
ing 6 months before the public announcement of a deal. We contribute to the
literature by focussing on insiders' trades even closer to the public announce-
ment. Only at this point in time do all acquirers' participation in the takeover
process seem to be more certain. In line with high legal jeopardy, we show that
insiders reduce their purchases as the public announcement becomes more im-
minent. At the same time, acquirer insiders are willing to stop selling to prot
from their material information without violating insider trading regulation.
It seems that insiders are only condent about their own estimation of the
synergy when closer to the deal announcement. More importantly, we show
that acquirer insiders use their material information in a selective way. Their
trading decisions dier depending on the information that they possess about
the future deal during the negotiation process, which suggests that they con-
sider some types of deals to be more protable than others. The information
also aects insiders' trading activity after the public announcement.
Buying another rm is an important investment and company devel-
opment decision that potentially creates benets for the rm. Insiders learn
2See Lorderer and Martin (1990), Moeller et al. (2004), Bradley and Sundaram (2006),
Moeller et al. (2007), and Akbulut and Matsusaka (2010) for detailed results.
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about their rm being `in play' after they participate in the takeover process at
or after the initiation date. Acquirer insiders might then decide to (not) buy
or (not) sell depending on their own estimation concerning the net synergy,
which is the dierence between the expected synergy and the premium paid.
Insiders also consider the eect of bidding winning probability. These three
factors are uncertain and subjective, and most likely are aected by takeover
deal characteristics. Therefore, we conjecture that insiders' trades depend on
the deal initiation, selling mechanism and method of payment.
As an additional contribution, we extend our analysis beyond the public
announcement and conjecture that insider trading decisions after the public
announcement also dier depending on deal characteristics. Insiders' trades
after the deal public announcement are mainly aected by the dispersion be-
tween insiders' expectation of nal net synergies and the market's perception.
Moreover, insiders take into account the risks of deal failure, possible oer
improvement and their ownership dilution after the completion of a deal.
We analyze the open market stock trades by insiders in 627 publicly
listed US acquiring rms over the period from 2005 to 2011. For the pur-
pose of examining insider trading before and after the public announcement
of takeover deals, we use the dierence in dierences approach relatively to
matched rms and a control period. Our analysis of the pre-announcement
period results in four main ndings. First, insiders are stronger net buyers in
deals sold in informal sales both before and after the public announcement.
This evidence strongly supports the private value hypothesis. Gorbenko and
Malenko (2013) argue that private value deals that are associated with infor-
mal sales can create higher synergies/value due to the specic asset t between
acquiring and target rms. Second, insiders are stronger net buyers in stock
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deals during the pre- and post-announcement periods. This result provides
an evidence for bidder overvaluation and long-term value creation hypotheses.
Stock payment is preferred because acquirers can take advantage of target in-
siders sharing the overpayment cost (Hansen, 1987; Eckbo et al., 1990). At
the same time, these stock takeovers can make expected long-run abnormal
returns less negative and so a high perceived synergy/value would be essential
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Savor and Lu, 2009).
Third, the selling mechanism and payment consideration reinforce each
other. We show that insiders are net sellers in cash deals that are sold in
formal auctions both before and after the public announcement. It seems that
insiders keep selling to avoid being cursed by their overvaluation of the target
when they cannot share the overpayment cost with target insiders (Roll, 1986;
Varaiya and Ferris, 1987; Hansen, 1987; Eckbo et al., 1990). For informal sales,
insiders are stronger net buyers in stock deals before the public announcement
but in cash deals after the public announcement. Cash deals that are associ-
ated with positive acquirer announcement returns (Bargeron et al., 2008; Savor
and Lu, 2009) enhance the value creation by private value deals (Gorbenko
and Malenko, 2013). Finally, despite a greater willingness to buy, net insider
purchases do not dier between nal acquirer versus other parties initiated
deals during pre- and post- announcement periods. We interpret the nding
as a result of the osetting eect by lower takeover premium in other party
initiated deals.
Overall, our results contribute to the literature on takeover value cre-
ation, neutral and destruction.3 Therefore, it would not be accurate to con-
3See Bradley et al. (1983), Bradley et al. (1988), Roll (1986), Jensen (1986) and Betton
et al. (2008) for details.
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clude that takeover deals are all associated with small market reaction.
This chapter extends the empirical literature on trades by acquirer in-
siders (Seyhun, 1990; Boehmer and Netter, 1997; Song, 2007; Akbulut et al.,
2014). Seyhun (1990) nds that insiders increase their net purchases due to
increase in purchases and drop in sales. Boehmer and Netter (1997) then doc-
ument that insiders do not change their net purchases patterns around the
public announcement. Moreover, Seyhun (1990) shows that net purchases are
higher in deals paid by cash relatively to by stock while Song (2007) and Ak-
bulut et al. (2014) gure out that insider sales increase in overpaid M&A deals
before the public announcement. In the chapter, we make a precise denition
of the pre- and post-announcement periods. We carefully code the initiation
date of each deal and so we capture relatively more precise timing of insiders'
acquisition of information concerning a possible takeover deal. Moreover, exact
information concerning the timing of the selling process allows us to explore
whether insiders trade on their material information since early in the selling
process or only later, as their information concerning negotiation outcomes
becomes more reliable. It also helps to explore whether insiders adjust their
trading activities during the public selling process.
The reminder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains
in more detail the hypotheses of acquirer insider trading before and after the
announcement date. Section 4.3 introduces the data, explains the coding and
the matching process and provides basic statistics. Section 4.4 shows and
discusses the regression results and Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 Hypotheses
4.2.1 Insider trading in the pre-announcement period
At or after the M&A initiation date, acquiring rms actively approach or are
contacted by the target rms to explore the interest of making an acquisition
(Boone and Mulherin, 2011). Acquirer insiders then start to learn about a po-
tential deal and estimate their expected net synergies, the expected dierence
between synergies and the premium paid to targets. The synergy and premium
vary widely and would also dier depending on takeover deal characteristics.
Therefore, our main conjecture is that insider trading decisions also depend
on deal characteristics. In particular, we consider the deal initiation, selling
mechanism and method of payment.
Seyhun (1990) shows that top managers of acquiring rms increase their
net purchases before the takeover pubic announcement date due to increase
in purchases and decrease in sales. However, Boehmer and Netter (1997) nd
no change in the trading patterns by all managers. Positive synergies can
be created after completion of a takeover (Bradley et al., 1988) and acquirer
insiders are overcondent about the takeover synergies (Roll, 1986; Malmendier
and Tate, 2008). Therefore, acquirer insiders can benet from increasing their
purchases after participating in bidding for a target. However, insider trading
on the material information of a potential takeover is illegal as acquirer stock
prices would be aected by the takeover. In contrast, insiders can strategically
choose to postpone their sales until the public announcement without violating
any insider trading regulation and still prot on their private information.
Acquiring rms usually involve taking part in a bidding process at the later
stage of the takeover process, and thus usually, insiders could only decide to
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reduce their purchases when closing to the public announcement. When it is
at the beginning of the takeover process, on average, acquirer insiders might
not learn about a potential takeover and thus do not change their purchases
patterns. A similar eect holds for insider sales: acquirer insiders might also
not change their sales pattern early in the selling process.
In contrast to Seyhun (1990) and Boehmer and Netter (1997), we con-
sider the time eects by checking when the acquiring rm participates in the
bidding process and build our rst hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1: (a) As a result of insider trading regulation acquirer
insiders decrease their purchases in the period close to the public announce-
ment but do not stop buying in the early stages of takeover process.
(b) Acquirer insiders stop selling immediately before the public announce-
ment but do not stop selling immediately after the deal initiation.
(c) As a result, insiders are net buyers only as the public announcement
of the deal becomes imminent.
Insiders' expected net synergy is mainly aected by their valuation con-
cerning the target rms that could dier depending on deal characteristics.
Estimated net synergies could be large in case acquirer insiders have high tar-
get valuation even though they are willing to pay high premium. However,
insiders' trades might not always be in line with the estimated target valua-
tion and could be aected by other important factors. Therefore, we also build
alternative hypotheses. In the following text, we rst provide hypotheses in
terms of the target valuation and then argue for an alternative relationship.
As each deal characteristics is associated with two alternative hypotheses, we
do not state them explicitly. Our underlying hypothesis is as follows:
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Hypothesis 2: Insider net purchases from deal initiation up to the
public announcement dier depending on deal initiation, selling mechanism
and payment consideration.
Initiation. The selling process is usually initiated either by a prospec-
tive bidder, including the nal acquirer or a third party, proposing to takeover
the rm or the board of the selling company deciding that they want to be
sold. We take into account the acquirers' willingness to buy and classify deal
initiation into nal acquirer initiation and other party initiation, including
target and a third party initiation. Final acquirer initiated deals are usually
associated with higher bidder valuations of target rms (Xie, 2010; Masulis
and Simsir, 2015) and so higher expected net synergies. This is due to higher
acquirers' willingness to buy from the beginning of the takeover process. At the
same time, the uncertainty of a successful takeover is smaller in case the nal
buyer is the only bidder before the public announcement. Therefore, acquirer
insiders in nal acquirer initiated deals may be motivated to increase their
net purchases. Alternatively, other parties initiation, especially target initi-
ation, results in lower takeover premium (Aktas et al., 2010; DeBodt et al.,
2014). Acquirer insiders in other parties initiated deals might expect higher
net synergies and, therefore, be motivated to increase their net purchases.
Selling mechanism. Target rms could be sold using full-scale auc-
tions, controlled sales or private negotiations (Boone and Mulherin, 2009). We
classify selling mechanisms along the odds of winning that depends on the num-
ber of bidders into formal auctions and informal sales, which include controlled
sales and private negotiations.4 A formal full-scale auction is associated with
4Note that our classication diers from the classication in Boone and Mulherin (2007)
who contrast private negotiations against `auctions,' which include controlled sales and full-
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a very structured process that follows multiple designed rounds and accommo-
dates relatively large number of bidders (Hansen, 2001). Controlled sales and
private negotiations involve a smaller number of bidders. In controlled sales,
target rms discretely canvass interest from a chosen and a limited number
of bidders who then counter-bid each other, while private negotiations involve
only one bidder (Boone and Mulherin, 2009). Informal sales takeovers are on
average private value deals, and thus are associated with higher bidder valua-
tions and higher expected net synergies. Gorbenko and Malenko (2013) argue
that private value deals involve a smaller number of bidders because they de-
pend on a specic asset t between acquiring and target rms. At the same
time, higher odds of winning in informal sales could be associated with higher
probability of gaining a higher net synergy. In contrast, the t in common
value deals is not bidder specic, and thus more bidders that are able to cre-
ate value in a similar way are attracted. Therefore, we conjecture that insiders
in deals sold in informal sales rather than formal auctions are more motivated
to increase their net purchases. Alternatively, formal full-scale auctions ex-
hibit lower takeover premium (Fidrmuc et al., 2012a), which could increase
expected net synergies. As a result, acquirer insiders in deals organized as
full-scale auctions might be motivated to increase their net purchases.
Payment consideration. Seyhun (1990) nds that acquirer insiders
in cash deals are more optimistic before the public announcement relatively to
stock deals. Song (2007) and Akbulut et al. (2014) then gures out that in-
sider sales increase in overvalued rms before the public announcement. Deals
paid for in cash could be associated with higher bidder valuation of targets
and higher expected net synergies. The reason for this could be that ac-
scale auctions.
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quiring rms who choose cash payment are sucient in cash reserves or/and
less leveraged and have a higher growth prospect. Also, acquirers in cash deals
usually suer stock undervaluation (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) and thus insid-
ers would expect price increasing after a takeover, further increasing expected
net synergies. Therefore, acquirer insiders in deals paid for in cash might
be motivated to increase their net purchases. Alternatively, bidders prefer
to pay for targets using their overvalued stock because they can benet from
the advantage of target shareholders sharing the overpayment cost (Hansen,
1987; Eckbo et al., 1990). Moreover, stock deals are associated with lower
realized takeover premium (Huang and Walking, 1987; Eckbo and Langohr,
1989; Hayn, 1989), further increasing insiders' expected net synergies. In con-
trast, Jensen (1986) suggest that rms with high free cash ows have higher
agency problems and, therefore, managers in cash deals could enlarge their
rm size through a takeover for the purpose of personal benets instead of
rm's long-term synergies. This argument then suggests that it is the stock
rather than cash deal rms whose insiders might be motivated to increase their
net purchases.
4.2.2 Insider trading in the post-announcement period
Information concerning the acquisition of a rm together with deal character-
istics is released at the public announcement date. Therefore, after the public
announcement, acquirer insiders are relatively free to trade. Insiders' trades
after the public announcement depend on the dispersion between insiders' ex-
pectation of nal net synergies after a takeover and the market perception.
The market reacts immediately after the public announcement of a takeover
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and acquiring rms are associated with small positive or even insignicant
announcement abnormal stock returns (Lorderer and Martin, 1990; Moeller
et al., 2004, 2007; Akbulut and Matsusaka, 2010). This stock performance
reects the market's perception of smaller nal net synergies. Overcondent
acquirer insiders might, however, believe that the market undervalues potential
net synergies (Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Therefore, in contrast
to Boehmer and Netter (1997) who nd no change of insider trading pattern,
we conjecture that acquirer insiders might be motivated to buy or stop sell
immediately after the public announcement. Our hypothesis concerning the
post-announcement period is as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Acquirer insiders increase their purchases and stop
selling after the public announcement. As a result, insider net purchases
are expected to increase after the public announcement.
The dispersion between insiders' view of the future synergies and the
market perception is the main factor that could aect insiders' trading ac-
tivity after the public announcement. Furthermore, insiders might also have
intuition concerning the risks of deal failure, possible improved oers and their
ownership dilution. All of these factors might depend on deal characteristics,
in particular deal initiation, selling mechanism and method of payment. As
in section 4.2.1, for each deal characteristic, we provide arguments for two
alternative hypotheses. Our underlying hypothesis is the following:
Hypothesis 4: Insider net purchases after the deal public announce-
ment dier depending on deal initiation, selling mechanism, payment con-
sideration.
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Initiation. Final acquirer initiation usually represents higher nal
buyers' willingness to acquire. Therefore, acquirer insiders might be condent
in future synergies that could be created after deal completion relatively to
market's perception at the announcement date and then intent to increase
their net purchases. At the same time, however, a greater willingness to buy
in nal buyer initiated deals might also be associated with increased bids
or/and higher risks of deal completion due to more competition (e.g., white
knights) after the public announcement. Therefore, insiders in other parties
initiated deals might be motivated to increase their net purchases.
Selling mechanism. Acquirers in informal sales are quite cautious
in evaluating and paying for targets' value as they require specic asset t
between their rm and the selling company (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2013).
Therefore, informal sales are associated with lower overpayment costs and
higher future synergies. In contrast, the hubris theory argues that winning
bidders in full-scale auctions are more likely to be cursed by their overvaluation
of the target (Roll, 1986; Varaiya and Ferris, 1987). If acquirer insiders in in-
formal sales believe higher nal net synergies relatively to the market's percep-
tion, they might be motivated to increase their net purchases. Alternatively,
after a pre-determined takeover process, full-scale auctions are associated with
relatively certain winning bidder and oered price which are rarely changed
during the public selling process after the public announcement. Therefore,
insiders in the winning rm expect larger odds of deal completion. In con-
trast, rms participating in informal sales might face higher probability of
competition after the deal announcement and thus could involve higher risks
of failure. For the purposes of successfully completing the deal, acquiring rms
might need to increase their bid, which could further reduce the expected net
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synergies. If insiders perceive the dierent risks of failure and levels of oer
improvement, acquirer insiders in rms participating in formal auctions rather
than informal sales might be motivated to increase their net purchases.
Payment consideration. Acquiring rms in stock deals usually suf-
fer negative announcement stock abnormal returns due to market's perception
of stock overvaluation before the announcement (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003;
Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). At the same time, acquirer insiders might expect
negative long-term abnormal returns but takeovers could make these returns
less negative (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Savor and Lu, 2009). Consequently, a
high perceived synergy would be essential and acquirer insiders might be moti-
vated to increase their net purchases. In contrast, cash deals exhibit relatively
high bidder announcement stock prices and thus motivate acquirer insiders
to sell. Furthermore, issuance of new acquirer's shares in stock deals at the
completion date could dilute acquirer insiders' ownership after the takeover
(Faccio and Masulis, 2005), further motivating acquirer insiders to increase
their ownership after the public announcement. Alternatively, cash deals oer
a more certain and xed price and are also less volatile in the odds of deal
completion. Under the circumstances of market perceived positive synergies,
acquirer insiders in deals paid for in cash might be motivated to increase their
net purchases.
4.3 Data
Our main focus is to analyze insider trading in acquiring rms before and
after takeover public announcement depending on deal characteristics, includ-
ing deal initiation, selling mechanism and method of payment. The sample
143
includes US M&A deals that were announced between January 2005 and De-
cember 2011 and are covered by the Security Database Corporation (SDC) in
Thomson ONE Banker. We apply the following 4 selection criteria: (i) both
the acquirers and targets are US companies; (ii) all targets are publicly listed
rms before the deal while acquirers could be publicly listed or private rms;
(iii) the acquirers own 100% of targets' shares after the deal; (iv) acquirers
have data in COMPUSTAT and CRSP concerning accounting and stock price
data. We hand collect and code information concerning the selling process
from the `background of the deal' section of DEFM14A, PREM14A, SC14D9,
or S-4 lings, which we recover from the EGDAR ling collection provided
by the SEC. We hand collect information concerning initiation, private date,
selling mechanism, number of bidders contacted and the number of bidders
signing a condentiality agreement. For our acquiring rms of all M&A deals
over the period 2005-2011, out of 2003 deals identied in SDC we are able to
nd SEC lings on EDGAR for 1260 deals. For further 103 deals, we are not
able to classify the initiator. Finally, we are not able to get data from Com-
pustat or CRSP for 530 acquirers.5 All together, the data collection results in
a sample of 627 deals of acquirers.
4.3.1 Deal and acquirer characteristics
We classify deal initiation into nal acquirer or other parties initiation, includ-
ing target and a third party initiation, depending on nal buyers' willingness
to buy. A deal could be sold in formal full-scale auction or an informal sale.
We classify controlled sales and private negotiations together in one category
5We are not able to get data from CRSP for 410 private acquirers. For further 120
acquirers, we are not able to get data from COMPUSTAT or CRSP.
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as they are associated with higher odds of bidder winning. Acquiring rms
can pay for target rms by cash or by stock, including partial stock and pure
stock payments.
Table 4.1 displays the selling process summary statistics. Column 2
shows the means for all deals and the signicance. Further, we show means
separately for nal acquirer versus other parties initiated deals in Columns 3
and 4, respectively, and report the signicance of the dierence in Column 4.
Columns 5 and 6 display means for deals sold through informal sales versus
formal full-scale auctions. Means for cash versus stock deals are reported in
Columns 7 and 8 while for informal sales paid for in stock versus formal auc-
tions paid for in stock in Columns 9 and 10. Variable denitions are provided
in Appendix 4.6.1. We test for dierences in means using the t-test allowing
for unequal variances.
- insert Table 4.1 about here -
Column 2 shows that the transaction value for public acquiring rms is
on average USD2.2 billion which is 31% of acquirer market capitalization at
the completion date. The nal premium paid to target rms, relatively to the
price 8 weeks before the public announcement, is positive (35%) for the full
sample. The premium is slightly smaller (34%) when we consider the initial
oer instead of the nal oer. This indicates a slight increase (1%) of nal
oer price at the completion date relatively to the initial oer price at the
public announcement. Table 4.1 further shows abnormal stock returns over
dierent windows over 2 year period before the initiation and over dierent
windows from the initiation date up to the public announcement. We see
positive stock returns in the pre-initiation period and the return drops as the
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deal initiation becomes more imminent. Stock returns are positive from the
initiation date up to 1 day before the announcement and the returns increase
when closer to the public announcement. The announcement eect measured
as a 3 days abnormal return around the announcement date is negative (-1%)
and signicant at the 1-percent level. Stock returns over the whole post-
announcement period are negative (-2%). We further see positive short-term
synergies but insignicant one-year future synergies measured as Fama-French
3-factor adjusted monthly calendar-time portfolio abnormal returns (Fama and
French, 1993).
Next, we show strongly large and positive total assets and market capi-
talization in one scal year before the pre- and post-announcement period and
their corresponding control periods. The book to market ratios of equity over
4 dierent periods are on average 0.50, indicating higher growth prospects of
acquiring rms. The mean private, public and whole selling process lengths are
360, 126 and 486 calendar days, respectively. The average number of bidders,
including acquiring rms, contacted by and sign condentiality agreements
with a target rm is 14 and 5, respectively. 50% of deals with public acquir-
ing and target rms are paid for in cash. 25% of deals are sold in full-scale
auctions, 41% in controlled sales and 34% in private negotiations. Moreover,
we classify a deal as target initiated if the target rm rmly decides on a sale
or at least hires a nancial advisor to identify and contact potential bidders.
Finally, column 2 reveals that 43% of deals are initiated by targets and 37%
are initiated by the nal acquiring rms.
Columns 3 and 4 show that nal acquirer initiated deals are larger in
transaction value (USD2.9 billion) relatively to other parties initiated deals.
They also exhibit larger relative size (0.36 versus 0.28), higher premium (41%
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versus 32%) and higher initial premium (39% versus 31%). We also see that
nal acquirer initiated deals are associated with a larger oer improvement
relatively to other parties initiated deals (1.2% versus 0.5%). Acquirer abnor-
mal returns over the 2 year period before the initiation are signicantly larger
in nal acquirer initiated deals. The stock performance during the private
selling process is, however, not dierent for the 2 groups of deals. We also do
not see any dierence in terms of acquirer abnormal returns from 1 day before
the public announcement to the completion and short-term synergies. Final
acquirer initiated deals are associated with larger one-year future synergies
(0.1% versus -0.3%). Moreover, the 2 partitions do not exhibit dierence in
total assets, market capitalization and book to market ratio.
Concerning deal characteristics, nal acquirer initiated deals take on
average fewer days from the initiation date to the public announcement (245
versus 429 days) and to the completion (383 versus 547 days) but stay longer
in the public selling process (139 versus 118 days). They contact and sign a
condentiality agreements with smaller number of bidders (4 versus 20 and 2
versus 7, respectively). The majority of nal acquirer initiated deals are sold
in private negotiations (71% versus 12%), but less frequently sold in full-scale
auctions (5% versus 38%) or controlled sales (24% versus 50%).
Columns 5 and 6 show that deals sold through informal sales are notably
larger (USD2.6 billion) relatively to formal auctions (USD0.9 billion) while
their relative sizes are not dierent. In line with Fidrmuc et al. (2012b) and
Fidrmuc and Moeller (2015), acquiring rms pay higher premium (37% versus
28%) and higher initial premium (36% versus 28%) in deals sold using informal
sales. Aquirer abnormal returns are higher over the 2 year period before
the initiation (20% versus 9%) but smaller from the initiation to 4 months
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before the public announcement (4% versus 9%). They are not dierent over
other windows from initiation to the public announcement for the 2 groups
of deals. We also do not nd a signicant dierence in the announcement
eect and stock performance during the public selling process. Informal sales
are associated with larger total assets and market capitalization, but smaller
growth prospect before the public announcement due to the larger book to
market ratio. In terms of deal characteristics, we see that deals sold through
informal sales take on average a shorter time from the initiation date to the
public announcement (321 versus 475 days) and to the completion (455 versus
576 days) but longer from the public announcement to completion (134 versus
101 days). The average number of bidders contacted (5 versus 41) and signing
a condentiality agreement (2 versus 14) is signicantly lower for informal
sales. Deals sold using informal sales are less often paid for by cash (45%
versus 66%). They are less frequently target initiated (34% versus 70%) and
are more often nal acquirer initiated (48% versus 7%).
Deals could be paid in cash or stock. The rst variable in Columns 7
and 8 shows that cash deals are signicantly smaller (USD1.4 billion) rela-
tively to stock deals (USD3.0 billion). They also exhibit smaller relative size
(17% versus 45%) but pay higher premium (42% versus 27%) and initial pre-
mium (41% versus 26%), consistent with Hazelkorn et al. (2004) and Ling
and Petrova (2008). We do not see any dierence in improving oers for cash
versus stock deals. Acquirer abnormal returns are smaller in cash deals over
the 2-year period before the initiation and during the private selling process.
They are even negative as the public announcement becomes more imminent.
Furthermore, cash deals are associated with higher acquirer stock performance
around the announcement date (0% versus -2%) and during the public sell-
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ing process (-1% versus -4%). They alo exhibit higher short- and long-term
synergies (2% versus 1% and 0% versus -0.2%, respectively). These statistics
suggest that acquirers' stock before the public announcement is undervalued
for cash deals but is overvalued for stock deals. Furthermore, cash deals ex-
hibit larger acquirer total assets and market capitalization and smaller book
to market ratio which implies higher growth prospect. They stay fewer days
in the public selling process (96 versus 155 days) but their private or whole
selling processes are not dierent. The number of bidders contacted (17 versus
11) and signing a condentiality agreement (7 versus 4) is signicantly larger
for cash takeovers. Deals paid for by cash are more often sold in formal auc-
tions (33% versus 17%) but less frequently in private negotiations (26% versus
42%).
We also introduce 2 additional partitions of deals, informal sales paid
for in stock and formal auctions paid for in cash. Stock deals sold in informal
sales are sizeably larger (USD3.2 billion) relatively to cash deals sold in full-
scale auctions (USD0.5 billion). They are also associated with larger relative
size (45% versus 16%) but the premiums are not dierent. Acquirer abnormal
performance before the initiation is not dierent for the 2 groups of deals but
the returns are larger during the 6 months period before the public announce-
ment for informal sales paid for in stock. Stock deals sold in informal sales
suer smaller and even negative announcement eect (-2% versus 0%) and ac-
quirer stock returns during the public selling process (-4% versus 1%), but the
short- and long-term synergies are not dierent. They exhibit smaller market
capitalization before the pre- and post-announcement period and larger book
to market ratio, so smaller growth prospect. In terms of deal characteristics,
stock deals sold in informal sales take fewer days from the initiation date to
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the public announcement (324 versus 489 days) and to the completion (483
versus 570 days) but longer from the announcement to completion (159 versus
81 days). They contact and sign condentiality agreements with signicantly
smaller number of bidders (5 versus 40 and 2 versus 15, respectively). They are
less frequently initiated by targets (39% versus 63%) and more often initiated
by nal acquirers (47% versus 10%).
4.3.2 Summary statistics for insider trading
Insider trading is from Thomson Financial Insider Filings Data, Table 1, which
contains corporate insider non-derivatives transactions required to be reported
via Form 4 by Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. We have in-
formation on the transaction date, transaction price, number of shares traded,
person ID, rm ID, company name, resulting shares held and transaction code
(purchase or sale). We exclude inaccurate or unreasonable lings 6 and trans-
actions labeled as amendments of previous insider transactions 7 (Agrawal and
Nasser, 2012). If a transaction price is missing, we replace it with the CRSP
closing price on the transaction date. We merge multiple purchases (sales)
by the same insider on the same transaction date in the same company. We
are interested in examining insider purchases and sales separately and, there-
fore, we keep both purchases and sales transacted on the same day separately.
We also compute insider net purchases as purchases minus sales by the same
insider on the same transaction date in the same rm (Agrawal and Nasser,
2012).
It is very important in our analysis to compare insider purchases and
6They are indicated by the Cleanse Indicator as "A" or "S".
7They are indicated by the Amendment Indicator as "A".
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sales in the pre- and post-announcement period to a non-event period within
the same rm. Concerning insider trading during the private selling process
before the public announcement, we take the initiation date as the cut-o point
when dening the pre-announcement and the control periods. Bidders start to
enter the selling process and obtain information of a potential takeover together
with deal characteristics at the initiation date. The pre-announcement period
is the time from the deal initiation date to the public announcement date.
Because insider trading depends on the length of the private selling process
and also varies within a year, we dene the control period as a one-year period
before deal initiation in case the pre-announcement period takes one year or
longer. In case the private selling process is shorter than one year, the control
period is matched in length and the time of year, e.g. it is from one year
before the initiation date to one year before the announcement date. In terms
of insider trading during the public selling process, the post-announcement
period is dened from the public announcement date to the completion date.
The corresponding control period is a one-year period before the initiation
date in case the public selling process takes one year or longer. It is the period
of the same length as the public selling process ending at the initiation date
in case the post-announcement period is shorter than one year.
Then we compare the change in insider trading in acquiring rms rel-
atively to change in insider trading in matched rms that do not experience
any takeover and remain publicly listed. The purpose is to adjust the overall
change/dierence in acquirer insider trading for the `normal' outcome, that is
the change/dierence in insider trading in rms that do not experience any in-
formation shock but are similar to the treatment (acquiring) rms and operate
over the same period of time. The change/dierence in insider trading from
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the control period to the event period for the matched rms then measures
the `normal' eect. We use it to adjust the overall aquiring rms' eect to get
a clean treatment eect that is free of any time trends. This is the essence of
the dierence in dierences approach.
We match based on the industry and rms' total assets just before the
initiation date (Shrieves and Stevens, 1979; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). Our
matching procedure is as follows. From the pool of all potential matching
rms with available accounting, stock price and insider trading data, we pick
the rm that is in the same Fama-French 30 industry and comes the closest
in terms of total assets in the same scal year using a +/{25% range. In case
we fail to nd a matching rm, we repeat the process for the corresponding
Fama-French 12 industry. If we still do not have a match, we apply the 4-digit
SIC code industry and then the 3-digit, 2-digit and nally 1-digit SIC code
industry. We also require that the same publicly listed rm is not matched
repeatedly to dierent acquiring rms and that those acquirers dropped out
from our data set due to unavailable SEC ling data are not included as
matched rms.8
We focus on trading by top executives and independent directors. Top
executives manage their rms' day to day operations and thus should possess
the most accurate information in terms of rm value and future prospects
(Seyhun, 1986; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Independent directors should also be
informed about the value and prospects of their rms as they monitor top
executives' work and are quite pivotal in takeover decisions. Combining the 2
types of insiders creates a well informed and relatively well populated group
8All together, 509 acquiring rms are matched based on FF30 industry, 82 based on
FF12, 5 based on 4-digit SIC, 4 based on 2-digit SIC and nally 27 based on 1-digit SIC.
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for our analysis. We use two proxies to measure insider trading: $ shares
traded (dollar value of shares traded in USD millions) and % equity traded
(number of shares traded as a fraction of shares outstanding in base points).
For all the 4 studied periods, we aggregate all shares bought (sold) by the top
executives and independent directors over the whole period and then divide
them by the length of the period in months. We do this re-scaling on a monthly
basis because the length of the pre- and post-announcement periods and their
corresponding control periods varies from deal to deal.
Table 4.2 shows insider purchases and sales for the pre-announcement
period. For acquiring rms, means for the pre-announcement versus the con-
trol period are reported in Columns 1 and 2. For matched rms, Columns
3 and 4 document means for the corresponding two periods. The next three
columns report dierences in means and their signicance and the last column
displays the dierence in dierences. We rst show the results for all deals and
then by the four deal characteristics: nal acquirer initiated versus other par-
ties initiated deals, deals sold through informal sale versus formal auction, cash
versus stock deals and informal sales paid for in stock versus formal auctions
paid for in cash. The two insider trading measures are reported on monthly
basis and are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
- insert Table 4.2 about here -
The signicant dierence reported by Panel A comes from the dollar
shares measure. For all deals, we see that acquirer insiders decrease their
purchases during the pre-announcement period relatively to the control pe-
riod but not to matched rms. Insiders in matched rms do not change their
purchases in the pre-announcement versus the control period. The dierence
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in dierences is also signicantly negative. Reduction of insider purchases in
acquiring rms before the public announcement is in line with legal jeopardy.
Concerning deal characteristics, Panel A documents that acquirer insiders in
only stock deals signicantly reduce their purchases in the pre-announcement
period relatively to the control period. Insider trading in acquiring rms before
the announcement is however not signicantly dierent relatively to matched
rms for all 8 partitions. The last column shows that the dierence in dier-
ences is signicantly negative for deals initiated by the nal acquirer or sold
using informal sales or/and paid for by stock.
Dollar shares measure in Panel B shows that acquirer insiders in all
deals signicantly increase their sales relatively to matched rms but not to
the control period. Insider sales in matched rms do not change in the pre-
announcement versus the control period. The last column documents positive
and signicant dierence in dierences. These statistics become negative and
insignicant when we consider percentage of equity measure that also includes
rm size eect.
In terms of deal characteristics, we see in Panel B that acquirer insiders
increase their sales (signicant only for the dollar shares measure) during the
pre-announcement period relatively to the control period only in cash deals.
Relatively to matched rms, insider sales before the announcement are sig-
nicantly larger in deals sold through informal sales or/and paid for by cash.
Interestingly, insiders in matched rms for deals sold in formal auctions or/and
paid for in cash decrease their sales in the pre-announcement period relatively
to the control period even though they are signicant only for the percentage
of equity measure. This is mainly due to the signicantly smaller market cap-
italization before the control period for matched rms of deals sold in formal
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auctions.9 As a result, the last column shows that the dierence in dierences
is positive and signicant for deals sold in formal auctions or/and paid for by
cash. It is negative and signicant for stock deals or deals sold in informal
sales and at the same time paid for in stock.
Table 4.3 reports insider purchases and sales in acquiring rms during
the post-announcement period. Similarly to Table 4.2, we show means of in-
sider trading for acquiring and matched rms for the post-announcement and
the control period. For comparison reasons, we also report pre-announcement
trading. With respect to dierences in means, we report the dierences for ac-
quiring rms over the post-announcement period relatively to both the control
and pre-announcement period and also to the matched rms. The dierence
in post-announcement period relatively to the control and pre-announcement
periods is repeated also for the matched rms. The last column shows the
dierence in dierences between target versus control rms. We again report
insider trading for all deals and for the 8 partitions by deal characteristics.
Both measures of insider trading are on monthly basis and are winsorized at
1% and 99%.
- insert Table 4.3 about here -
Panel A reports acquirer insider purchases and we see that dierences
in means are not signicant for all deals. During the post-announcement
period, acquirer insiders signicantly increase their purchases in stock deals
while signicantly reduce their purchases in cash deals sold in formal auctions
relatively to the control period. They also signicantly increase their purchases
in other parties initiated or stock deals relatively to matched rms. These
9These statistics are not reported, but are available on request.
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statistics are signicant only for the percentage of equity measure. Insider
purchases in matched rms do not change in the post-announcement period
relatively to the control and pre-announcement periods. The last column shows
that the dierence in dierences is however not signicant for all deals and all
8 partitions.
Panel B displays insider sales and shows that dierences in means an-
alyzed below are signicant mostly for the percentage of equity measure, ex-
cept for additional instructions. For all deals, we see that insiders in acquiring
and matched rms decrease their sales in the post-announcement versus the
control period, so no signicant dierence in dierences. Concerning deal
characteristics, we nd that acquirer insiders signicantly reduce their sales
in 3 partitions, deals sold in informal sales or/and paid for by stock, after
the public announcement relatively to the control period. The dierence is
positive for cash deals sold in formal auctions, though they are signicantly
only for the dollar shares measure. Furthermore, acquirer insiders in cash
deals sold in formal auctions signicantly reduce their sales in the post- ver-
sus pre-announcement period for both two measures. Relatively to matched
rms, insiders stop selling in stock deals with/without being sold in informal
sales during the post-announcement period but do not stop selling in formal
auctions paid for in cash. For matched rms, Panel B shows that insiders sig-
nicantly decrease their sales during the post-announcement period relatively
to the control period in 5 partitions, nal acquirer initiated, formal auctions
or/and paid for in cash and stock deals. These eects are mostly due to a
smaller market capitalization before the control period for matched rms in
other parties initiated or formal auction or cash deals.10 The dierence is how-
10These statistics are not reported, but are available on request.
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ever not signicant relatively to the pre-announcement period all 8 partitions.
Consequently, the dierence in dierences in the last column is positive and
signicant for 3 partitions, deals sold in formal auctions or/and paid for by
cash.
4.4 Results
Tables 4.4 to 4.7 report our results for insider trading patterns in acquiring
rms before and after the M&A public announcement date depending on the
deal initiation, selling mechanism and method of payment. For each table,
insider purchases, sales and net purchases by top executives and independent
directors are measured as a fraction of common equity in base points and all are
re-adjusted on a monthly basis. We believe that scaling the number of shares
traded by all shares outstanding provides the best insider trading measure as
it incorporates both the trading volume as well as rm size. All regressions
include the following control variables: natural log of market capitalization,
book to market ratio, volatility of daily stock returns, change in volatility of
daily stock returns, market-adjusted average daily abnormal returns lagged 1,
2, 3 and 4 quarters relatively to the studied period, insider ownership, R&D
over total sales, liquidity, time and industry dummies.11 Insider purchase
and sale regressions are estimated using a left-censored Tobit model while
net purchase regressions are estimated using OLS. We report Hubert/White
robust standard errors in brackets.
11Coecients for control variables are not reported in the tables to preserve space, but
are available on request. The estimated values are consistent with the literature concerning
insider trading (Seyhun, 1986; Aboody and Lev, 2000; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).
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4.4.1 Results for pre-announcement insider trading
Table 4.4 shows the results for insider trading before the takeover announce-
ment. To test Hypothesis 1, we partition the pre-announcement period
into the 2-month period immediately before the public announcement and the
early pre-announcement period and report the results for these two subperiods
in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. Panel C reports results for the whole
pre-announcement period, starting at the initiation date. We includes three
additional control variables that are not considered in the literature so far: the
abnormal stock return during the pre-announcement period, takeover trans-
action value as a fraction of acquirer market value and the period length.12
Insider purchases are reported in Columns 1 to 4, insider sales in Columns 5
to 8 and insider net purchases in Columns 9 to 12.
Column 1 in Panel A reports the results for insider purchases immedi-
ately before the public announcement. The interaction term `acquirer x pre-
announcement' shows the clean dierence in dierences eect.13 It is negative
and signicant at the 1-percent level showing that acquirer insiders signi-
cantly decrease their purchases during the last 2 months before the public
announcement. In line with Hypothesis 1a, the reduction in purchases is
likely due to strict legal restrictions in the post-SOX environment. At the
same time, the interaction term in Column 5 shows that insider sales also
drop signicantly, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1b. It seems that
12We see that insider purchases increase and sales increase more when the pre-
announcement period is longer. It seems that acquirers do not participate in the takeover
process when it is so far to the public announcement and thus insiders are relatively more
free to trade.
13The interaction term shows the dierence in dierences eect as `acquirer' stands for a
dummy variable for acquirers versus matched rms and 'pre-announcement' is the dummy
variable for pre-announcement versus control period.
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insiders for all takeovers are quite certain in estimating the expected net syn-
ergy when it is only 2-month before the public announcement and stop selling.
Overall, acquirer insiders do not change their net purchases: the interaction
term in Column 9 is positive but not signicantly dierent from zero, which is
inconsistent with Hypothesis 1c. Insiders reduce their purchases and sales
to the same extent and thus overall do not benet from the private information
that they possess immediately before the public announcement.
Columns 2 to 4 explore the eect of deal characteristics on insider pur-
chases immediately before the public announcement. In order to show diering
eects of insider trading depending on individual deal characteristics in the
dierence in dierences approach, we have to include a set of additional in-
teraction terms. Ultimately, we are interested in the triple interaction term
`deal characteristic x acquirer x pre-announcement' and its sum with the plain
interaction term `acquirer x pre-announcement' that is reported at the bottom
of the panel under the heading `total eect by deal characteristic.'
The eect of deal initiation is reported in Column 2. The plain inter-
action term is signicantly negative while the triple interaction term is not
signicant: insider purchases drop in other parties initiated deals and this
drop is not signicantly dierent relatively to nal acquirer initiated deals.
The total eect which represents the overall insider purchases patterns in nal
acquirer initiated deals is signicantly negative, suggesting that insiders also
lower their purchases signicantly in nal acquirer initiated deals. Columns 3
and 4 show similar results for deals sold in informal sales and paid for in stock,
respectively.
Columns 6 to 8 report insider sales depending on the three deal char-
acteristics. The plain interaction terms show that insiders increase their sales
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in formal auctions and do not stop selling in nal acquirer initiated and cash
deals. The triple interaction terms are signicantly negative in Columns 7 and
8: the selling mechanism and payment consideration matter for insider sales.
The overall eect is negative and signicant for all three deal characteristics:
nal acquirer initiated, informal sales and stock deals.
- insert Table 4.4 about here -
Columns 10 to 12 report net purchases and show some interesting re-
sults. First of all, the selling mechanism and payment method do exhibit signif-
icant dierences in net insider purchases: both the triple interaction terms are
signicantly positive in Columns 11 and 12, which supports Hypothesis 2.
The dierence suggests that insiders' estimation of expected net synergies and
other takeover benets dier depending on the deal characteristics. Secondly,
larger net insider purchases in deals sold in informal sales rather than formal
auctions are in line with higher expected net synergies that can be created
by private value deals. Insiders in stock (versus cash) deals increase their net
purchases, which alternatively supports the bidder stock overvaluation hypoth-
esis. The results is contradictory to Seyhun (1990), Song (2007) and Akbulut
et al. (2014). It rather indicates that insiders aim to take advantage of target
insiders sharing the overpayment cost (Hansen, 1987; Eckbo, 2009). No dif-
ference of net insider purchases for initiation indicates that higher willingness
to acquire for nal acquirer initiated deals might even out the lower premium
for other parties initiated deals. Finally, we see in Column 11 that insiders
increase their net sales in deals sold in formal auctions and they increase their
net purchases in deals sold in informal sales: the plain interaction term is sig-
nicantly negative and the total eect is signicantly positive. Insiders seem
160
to be quite condent about future synergies associated with specic assets t
(Gorbenko and Malenko, 2013).
Panel B reports the results for insiders' trades during the early pre-
announcement period, that is from the initiation date up to 2 months before
the public announcement. Column 1 shows that overall acquirer insiders do
not stop buying when it is still far to deal announcement, which supports Hy-
pothesis 1a. Neither the result is aected by deal characteristics (Columns
2 to 4). The result suggests that nal buyers are on average not participating
in the takeover process at this point in time, or are more lenient with rules
when they actively initiate a deal. For insider sales, we see in Column 5 that
overall acquirer insiders do not stop selling but deal characteristics do matter.
The triple interaction terms in Columns 7 and 8 are signicantly negative: in-
siders signicantly decrease their sales in informal sales versus formal auctions
and stock versus cash deals. The total eect is signicantly negative for stock
deals.
Finally, Column 11 shows that insiders in formal auctions increase their
net sales rather than purchases. The triple interaction term is signicantly
positive: insiders increase their net purchases in informal sales relatively to
formal auctions. This might be due to higher odds of winning associated with
informal sales and higher expected net synergies. A similar eect holds for the
payment consideration. Net insider sales increase for cash deals suggesting that
insiders' diversication and liquidity needs prevail at the beginning of takeover
process. Net insider purchases increase for stock versus cash deals, which fur-
ther supports overvaluation of bidders' stock hypothesis. Panel C shows insider
trading over the whole private selling process. The results are similar relatively
to Panel A, but due to the weaker eect in the early pre-announcement period
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(Panel B), the overall eect over the whole pre-announcement period is a bit
weaker. One exception is that insiders in cash deals signicantly increase their
net sales in the whole pre-announcement period due to the stronger eect in
the early stage of private selling process (Panel B).
Table 4.5 further explores the possible reinforcing eects between sell-
ing mechanism and method of payment. In particular, we separately report
insider trading eects depending on the payment consideration in rms sold
in informal sales in Columns 1 to 3 versus in rms sold in formal auctions
in Columns 4 to 6. Target rms determine a particular selling mechanism
shortly after the initiation date. Informal sales are usually associated with
stock deals while formal auctions are more often paid for in cash (Fidrmuc
et al., 2012b).14 Similar to Table 4.4, Panels A, B and C report results for the
period immediately before the public announcement, early pre-announcement
and the whole pre-announcement period, respectively.
- insert Table 4.5 about here -
Panel A reports the results immediately before the public announce-
ment. Insiders in stock deals sold in informal sales stop buying and at the
same time stop selling even more: the total eects are signicantly negative in
Columns 1 and 2. Therefore, the total coecient (Column 3) is signicantly
positive, showing that these insiders increase their net purchases. For formal
auctions, insider purchases drop in stock deals: the total coecient in Column
4 is signicantly negative. The plain interaction term in Column 5 is signi-
cantly positive showing that insiders increase their sales in cash deals. As a
14We see in Table 4.1 that 95% of nal acquirer initiated deals are sold in informal sales
and the reinforcing eect of across the two characteristics does not lead to any interesting
results.
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result, insiders in deals sold in formal auctions increase their net sales rather
than purchases, independent of the payment consideration during the 2-month
before the public announcement. The results suggest that private value deals
reinforce the eect of the overvaluation of bidder hypothesis (Gorbenko and
Malenko, 2013; Hansen, 1987; Eckbo, 2009). Insiders seem to prot from shar-
ing target insiders the overpayment cost only when they are condent about
higher future net synergies. This eect however does not present for stock
deals sold in formal auctions. In cash deals sold in formal auctions involving
a large number of bidders, insiders might expect an increasing stock price due
to information leakage as the public announcement becomes more imminent
and their diversication or/and liquidity needs prevail.
Panel B still shows some interesting results in the period after deal
initiation. The triple interaction term in column 3 is signicantly positive:
insiders increase their net purchases in stock (versus cash) deals sold in infor-
mal sales due to drop in sales. Even in the early pre-announcement period,
insiders seem to believe that private value deals can create higher future syn-
ergies associated with larger odds of winning and at the same time they can
take advantage of target insiders sharing the overpayment cost (Gorbenko and
Malenko, 2013; Hansen, 1987; Eckbo, 2009). For formal auctions, insider sales
increase even more in cash deals when it is so far rather than closer to the
public announcement. The results are in contrast to the acquirer stock un-
dervaluation hypothesis associated with cash payment. It rather supports the
agency cost theory in Jensen (1986). Insiders in rms with high free cash ows
expect lower odds of winning associated with formal auctions at the early stage
of takeover process and thus increase selling to satisfy their personal benets
in rst time. Panel C reports the results for the whole pre-announcement and
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shows similar but a bit weaker results relatively to Panels A and B.
In essence, we wish to highlight four points to summarize our results
for insider trading in acquiring rms before the public announcement. First
of all, in line with Hypothesis 1a insiders decrease their purchases only as
the public announcement becomes more imminent when nal acquirers usually
have participated in the takeover process. At the same time, the imminent
takeover announcement represents increased legal jeopardy and restricts in-
sider purchases. Second, insiders strategically reduce their sales when closer
to the public announcement to prot from higher expected net synergies as
regulation is less restrictive on insider sales. At this point in time, insid-
ers are more precise about the information concerning the potential takeover.
Third, insider net purchases measure the combined eect of drop in insider
purchases and reduction in insider sales during the 2 months before the public
announcement. The combined eect for all rms together is insignicantly
dierent from zero. Insiders are forced by strict regulation to stop buying, but
they adjust their sales accordingly and oset the negative eect of purchases.
Still, net purchases are aected by deal characteristics. They are signicantly
positive for deals sold in informal sales, suggesting that private value deals are
expected to create higher net synergies (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2013). Fi-
nally, insiders are stronger net buyers in stock deals sold in informal sales. The
advantage of target insiders sharing the overpayment cost seems to enhance
the high synergy creation in private value deals.
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4.4.2 Results for post-announcement insider trading
Table 4.6 shows the patterns of insider trading in acquiring after the public
announcement up to the resolution of a deal. The results are reported in a
similar fashion to Table 4.4, but we replace the pre-announcement dummy
with a post-announcement dummy to reect the change of the studied pe-
riod. Again we are interested in the plain interaction term `acquirer x post-
announcement,' the triple interaction term `deal characteristic x acquirer x
post-announcement' and the total eect for a given deal characteristic `acquirer
x post-announcement + deal characteristic x acquirer x post-announcement.'
As before, we include all usual control variables, but do not report their es-
timated coecients because they are in line with the previous ndings in the
literature. We include the relative size and the length of the public selling pro-
cess as an additional control variable.15 Again, results for insider purchases
are reported in Columns 1 to 4, insider sales in Columns 5 to 8 and insider
net purchases in Columns 9 to 12.16
Column 1 shows that insiders in all rms do not stop buying: the dier-
ence in dierences interaction term is positive but not signicant. Insiders also
do not stop selling in the post-announcement period, so no change of their net
purchases. This result does not support Hypothesis 3 but is consistent with
Boehmer and Netter (1997). It seems that on average insiders' expectation of
nal net synergies are the same as market's perception. Nothing is signicant
for insider purchases in Columns 2 to 4.
By exploring the eect of deal characteristics on insider sales and net
15Insiders increase their purchases and sales when the post-announcement period is longer.
16We do not divide the post-announcement period into dierent sub-periods as the public
selling process on average takes only 126 calendar days (see Table 4.1). The division would
not result in dierent conclusions.
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purchases in the post-announcement period, we see large dierence which is in
line with Hypothesis 4. Insiders increase their sales in deals sold in formal
auctions or paid for in cash. The triple interaction terms in Columns 6 to 8
are signicantly negative: insider sales drop in nal acquirer initiated, informal
sales and stock cash deals. Consequently, insiders in formal auction and cash
deals increase their net sales rather than purchases. The plain interaction
terms in Columns 11 and 12 are signicantly negative. Triple interaction
terms are signicantly positive suggesting a markedly dierence to informal
sale and stock deals. Insiders do not change their trading behavior from the
pre- to post-announcement period. Insiders in informal sales seem to believe in
future net synergy improvement associated with lower overpayment cost and
thus increase their net purchases. In contrast, insiders in deals sold in formal
auctions are worried about winner's curse due to a large overpayment cost
(Roll, 1986; Varaiya and Ferris, 1987) and decide to sell immediately after the
announcement. Insiders in stock deals increase their net purchases during the
public selling process, suggesting that takeovers add value to acquiring rms
in the long-term (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Savor and Lu, 2009). In contrast,
stock prices increase after public announcement of cash deals and thus insiders
are willing to sell.
- insert Table 4.6 about here -
We further explore possible reinforcing eects across deal character-
istics. Table 4.6 shows that the largest dierence in insider sales and net
purchases is for informal versus formal sales. Formal auctions are usually as-
sociated with cash payment (Fidrmuc et al., 2012b) and thus we examine the
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reinforce eect of payment consideration on selling mechanism.17 We see in
Table 4.7 that the dierence depending on the selling mechanism comes from
deals paid for in cash rather than in stock. Nothing is signicant in Columns 1
to 3. For cash deals, insiders in formal auctions do not stop buying and at the
same time sizeably increase their sales, so large drop in net insider purchases.
The triple interaction term in Column 5 is large and signicantly negative:
insiders stop selling more in deals sold in informal sales and paid for by cash.
Net insider purchases thus increase. Therefore, cash payment reinforces the ef-
fect of both formal auctions and informal sales during the post-announcement
period. This suggests larger expected future synergies when private deals also
exhibit positive announcement stock returns (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2013;
Bargeron et al., 2008; Savor and Lu, 2009).
- insert Table 4.7 about here -
Insiders increase net purchases in rms that exhibit higher potential
future net synergies relatively to market's perception and lower overpayment
cost. They seem to be quite condent in value creation after the completion
of a deal.
4.5 Conclusions
Our main focus in the chapter is to analyze insider trading in acquiring rms
before and after the takeover public announcement depending on deal charac-
teristics. In particular, we consider the deal initiation, selling mechanism and
method of payment. By studying a sample of 627 publicly listed US acquiring
17The reinforcing eect across the payment method deal initiation does not lead to any
interesting results.
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rms, we examine insider trading patterns using the dierence in dierences
approach that controls for insider trading in the same rm during a control
period and at the same time for change in insider trading in matched rms.
Consistent with Boehmer and Netter (1997), we conrm that acquirer insiders
do not change their net purchases pattern before the public announcement.
Insider purchases drop only as the deal public announcement becomes more
imminent, which is in line with legal jeopardy. Acquiring rms on average
participate in the takeover process closer to the public announcement and are
regulated in that point of time. At the same time, we nd that insiders de-
crease their sales to prot on the private information of a potential takeover.
Insider purchases and sales patterns are on average unchanged during the early
stage of private selling process and after the public announcement. Their di-
versication and liquidity needs prevail.
We further explore the eect of deal characteristics. We nd that ac-
quirer insiders are stronger net buyers, both before and after the public an-
nouncement, in deals sold in informal sales rather than formal auctions and
in deals paid for by stock rather than by cash. It seems that insiders are
quite certain about higher expected net synergies and the probability to win
associated with private value deals (Gorbenko and Malenko, 2013). Insiders in
stock deals can also benet from sharing target insiders the overpayment cost
and less reduction in future stock prices after completion of a deal. Despite
higher willingness to buy, net insider purchases are not dierent between nal
acquirer versus other parties initiated deals during pre- and post- announce-
ment periods. We interpret the nding as a result of the osetting eect by
lower takeover premium in other parties initiated deals.
Selling mechanism and payment consideration reinforce each other. We
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nd that insiders are stronger net buyers before the public announcement in
stock deals sold in informal sales and stronger net sellers in cash deals sold
in formal auctions. The eect on changes after the public announcement and
comes from only cash deals. Insiders are still stronger net buyers in deals
sold through informal sales but only for cash deals. These results suggest
that insiders are more optimistic in rms that exhibit higher future synergies
relatively to market's perception and at the same time that are associated with
lower overpayment cost.
In summary, our analysis shows that insiders take into account their
private information and their trading activities dier across takeovers with
dierent deal characteristics.
Future versions of the chapter could improve the analysis in several
aspects. First, to control for diering patterns of insider trading during a cal-
endar year, one could rematch the 2 control periods exactly in the same months
with the pre- and post-announcement period. Second, one could check trades
by other groups of insiders, e.g., CEO or CFO or all insiders but excluding
blockholders. Third, one can gure out whether the Global Financial Crisis
from 2007 to 2009 aect insiders' trades, especially in the control periods.
Fourth, one could check insider trading by rm and industry characteristics,
e.g., cash levels leverage ratio, CEO remuneration, industry uidity, industry
concentration and etc. Finally, it might be valuable to analyze the long-term
stock and operating abnormal performance of acquiring rms relatively to
matched rms that do not have a takeover.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Variable denitions
Variable Denition Source
 The volatility of daily stock returns over the
period from 250 to 126 trading days before
the beginning of the pre-announcement, post-
announcement and control period, respectively.
Based on Agrawal and Nasser (2012).
CRSP, OC
 The change in volatility of daily stock returns
over the period from 125 to 1 trading day ver-
sus the period from 250 to 126 trading days be-
fore the beginning of the pre-announcement, post-
announcement and control period, respectively.
Based on Agrawal and Nasser (2012).
CRSP, OC
% equity The total fraction of shares outstanding in base
points bought or sold by corporate insiders dur-
ing the pre-announcement, post-announcement or
control period and is scaled as monthly basis
depending on the length in months of the pre-
announcement, post-announcement and control
period, respectively.
TIF, OC
$ shares Total value of shares (transaction price or stock
price that trading day if transaction price is un-
available times total number of shares) in USD
millions bought or sold by corporate insiders dur-
ing the pre-announcement, post-announcement or
control period and is scaled as monthly basis
depending on the length in months of the pre-
announcement, post-announcement and control
period, respectively.
TIF, OC
Acquirer Dummy variable equal to 1 for the acquiring rm
and 0 otherwise.
OC
Auction Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the company
is sold in a highly organized auction with pre-set
rules and 0 otherwise. Based on Hansen (2001).
HC
Bidders contacted Total number of bidders that the target rm con-
tracts during the selling process.
HC
Bidder initiated deal Deal for which, at the beginning of the private
selling process, a potential buyer approaches the
target rm and proposes an M&A transaction.
The deal includes both nal acquirer initiated and
third party initiated M&As.
HC
Bidders with cond.
agreement
Total number of bidders that the target rm signs
condentiality agreement with during the private
selling process.
HC
continued on next page
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Variable Denition Source
Book to market Book value of equity over market capitalization
1 scal year before the beginning of the pre-
announcement, post-announcement and control
period, respectively.
COMPUSTAT
CAR 1;+1 The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
from 1 day before to 1 day after the public an-
nouncement.
CRSP, OC
CAR1yb:init:;init The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
over the 1-year period before the initiation.
CRSP, OC
CAR2yb:init:;init The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
over the 2-year period before the initiation.
CRSP, OC
CAR2mb:ann:;1db:ann: The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
from 2 month before to 1 day before the public
announcement.
CRSP, OC
CAR4mb:ann:;1db:ann: The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
from 4 months before to 1 day before the public
announcement.
CRSP, OC
CAR6mb:ann:;1db:ann: The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
from 6 months before to 1 day before the public
announcement.
CRSP, OC
CARann:;comp: The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
from the public announcement date to the com-
pletion.
CRSP, OC
CARinit:;6mb:ann: The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
over period from the initiation date to 6 months
before the public announcement.
CRSP, OC
CARinit:;4mb:ann: The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
over period from the initiation date to 4 months
before the public announcement.
CRSP, OC
CARinit:;2mb:ann: The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
over period from the initiation date to 2 months
before the public announcement.
CRSP, OC
CARinit:;1db:ann: The cumulative acquirer abnormal stock returns
over period from the initiation date to 1 day before
the public announcement.
CRSP, OC
Control period Concerning the pre-announcement period, it is the
1-year period before the initiation in case the pri-
vate selling process takes one year or longer It is
from 1 year before the initiation to 1 year before
the announcement in case the length is less than
one year. Concerning the post-announcement pe-
riod, it is the 1-year period before the initiation
in case the public selling process takes one year or
longer. It is the period of the same length as the
public selling process ending at the initiation date
in case the length is shorter than one year.
OC
continued on next page
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Variable Denition Source
Cash oer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the acquirer
oers pure cash as the payment consideration and
0 otherwise.
SDC
Controlled sale Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the target com-
pany decides to discreetly canvass a limited num-
ber of bidders that target management believes to
have a serious interest in acquiring the company
and 0 otherwise. Based on Boone and Mulherin
(2009).
HC
Early pre-
announcement period
The period from the initiation date to 2
months before the announcement in case the pre-
announcement period takes 2 months or longer. It
is from the initiation date to the public announce-
ment in case the length is shorter than 2 months.
OC
Immediately before
announcement
The 2-month period before public announcements
in case the private selling process stays six months
or longer and the initiation date to the public an-
nouncement in case the length is shorter than 2
months.
OC
Informal sale Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the deal is sold
in controlled sales or private negotiations and 0
otherwise. Based on Boone and Mulherin (2009).
HC
Initial premium The initial oer price at the announcement date
relative to the stock price 8 weeks before the an-
nouncement in percentage points.
SDC
Initiation date The date on which the target starts to consider
a potential sale of the rm. Based on Boone and
Mulherin (2007).
HC
Insider ownership The total fraction of shares outstanding owned by
the board members and top ocers (CB, CEO,
CO, GC, P; AC, AF, CC, CFO, CI, CT, D, DO,
EC, FC, GP, H, M, MC, MD, O, OB, OD, OP, OS,
OT, OX, S, SC, TR, VC) just before the beginning
of the pre-announcement, post-announcement and
control period, respectively.
TIF, OC
Length of private sell-
ing process
Length in days from the initiation date to the SDC
announcement date.
HC
Length of public sell-
ing process
Length in days from the SDC announcement date
to the resolution date.
HC
Length of whole sell-
ing process
The length in calender days from the initiation
date to the resolution date.
HC
Liquidity Daily average fraction of shares outstanding that
is traded over the one calender year before
the beginning of the pre-announcement, post-
announcement and control period.
COMPUSTAT
continued on next page
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Variable Denition Source
Long-term synergies Fama-French 3-factor adjusted calendar-time
portfolio monthly abnormal returns. The realized
returns are 1-year monthly returns after the com-
pletion date. Based on Fama and French (1993).
CRSP, Ken-
neth R.
French - Data
Library, OC
Market capitalization Stock price times shares outstanding 1 scal year
before the beginning of the pre-announcement,
post-announcement and control period, respec-
tively; in the analysis used as a natural log.
CRSP
Net purchase Purchase minus sale by the same insider in the
same transaction date in the same company.
Based on Agrawal and Nasser (2012).
TIF, OC
Oer improvement The nal oer price at the completion date relative
to the initial oer price at the initiation date in
percentage points. SDC
Pre-announcement Dummy variable equal to 1 in case insider trading
is from the initiation date to the public announce-
ment and 0 otherwise.
TIF, OC
Premium The nal oer price relative to the stock price 8
weeks before the SDC announcement date in per-
centage points.
SDC
PRETt Market adjusted average daily abnormal returns
t quarter before the pre-announcement, the post-
announcement or the control period and t equals
1, 2, 3 and 4. Based on Agrawal and Nasser
(2012).
CRSP, OC
Post-announcement Dummy variable equal to 1 in case insider trad-
ing is from the SDC announcement date to the
resolution and 0 otherwise.
TIF, OC
Private negotiation Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the target rm
negotiates with only one bidder during the selling
process. Based on Boone and Mulherin (2009).
HC
Pri. pro. length Natural log of the private selling process length. HC
Pub. pro. length Natural log of the public selling process length. HC
R&D Research and development expenses divided by to-
tal sales.
COMPUSTAT
Relative size Transaction value as a fraction of acquirer market
capitalization shortly before the completion.
SDC, CRSP,
OC
Selling process length The length in days from the initiation date to the
resolution date.
HC
Short-term synergies Weighted average of acquirer and target abnormal
stock returns 3 days around the public announce-
ment.
CRSP, OC
Stock oer Dummy variable equal to 1 in case the acquirer
oers fully or partially merged rm's shares as the
payment consideration and 0 otherwise.
SDC
continued on next page
173
continued from previous page
Variable Denition Source
Target initiated deal The board of the target rm decides to sell
the company and consequently contacts potential
buyers.
HC
Third party initiated Bidder initiated deal that ends up with a buyer
that is not the primary initiator of the deal.
HC
Top executives and
independent directors
Corporate insider group that includes the board
members and top ocers (CB, CEO, CO, GC, P;
AC, AF, CC, CFO, CI, CT, D, DO, EC, FC, GP,
H, M, MC, MD, O, OB, OD, OP, OS, OT, OX, S,
SC, TR, VC, AV).
TIF, OC
Total assets Book value of total assets in USD millions; in the
analysis used as a natural log.
COMPUSTAT
Total sales Total amount collected for providing goods and
services in USD millions.
COMPUSTAT
Transaction value Total value paid by the acquirer less fees and ex-
penses in USD millions.
SDC
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Table 4.5: Insider trading in acquiring rms before the public announcement:
interaction eect of selling mechanism on method of payment
This table reports estimation results of insider purchases, sales and net purchases before the public
announcement in acquiring rms participating in informal sales (Columns 1 to 3) and formal auctions
(Columns 4 to 6). Panels A, B and C report results of insider trading immediately before the public
announcement (two-month period before the public announcement in case the private selling process
stays two months or longer and from the initiation date to the public announcement in case the length
is shorter than two months), in the early pre-announcement period (initiation date to two months before
the announcement in case the pre-announcement period takes two months or longer and zero in case the
private selling process length is shorter than two months) and during the whole pre-announcement period
(the initiation date to the public announcement), respectively. The dependent variables are purchases,
sales and net purchases (i.e, purchases minus sales) by top executives and independent directors measured
as percentage of equity in base points. Regression of purchases and sales uses the left-censored Tobit model
and regression of net purchases uses the OLS model. The data covers 627 acquiring and 627 matched
rms over the pre-announcement and the control period. We report Hubert/White robust standard errors
in brackets. All variables are dened in Appendix 4.6.1 and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles,
except for all dummy variables. Both year and industry dummies are included in the regressions but are
not reported. a, b and c indicate signicance at the one-, ve- and ten-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Informal sales Formal auctions
Insider Insider Net Insider Insider Net
purchases sales purchases purchases sales purchases
Panel A: Immediately
before announcement
Constant -1.566 -3.085 -4.136a 0.890 13.49b -8.611b
(1.065) (2.608) (1.565) (3.232) (5.285) (3.544)
Pre-announcement -1.006a -2.955a 0.801 -1.120c -6.244a 3.194a
(0.322) (1.008) (0.685) (0.666) (1.304) (0.951)
Acquirer 0.268 -0.963 0.848 -0.615 -2.207c 1.324
(0.265) (0.786) (0.614) (0.589) (1.179) (0.978)
Acquirer x pre-ann. -0.773 -0.522 -0.021 -1.280 3.069c -2.326c
(0.499) (1.267) (0.863) (1.035) (1.647) (1.231)
Stock 0.309 -0.657 0.515 -0.853 -2.677c 1.670
(0.256) (0.978) (0.715) (0.723) (1.587) (1.291)
Stock x pre-ann. -0.614 0.408 -0.297 0.919 -0.161 0.311
(0.468) (1.325) (0.882) (1.129) (2.145) (1.517)
Stock x acquirer -0.229 2.835b -1.868b 2.847a 0.406 1.150
(0.387) (1.143) (0.892) (0.982) (1.870) (1.530)
Stock x acquirer x pre. -0.044 -4.573b 2.029c -2.577 -0.843 -1.528
(0.677) (1.831) (1.191) (1.717) (3.177) (2.040)
CARinit:;1mb:ann: -0.444
c 0.550 -0.470 0.705 -1.556 1.441c
(0.251) (0.810) (0.543) (0.632) (1.087) (0.859)
Relative size -0.207 0.018 -0.166 -1.477c -1.714 0.248
(0.218) (0.673) (0.427) (0.815) (1.421) (0.873)
Pri. pro. length 0.355a 0.963a -0.146 -0.132 -0.434 0.356
(0.110) (0.290) (0.174) (0.410) (0.583) (0.378)
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Total eect by stock -0.817c -5.095a 2.008b -3.857a 2.226 -3.854b
# observations 1,598 1,598 1,598 510 510 510
F 2.325a 4.290a 3.835a 1.310c 3.050a 2.648a
(Pseudo) R2 8.23% 3.60% 10.10% 9.52% 6.76% 27.80%
continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Informal sales Formal auctions
Insider Insider Net Insider Insider Net
purchases sales purchases purchases sales purchases
Panel B: Early pre-
announcement period
Constant -4.551a -9.475a -2.849 -2.878 13.69a -14.62a
(0.932) (2.654) (1.783) (1.859) (5.289) (4.502)
Pre-announcement -0.090 -1.971b 0.919 0.300 -2.813a 2.393b
(0.213) (0.903) (0.692) (0.400) (1.055) (0.944)
Acquirer 0.295 -0.779 0.892 -0.193 -1.903 1.279
(0.246) (0.806) (0.639) (0.470) (1.165) (1.026)
Acquirer x pre-ann. -0.277 0.944 -0.784 0.182 4.060a -3.316b
(0.329) (1.187) (0.910) (0.601) (1.528) (1.360)
Stock 0.268 -1.138 0.693 -0.526 -1.734 1.256
(0.236) (1.025) (0.778) (0.568) (1.553) (1.348)
Stock x pre-ann. -0.340 1.207 -0.880 0.378 0.268 -0.997
(0.324) (1.284) (0.956) (0.713) (1.979) (1.700)
Stock x acquirer -0.198 2.761b -1.957b 2.134a 0.465 0.698
(0.364) (1.206) (0.948) (0.794) (1.865) (1.619)
Stock x acquirer x pre. 0.441 -3.731b 2.325c -1.073 -2.982 2.912
(0.487) (1.762) (1.316) (1.093) (2.690) (2.240)
CARinit:;2mb:ann: -0.395
c -0.665 0.414 0.022 -0.417 0.600
(0.212) (0.808) (0.688) (0.373) (1.115) (1.020)
Relative size 0.159 -0.023 -0.321 -0.526 -0.333 -0.458
(0.168) (0.689) (0.519) (0.375) (1.220) (0.885)
Pri. pro. length 0.727a 2.539a -0.590a 0.603a 0.272 0.399
(0.094) (0.322) (0.205) (0.220) (0.584) (0.496)
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Total eect by stock 0.164 -2.787b 1.541 -0.891 1.078 -0.404
# observations 1,598 1,598 1,598 510 510 510
F 2.943a 4.672a 4.393a 1.357c 4.777a 15.88a
(Pseudo) R2 7.94% 4.12% 14.00% 7.63% 4.98% 25.70%
continued on next page
186
continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Informal sales Formal auctions
Insider Insider Net Insider Insider Net
purchases sales purchases purchases sales purchases
Panel C: Whole pre-
announcement period
Constant -3.622a -6.001b -2.920c -1.147 14.37a -13.89a
(0.965) (2.399) (1.743) (2.075) (5.081) (4.404)
Pre-announcement 0.310 -0.826 0.806 0.688 -2.793a 2.622a
(0.226) (0.840) (0.697) (0.448) (1.021) (0.941)
Acquirer 0.313 -0.859 0.915 -0.387 -1.896c 1.235
(0.265) (0.779) (0.638) (0.499) (1.142) (1.013)
Acquirer x pre-ann. -0.456 0.082 -0.438 -0.167 4.006a -3.408b
(0.356) (1.074) (0.883) (0.636) (1.463) (1.344)
Stock 0.349 -0.972 0.675 -0.729 -1.916 1.295
(0.248) (0.990) (0.781) (0.600) (1.505) (1.324)
Stock x pre-ann. -0.441 1.009 -0.818 0.544 0.964 -0.919
(0.344) (1.157) (0.927) (0.746) (1.771) (1.572)
Stock x acquirer -0.191 2.767b -1.971b 2.369a 0.424 0.816
(0.394) (1.167) (0.952) (0.844) (1.815) (1.600)
Stock x acquirer x pre. 0.335 -2.927c 1.987 -1.225 -3.529 2.467
(0.510) (1.584) (1.275) (1.116) (2.439) (2.072)
CARinit:;1mb:ann: -0.387
c -0.551 0.187 0.082 -0.980 1.059
(0.220) (0.734) (0.632) (0.388) (1.037) (0.971)
Relative size -0.017 0.151 -0.447 -0.443 -0.518 -0.229
(0.171) (0.635) (0.514) (0.401) (1.163) (0.868)
Pri. pro. length 0.636a 1.799a -0.513b 0.254 0.040 0.361
(0.102) (0.285) (0.200) (0.279) (0.545) (0.492)
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Total eect by stock -0.121 -2.845b 1.549c -1.392 0.477 -0.941
# observations 1,598 1,598 1,598 510 510 510
F 2.544a 4.432a 4.531a 1.339c 4.002a 10.10a
(Pseudo) R2 6.65% 3.66% 14.00% 6.68% 5.18% 26.60%
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Table 4.7: Insider trading in acquiring rms after the public announcement:
reinforcing eect of payment consideration on selling mechanism
This table reports estimation results of insider purchases, sales and net purchases after the public an-
nouncement in acquiring rms paying for stock (Columns 1 to 3) cash (Columns 4 to 6). The dependent
variables are purchases, sales and net purchases (i.e, purchases minus sales) by top executives and in-
dependent directors measured as percentage of equity in base points. Regression of purchases and sales
uses the left-censored Tobit model and regression of net purchases uses the OLS model. The data covers
627 acquiring and 627 matched rms over the post-announcement and the control period. We report
Hubert/White robust standard errors in brackets. All variables are dened in Appendix 4.6.1 and are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles, except for all dummy variables. Both year and industry dum-
mies are included in the regressions but are not reported. a, b and c indicate signicance at the one-,
ve- and ten-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stock deals Cash deals
Insider Insider Net Insider Insider Net
purchases sales purchases purchases sales purchases
Constant -7.701a -4.948 -5.712c -11.05a -2.396 -11.19a
(1.824) (4.724) (3.442) (1.928) (4.072) (2.901)
Post-announcement -0.777 -2.186 1.486 0.524 -4.097b 3.406b
(0.769) (2.080) (1.537) (0.529) (1.923) (1.423)
Acquirer 1.560c -4.107 2.957 -0.172 -3.229 2.404
(0.805) (2.589) (1.947) (0.628) (2.068) (1.552)
Acquirer x post-ann. 1.032 1.312 -0.783 -0.917 6.101b -4.910a
(1.106) (3.075) (2.199) (0.846) (2.494) (1.797)
Informal sale 0.732 -2.362 1.533 -0.075 -4.619b 3.169b
(0.561) (1.896) (1.478) (0.430) (1.873) (1.415)
Informal x post-ann. 0.502 1.817 -1.120 -0.695 4.464b -3.682b
(0.809) (2.296) (1.693) (0.604) (2.106) (1.499)
Informal x acquirer -1.530c 4.250 -2.719 0.750 4.911b -2.968c
(0.854) (2.777) (2.096) (0.725) (2.289) (1.671)
Informal x acquirer x post. -0.501 -2.693 1.779 1.091 -6.210b 4.549b
(1.189) (3.312) (2.370) (0.981) (2.870) (2.030)
Relative size 0.443c 0.777 -0.434 -0.930b -1.454 0.486
(0.257) (0.694) (0.506) (0.398) (1.371) (0.920)
Pub. pro. length 1.050a 1.231 0.423 1.796a 2.865a -0.343
(0.255) (0.793) (0.580) (0.333) (0.585) (0.371)
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES
Total eect by informal 0.531 -1.381 0.996 0.174 -0.109 -0.361
# observations 1,061 1,061 1,061 1,061 1,061 1,061
F 2.138a 2.323a 2.751a 1.330c 1.965a 2.029a
(Pseudo) R2 7.03% 2.54% 11.30% 14.60% 2.23% 10.50%
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
The thesis presents discussions concerning M&A deal initiation, managers'
motivation in actively participation and insiders' trades in target and acquiring
rms in three separate chapters.
The main aim of Chapter 2 is to explore explore empirically the reasons
for why a board of directors might decide to sell its rm and how the board
incentivizes its managers for the sale. Overall, our analysis shows that even
though target versus bidder initiated deal rms are quite alike and together
much more dierent from non-deal rms, they still dier in two important
respects in terms of the CEO motivation and rm specic circumstances. The
rst dierence indicates that CEOs in target versus bidder initiated deals are
more motivated for active participation in takeover negotiations. Second, it
suggests that the rm intends to avoid possible future nancial distress that
would largely destroy rm value associated with valuable growth options.
The main focus of Chapter 3 is to analyze target insiders' trades before
and after the takeover public announcement depending on deal characteristics.
In particular, we consider the deal initiation, selling mechanism, payment con-
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sideration and buyer type. First, we shows that target insiders in all deals
stop selling during 6 months immediately before the public announcement
but do not stop selling in the early pre-announcement period. Second, deal
characteristics do matter for insiders' trading activities during the pre- and
post-announcement periods. Third, we nd that insiders are willing to change
their trading patterns turning from before to after the public announcement.
Chapter 4 also mainly explores the eect of deal characteristics on insid-
ers' trade, but for acquiring rms. This chapter shows that, overall, acquirer
insiders reduce their purchases and sales to the same extent during the 2-
months immediately before the public announcement. Furthermore, insider
trading diers depending on the selling mechanism and payment method be-
fore and after the public announcement. The two factors reinforce each other.
Future research could improve the analysis in several aspects. For both
Chapters 3 and 4, to control for diering patterns of insider trading during a
calendar year, one could rst rematch the 2 control periods exactly in the same
months with the pre- and post-announcement period. Second, one could check
trades by other groups of insiders. One additional analysis might be valuable
for Chapter 3 is to gure out when do insiders in stock deals sell after the
public announcement. Do they sell immediately at the public announcement
date or later after the announcement?
For Chapter 4, we present three additional points. First, one can gure
out whether the Global Financial Crisis aect insiders' trades, especially in the
control periods. Second, one can check insider trading by rm and industry
characteristics. Finally, it might be valuable to analyze long-term stock and
operating abnormal performance of acquiring rms relatively to matched rms
that do not have a takeover.
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